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CIVILIZATIONS AND WORLD
SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION
Stephen K. Sanderson
At the annual meetings of the ISCSC held in Scranton, Pennsylvania in June
1993, the idea arose of devoting a special issue of this journal to a dialogue
between civilizationists and world-system theorists. I am not sure who
originated the idea, but it was suggested to me by the editor of this journal,
Wayne Bledsoe, and I passed it along to Christopher Chase-Dunn and
Thomas Hall. We were all enthusiastic about having such an issue. After
considerable discussion, it was decided that I would serve as a guest editor
for this special issue. I asked for contributions from Matthew Melko, Roger
Wescott, Andre Gunder Frank, Thomas Hall, Christopher Chase-Dunn,
Albert Bergesen, Immanuel Wallerstein, and David Wilkinson, and I had
an idea for an article that I myself would write. I am pleased to be able to
say that all of the nine invited contributors have submitted articles.
The basic idea behind this special issue was to publish some "think
pieces" in which both civilizationists and world-system theorists would
criticize each other's paradigms but at the same time try to see what might
be of value in each other's views. The article that set this whole process of
debate in motion was Matthew Melko's "World Systems Theory: A Faustian
Delusion?" which was originally published in the Spring/Summer 1992 issue
of the ISCSC Newsletter. That article is reprinted here as the first article.
Melko is concerned that the TSCSC may be in the throes of invasion by the
"virus" of world-systems theory, and that a great deal will be lost as a result.
He worries that world-systems theory is too matcrialist in theoretical
orientation, and that it insufficiently appreciates values and inner experience.
It has, he says, no place for culture. He also suggests that world-systems
theory is insufficiently comparative, being too focused on the modern West.
In a second article, prepared especially for this issue, Melko repeats his point
that world-systems theory does not take culture seriously, as well as his
point that is seems insufficiently comparative. He doesn't like its
evolutionary view of world history, noting that civilizationists are more
concerned with decline and fall than with linear or cumulative patterns.
Melko is not convinced that we live today in a world so different from the
past that it needs its own name or category. In the end, though, Melko agrees
that there are important points of convergence beween world-systems theory
and civilizational analysis, and he closes by contemplating the possibility
that the dialogue between the two camps might result in civilizational
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analysis's acting as a virus of its own in invading the host of world~systems
theory!
Andre Gunder Frank replies to each of Melko's articles but
concentrates mostly on the first. His view is that Melko is laboring under
some serious misconceptions. Melko attacks modernization theory but
somehow ends up assuming that this perspective is endorsed by world~
systems theorists. As Frank notes, exactly the opposite is the case, as he,
Wallerstein, and other world-systems theorists have been vehement
opponents of modernization theory. Melko's criticism that world-systems
analysis is insufficiently comparative is also misdirected, says Frank, for
world-systems theorists usually insist on the importance of comparison. This
has been especially true of Chase-Dunn and Hall's world-systems approach.
Moreover, Melko emphasizes the cyclical view of the civilizationists in
opposition to the allegedly evolutionary view of the world-systems theorists,
yet fails to recognize that world-systems theorists give special emphasis to
cycles of their own. Frank, it seems, sees much more commonality between
world-systems and civilizational analysis than does Melko.
Thomas Hall's paper was originally written at least partially in
response to Melko's original article. Like Frank, Hall sees many
misrepresentations of world-systems theory in Melko's article, and also like
Frank he seems more concerned to emphasize the similarities rather than
the differences between civilizationists and world-systems theorists. Hall
is especially interested in determining what the two camps can learn from
each other. To this end, he notes that the world-systems perspective itself
is quite broad and contains many different camps of its own. First there is
the distinction hetween those who would apply world-systems analysis only
to the modern (post-I 500) world and those, like himself, who are trying to
reformulate it so it can be fruitfully applied to precapitalist systems over
thousands of years of world history. As Hall notes, this latter camp - what
is sometimes called precapitalist world-systems theory - contains several
subcamps of its own, one of which is associated with his own work with
Chase-Dunn (the "transformationist" camp), and another of which is
associated with Frank's work (the "continuationist" camp). Hall then goes
on to note several important areas of overlap between civilizationists and
world-systems theorists, particularly parallels in the bounding of
civilizations and world-systems, as well as an emphasis on units of analysis
larger than individual societies or states. He also tries to allay Melko's fears.
The evolutionism of world-systems theory is not of the teleological sort, as
Melko seems to imagine; world-systems theorists are not modernization
theorists at all, but strongly opposed to modernization theory; while worldsystems theorists emphasize processes of interaction between societies they
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still take into account the internal characteristics of civilizations; and worldsystems analysis is not the hypermaterialist perspective that totally ignores
culture that Melko thinks it is. In the end, Hall insists that civilizational
analysis and world-systems theory are complementary rather than competing
perspectives, and that both contribute in important ways to the study of world
history.
Roger Wescott's paper is a critical reaction to the precapitalist
world-systems analysis of Frank on the one hand and Chase-Dunn and Hall
on the other. Wescott is concerned that students of the human situation
avoid four types of parochialism, which he calls disciplinary, regional,
temporal, and ideological. He admires the work of Frank, Chase-Dunn, and
Hall for ha'/ing avoided the first three of these forms of parochialism, but
feels that they have failed to avoid the fourth. For Wescott, their ideological
parochialism is closely linked to their political and economic reductionism
and their neglect of the artistic and symbolic aspects of civilization. He
feels that they speak too abstractly and miss the "sensuous texture" of actual
cultures. These criticisms, of course, closely parallel those of Melko.
David Wilkinson, although usually known as a civilizationist, feels
at home in both the civilizationist and world-systems camps. He sees the
two camps as doing very similar things and as having complementary
emphases. Civilizationists are more interested in the cultural aspects of
society, world-systemists in the political and, especially, the economic
aspects; civilizationists may be more inclined to explore the earlier epochs
of social evolution, world-systemists the later epochs. Wilkinson lays out
his own unique perspective in a crisp I O-point summary, and then proceeds
to make clear how he stands with respect to Toynbee, Quigley, Spengler,
Melko, Hord, Sorokin, Huntington, Chase-Dunn and Hall, and Frank and
Gills. He concludes by saying that the entities studied by civilizationists
and world-systemists are largely the same, and that their theories should be
synthesized,
Immanuel Wallerstein, the originator of world-systems theory,
raises serious questions about both the world-system analyses of Frank and
Chase-Dunn and Hall and the analyses of the civilizationists. Wallerstein
is concerned with three temptations, what he calls the nomothetic temptation,
the idiographic temptation, and the temptation to reify. To the extent that
students of human society and history fall victim to any of these temptations,
he believes, their analyses run aground. Chase-Dunn and Hall, he feels, fall
victim to the nomothetic temptation, wanting to generalize historically the
world-system concept as far as they can. Wallerstein is skeptical of such
an attempt, wondering just how much a concept developed for one particular
historical situation can be reworked in order to be applied to other situations.
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Concepts come in packages, he says, and thus his concept of "core/periphcry"
was closely linked to, among others, the notion of "endless accumulation
of capital." Thus, does not a certain sort of incoherence and conceptual
violence occur when wc attempt to use the concept of "core/periphery" in
situations where there is no "endless accumulation of capital?" Andre Gunder
Frank's form of precapitalist world-systems analysis, Wallerstein argues,
falls victim to the opposite, or idiographic, temptation, For Frank, there is
but one single world-system that has existed for some 5,000 years, and the
modern world-system that is usually dated from about 1500 is only a
continuation of the development of that system, In Wallerstein's thinking
it is always possible to show that a particular system is part of some larger
system; however, once we do this where do we stop? And how fruitful is
it, he wonders, to make such connections, many of which must be extremely
tenuous indeed, The final temptation, that of reification, is the one to which
civilizationists have succumbed, They take something like "China" and see
it as having a single indivisible history and virtually a life of its own over
thousands of years, But there is danger in this, Wallerstein believes, for
China since 1945 may be more similar in several respects to Brazil since
1945 than the fonner is to earlier Chinese dynasties, If this is the case, then
what sense does it make to consider China a single historical entity with its
own cultural essence? Wallerstein thus ends up being skeptical of
civilizational analysis just as he is skeptical of the precapitalist world-system
analyses of Frank and of Chase-Dunn and Hall.
Albert Bergesen is a scholar who has worked within the worldsystems tradition but who at the same time has often been quite critical of
some aspects of it. Bergesen begins his paper by looking at the differences
between what he calls the "Pre-1500ers" and the "Post-1500ers," The Posts
limit themselves to applying world-system concepts to the period after 1500,
whereas the Pre's look for earlier origins of world-system-Iike phenomena,
Wallerstein, of course, is a Post, whereas Frank, Chase-Dunn, Hall, and
Janet Abu-Lughod are Pre's, Rather than attempt to reconcile the differences
between these world-systems camps, or to choose one over the other,
Bergesen has harsh criticism for both. They have failed, he claims, to produce
anything distinctly new and their respective paradigms do not transcend
traditional sociological concepts. Although they claim to be substituting
the notion of "world-system" for that of "society," their notion of worldsystem is simply that of a structure which is made up of interacting societies.
The world-system only exists by virtue of the interactions among its
component societies, and thus is little more than a large-scale aggregation
of societies. What is needed, Bergesen argues, is a notion of a world-system
that has its own emergent properties and that determines the traits of the
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various societies upon which the world-system has an impact - a sort of
"Durkheimian world-system theory," as it were. Thus, to the charge that
world-system theory engages in a process of reification, Bergesen' s response
is that, on the contrary, it does not reify enough. Until this happens, Bergesen
feels, until we shift from sociology to "globology," no real intellectual
progress will be made in the social sciences.
All of the preceding articles have been think pieces designed to
promote an open exchange of ideas between different groups of students of
historical social science. The final two articles, however, are more
substantive in nature. My own article turns the tables on Melko and Wescott
by insisting that civilizationists have a strong idealist bias and something of
an antievolutionary orientation. They need to pay much more attention to
politics and economics, and they need to recognize that patterns of cyclical
change may coexist with patterns of long-term social evolution. I then go
on to suggest a new concept, that of "expanding world commercialization,"
as one that provides something of a bridge between the two perspectives.
By expanding world commercialization I mean a long-term evolutionary
process in which trade networks have become both more extensi ve and more
intensive throughout the agrarian era between about 3000 B.C. and A.D.
1500. I derived this idea from the work of Frank and Gills, even though I
reject their notion of a single world-system covering 5,000 years of world
history. World commercialization retains the economic focus of worldsystems analysis but also gives us a feel for what Wescott has called the
"sensuous texture" of the life of civilizations.
The final paper, that of Christopher Chase-Dunn and Alice Willard,
demonstrates by example that civilizational analysis and world-systems
theory can be fruitfully combined in actual research. Their paper makes use
of civilizational analysis 11 la David Wilkinson and world-systems theory to
study changes in city size hierarchies since A.D. 1200. City size hierarchies
involve the relative distribution of the sizes of cities in a particular region.
In this case, the region is what the authors call the Central PoliticallMilitary
Network, an Afro-Eurasian world-system within which both economic
exchange and political and military competition went on, and within which
Europe eventually became dominant after 1500. Chase-Dunn and Willard
study the changes in the city size hierarchy with a special eye to understanding
the causes and consequences of changes in the relative sizes of cities. Two
central questions to which they seek answers are, Do changes in the city
size distribution reflect a cycle of the concentration and deconcentration of
political and/or economic power? and What does the changing city size
distribution of the Central Political/Military Network tell us about the kinds
of power that have been most important and how the nature of power may
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have changed with the emerging dominance of capitalism in Europe? The
authors also go on to ask about the implications of their findings for an
understanding of contemporary world cities and the future shape of
settlement systems on Earth.
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
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WORLD SYSTEMS THEORY: A
FAUSTIAN DELUSION? I
Matthew Melko
I was amused at the 1989 meeting at Berkeley when David Wilkinson
brought Gunder Frank over to ask me if Wilkinson's viewpoint was typical
ofthe ISCSe. Laughing, I responded that Wilkinson was generally perceived
to be a maverick in that he was more interested in the relations between
civilizations than he was in the civilizations themselves. Worse, he had an
evolutionary view of history in that he saw the civilizations as gradually
merging into a central civilization. In fact, from Wilkinson's perspective,
the study of civilizations was a historical exercise that had little contemporary
application. I did not then realize, because world systems were not in my
paradigm, who Andre Gunder Frank was, or that to him the position I
attributed to Wilkinson must have seemed normal, sensible, reasonable.
Perhaps because of this encounter, I became aware that there was a
great deal of discussion at the meeting on "modernization." This was mildly
threatening to me, because modernization implies a universal process that
is world evolutionary, not a recurrent process in different civilizations. At
one plenary meeting, after hearing the term once too often, I got up to ask,
with more emotion than I expected, whether modernization was not a
synonym for Westernization, and if we, as civilizationists, should not be
cautious about assuming that what looks progressive to us is also seen as
progressive by members of other civilizations.
The following spring, at an International Studies Association meeting
in Washington, Wilkinson introduced me to Frank's coauthor, Barry Gills.
I was much reassured by the conversation I had with him, because Gills was
interested in the world system in history, particularly trade and information
exchanges between civilizations. This is what, in the 1970s, the ISCSe's
first American president, Benjamin Nelson, would have called the study of
intercivilizational encounters.
It is ironic to legitimize the world systems enterprise by seeking a
posthumous blessing from Nelson, because in the 1970s he represented, to
me, the dominant paradigm of the ISCSC, which I tolerated because it
tolerated the minority of comparativists, of which I was one. For the
Nelsonians, each problem was studied in civilizational perspective, which
included influences from other civilizations, but not isomorphic
generalizations. For the comparativists, each civilization had its own
character, and similarities and differences were the focus of the study. Both
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paradigms agreed, however, on the value of studying intercivilizational
encounters.
With Nelson's death and Vytautas Kavolis's becoming president in
1977, the majority of the sessions at ISCSC meetings became comparative,
and many Nelsonians went elsewhere, though they still drop in to visit at
meetings and occasionally organize a session or two.
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ISCSC

But in the 1990s I see the systems view becoming more powerful in
the ISCSC, not only avowed systems theorists like Christopher Chase-Dunn
and Thomas Hall, but many others taking an evolutionary view, becoming
at least fellow travelers, turning into rhinoceroses as in lonesco's play. In
1992 I am not sure who has the majority, but the threat to the comparative
paradigm could be a general movement in the society to an area perceived
as more rewarding, one in which greater growth is possible, and more
communication possible with other organizations such as the World Systems
section of the American Sociologcial Association or the International Studies
Association. From the perspective of a beleaguered comparativist, those
holding a world systems perspective could be seen as viruses taking over a
convenient host. They may be viruses from my perspective, but I suppose
the host looks different if you happen to be the virus.
So the ISCSC, a major center of activity in my professional life, may
turn into something else. Under the presidency of Chase-Dunn or Wilkinson
the name may change to the Society for Systems and Civilizational Studies,
the SSCS. By 2002, members will wonder why "Civilizational" is in the
name, destroying the symmetry of those S's. And the enterprise to which I
gave so much of my time and energy will be remembered, if at all, as the
curious presystems period, before the association found its purpose and focus.
What would be lost if that were to happen? Well, from my perspective,
world systems could be a Faustian Delusion. Faustian is the name Spengler
gave to Western Civilization. Faustians, like Faust, were hard driving, future
oriented, never satisfied with their current position, meddlesome, restless.
From the perspective of other civilizations, they were also superficial,
insufficiently concerned about central values or inner experience.
To a great extent world systems theory seems materialistically oriented,
inclined to generalize about the world as a whole. The great conflict about
underdeveloped nations - the term is significant - is whether they have
not yet experienced modernization or whether their development has been
skewed by dependency foisted upon them by the developed nations.From
the perspective of the civilizationist, these are two aspects of the same side
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of the question. The other side is the extent to which other civilizations are
in the process of absorbing and transforming Western technologies. In the
same sense that China transformed Indian Buddhism so that it became more
like Taoism, why wouldn't China in the twenty-first century transform
Western technologies and political ideas so that they were consistent with
Chinese culture?
I have been using Stephen Sanderson's Macrosociology (1991) for a
social organization course. It is a wonderful book for that course, has great
scope and clarity, and converts the majority of students to systemic
materialism. But is has no place for culture. The culture chapter comes before
the game plan, as if to get it out of the way, and art and literature are nowhere
considered, while religion is seen purely as serving certain material purposes,
keeping the lower classes quiet, providing ideological support for
governments. The book is evolutionary but pessimistic. The industrial
revolution has implications that would have made Spengler happy. Well,
not happy. Not Spengler. But he might well have been in agreement. As a
synthesis of systems theory, then, Sanderson is exciting, frightening, but
lacking in cultural perspective and somewhat "civilizationocentric."
WHAT IF IT'S NOT A NEW AGE?

Suppose we are not at the dawn of a new epoch, good or bad, but in a
Hellenistic period? In 300 B.C. you might have thought that all the world
would become Hellenized, as the glories ofthis culture were carried to India.
But 300 years later, a quite different outcome was apparent. Three hundred
years from now is it so obvious that there will be just a central, global
civilization, or is it not possible that China, India, Africa, Islam, Hispanic
America and Byzantium (Russia) will have developed within their own
cultural patterns, retaining technological advantages from the West, but
developing political, economic and cultural styles within their own cultures?
And even Wilkinson concedes that this would be a happier outcome than a
monocultural central civilization.
Studying civilization, by the way, is itself a Faustian enterprise. For
the Faustian is basically outreaching, meddlesome, and curious about others.
Using that perspective, what is so different about the current Western
expansion? Extent of territory covered? Only a Faustian would make such
a quantitative judgment. Superiority of our culture? But daily we ourselves
are critical of it, of our loss of community, of our growing alienation, of our
capacity for destruction. Is it not possible that other cultures may apply our
science and technology in selected ways, maintaining community, worldview
and culture?
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When we worry about this, we worry about Japan using our methods
to produce a more effective economic system. We are less inclined to ask
how the Japanese are doing in terms of morals, ethics, values, culture. We
have, of course, claimed cultural superiority, measuring it in our own terms.
But we haven't worried about whether other countries are getting ahead of
us on some sort of ethical index. (Only a Faustian would seriously consider
such a comparison!)
There is one other concern I have about systems theory that comes out
of my own civilizational work. I have argued that civilizations experience
periods that later are perceived as ages that can be characterized in terms of
style. There was a T'ang style and a Sung style in Chinese civilization that
are recognizably different but definitely Chinese. There was an age of
Enlightenment and a Victorian Age that were different but clearly Western.
I think our present age, still Western, is also characterizable in these terms,
and one of the qualities that seems striking to me is a relational outlook, a
concern about relationships between entities that is greater than concern
about the entities themselves.
Systems theory is an illustration of this relational perspective. It isn't
that this isn't a valid and useful perspective, and certainly it comes up with
insights and answers that would not have been apparent to Victorians. But
every theoretical perspective has its own limitations, and it is important in
using any perspective to be aware of this. The world systems approach is an
approach; it may develop some new perspectives, but it may also close some
old ones. It is one thing to say, this is how the world looks from this
perspective. It is something else to say, this is how the world is.
SYMBIOSIS?

In the first article of the first edition of the Journal of World History,
William McNeill (1990) perceives that his book, The Riseofthe West (1963),
suffered from too much emphasis on separate civilizations, and not enough
on their cosmopolitan interactions. He does not think he should have ignored
civilizations, but that he needed a better balance between the entities and
their interactions.
It seems reasonable to suppose, therefore, that world systems and
civlizational research could be mutually supportive. The civilizationists can
remind the world systems theorists of the kinds of concerns I have been
expressing here. Be careful that by modernization you don't mean
Westernization. Keep in mind the culture and values of other civilizations;
don't be a civilizational boor. Try to look at the world from the perspective
of other civilizations. Keep open to the possibility that the trends toward
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merger and communication you have noted in the 20th century can be
reversed in the 21st as civilizations reassert themselves, as they have before.
Keep in mind that the world systems approach is an approach, and one that
happens to be particularly congenial to historians and social scientists of the
twentieth century.
Civilizationists can be reminded by world systemists that civilizations
are not Spenglerian autonomes impervious to outside influences; that there
are periods when external influences become of considerable importance,
when one civilization challenges another or several others; that such
interactions take place continually throughout history and need to be given
consideration along with comparisons between civilizations; that economic
interactions are important and always influence other kinds of development.
Each approach has its validity, and can serve as a useful corrective to
the other. From this perspective, civilizationists could see systems theorists,
not as viruses, but as salutary breezes. And if a civilizationist wanders into
a meeting of systems theorists, he could be perceived, not as an outmoded
nuisance, but as a preserver of perspective.
Wright State University
REFERENCES
McNeill, William H. 1963. The Rise of the West: A Historv of the Human
Community. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sanderson, Stephen K. 1991. Macrosociology: An Introduction to Human
Societies. 2nd ed. New York: HarperCollins.
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WORLD SYSTEMS THEORY: A
FAUSTIAN DELUSION? II
Matthew Melko
Is it fair to suggest that world systems theory is materialistically
oriented? One of the conflicts within the paradigm concerns whether
underdeveloped nations have not yet modernized, or whether their
development has been skewed by dependency foisted upon them by
developed nations (Sanderson, 1988: 159-74).
From a civilizationist perspective, these are two aspects of the same
side of the question. The other side is the extent to which other civilizations
are in the process of absorbing and transforming Western technologies and
ideas to make them culturally assimilatable. Just as China transformed Indian
Buddhism so that it became more like Taoism, why wouldn't China transform
Western technologies as well as political and economic ideas so that they
were consistent with Chinese culture?
This, perhaps, is the crucial difference between world systems theorists
and civilizationists. Everything else is resolvable, negotiable or translatable.
The idea of studying other civilizations is basically Faustian. Faustians
can't help trying to bring their worldview to others. We are self-critical of
this tendency, regret that we transform what we touch so that when we seek
the exotic we find it transformed into ourselves. But somehow we feel this
expansion is inevitable. The same folks who had to cross the Ocean because
it could be done had to establish a physical presence on the Moon. It goes
without saying that we must cure malaria and improve agricultural efficiency,
leaving television, computers and Coca Cola in our wake.
So we perceive that we are transforming the World. We Think Globally.
Some of us perceive the development of a Modern World System
(capitalized). Founders of world systems theory, like Wallerstein and
Braudel, tended to see the system as Europe-centered (Chase-Dunn and Hall,
1991:10, 12). Hence the modern world system is Western. And the
civilizationist might add, if Western, Faustian.
The world system envisioned by Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas
D. Hall has come into existence only within the past five centuries, the period
considered by many historians to be that of "modern" history. Before that
human net works were "separate and autonomous with regard to their material
and cultural processes of reproduction and development." But culture, even
in these earlier phases, gets little attention. "Culturalists" are dismissed in a
sentence. What is of central concern are economic and political interactions
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(Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1991: 10, 15).Ifboundaries are to be determined, look
at the interconnections, the trade, diplomatic interactions, and conflict. The
term "world" means the boundaries of material interactions. Whatever these
are form the worlds of a period. From this perspective, the global world
system is the most recent, most important, the only true capitalist, and
presumably the last of the world systems. There have been, however, earlier
ones, ranging from primitive to civilized. These earlier civilized systems,
either state- or empire-based and often multicentered, have heen found in
China, India, Persia, the Middle East, Mesoamerica and Peru (Chase Dunn
and Hall, 1991 :23). The organizing principle is different, but the systems
are similar to those discerned by civilizationists.
World systems and civilizationist perspectives combine in the work of
David Wilkinson, a founding council member of the American ISCSC. His
delineation of civilizations is fairly typical, and he sees Quigley as a major
influence in his work. But he has long defined civilizations in terms of their
political and economic interaction, rather than in terms of culture. Since
Wilkinson's civilizational formulations appear to be usable either as
ci vilizations or world systems, it would suggest that autonomous interactions
played a major role in establishing the distinctive patterns of each civilization
(Wilkinson, 1987).
The result for Wilkinson is an evolutionary model that makes the study
of civilizations a historical enterprise, while the world we live in consists of
a single global civilization, easily translatable into the world system of ChaseDunn and Hall. While Wilkinson has studied and visited other civilizations,
the global civilization, given the seemingly neutral title "Central", turns out
to be Western Civilization expanding to engulf the world, which makes
"central" no more neutral than the Chinese "middle."
The world systems perspective, then, suggests that we live in a global
system that is no more than a few centuries old. Before that, there were
separate systems of interaction that could be discerned. That long period of
history has now terminated.
But is this perception valid? In the past it has been very difficult to
transform other cultures. Mongol conquerors who dominated the world found
their progeny becoming Chinese in the East and Muslim in the West.
Conquerors, as Toynbee suggests (l954,VII:61), are mostly exporting
government. Even carriers of basic ideas, like the Buddhists, become Sinified
when they leave their own civilization.
What is different about the West? We ourselves are critical of it, of our
loss of community, of our growing alienation, of our capacity for destruction
which has in this very century produced a general war (1914-1945) that was
far more lethal than all wars in all of history (Eckhardt, 1992: 173-77). The
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great lesson the civilizationists should have taught us is that each civilization
has had its own culture, and the representatives of anyone of them ought to
be extremely cautious about assuming their own superiority.
Expansive phases in the past have often proved to be superficial and
ephemeral. The Achemenid Empire and the Roman, the Han and the Inca,
each expanded and ossified. AlI, as Robert Wesson argues (1967), have been
dreary places in which to live. Is it not possible that the current Western
overlay wilI prove to be equalIy superficial? African nations fail to
"modernize" according to Rostow's (1991) five-step prescription; Russia
remains boringly Byzantine no matter how many revolutions; and China,
whether Communist or Capitalist, looks like the Middle Kingdom in the
process of revi ving its own perception of a World System.
Of course, this civilizational expansion is arguably worldwide, which
would make it appear unique, at least to Faustians. How like them to assume
that what is quantitatively different must be qualitatively different.
There are important qualitative differences, of course. We have, for
instance, expanded length of life decade by decade in most civilizations.
That is a major and unique accomplishment. We are also fearful that this
expansion is going to have damaging ecological results that wilI eventualIy
reduce the quality of life and perhaps reverse those life statistics. Or, even
worse, we have developed a capacity for human destruction that could solve
the population problem for milIennia to come.
But stilI, these potentialities are consequences of Faustian qualities,
just as other civilizations have had florescences and colI apses because of the
qualities they had. Surely our awareness of the fragility of our situation
should make us aware it may welI be ephemeral, that our power and
dominance may recede.
Even if the worst were to happen and we had a total nuclear war, a few
would survive. A feudal system would emerge, as it has in bad times before.
Feudalism occurs, Coulborn (1956) argues, in times of recovery, and what
would recover would be a civilization, whether a new phase or a new
civilization being a problem for the Hords and Wilkinsons of the future. In
any event therc would be a recovery of literacy sufficiently widespread that
the civilization could again afford the lUXury of having historians. Wouldn't
they be likely to look back at our period and remark, not without irony:
"They calIed it the Modern World System?" (cf. Melko and Archive, 1985).
No, there is no compelIing reason to assume that we live in a world so
vastly different from the past that it needs a classification alI its own. We
want it to be different because we live in it, just as Gibbon supposed his
world to be different in an evolutionary sense from that of the Romans he
studied.
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One reason we study comparative civilizations is to gain insight into
our own situation, to see ourselves from outside ourselves. If we adopt the
world systems model, we throwaway that advantage. We can only see
ourselves as the cumulation of everything else, which is exactly the view
we were trying to surmount in resurrecting the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations.
If we adopt a world systems model, we are also in danger of undermining
our perception of reality. Giving priority to material interactions, world
systems theorists appear to equate material interaction with reality. Hence
"civilizations" are a reification placed within quotation marks, but world
systems need no such qualification. Chase-Dunn and Hall go so far as to say
"the reality" is that the British and French Colonial systems existed within
a "multicentric, intersocietal system" (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1991: 12).
They also introduce Europe into the equation without quotation marks.
I can't find any Europe on the map, just a peninsula of Western Asia
containing small countries that change boundaries and sometimes names
from century to century. Whence came this "Europe"? What trade networks
defined it?
What I am suggesting, of course, is that civilizations, world systems,
and Europe are all reifications, terms that we have applied as matters of
convenience. Their reality exists only in that a sufficient number of people
find them convenient to use. Such terms are certainly useful; we couldn't
communicate without them. But a term that focuses on material matters, like
economy, is no more real than one that has more spiritual content, like
religion.
Civilizationists are always intrigued by decline and fall, even if it means
the decline and fall of civilizational studies. From Kroeber's perspective
(1944, 1957), what we may be seeing is the eclipse of one pattern by another.
The approach of Spengler and Toynbee is maintained by a few scholars. The
average age ofISCSC members, the last time I tried to calculate, appears to
be in the 50's. World systems theory, on the other hand, is growing; it has
younger members and has become a strong force in graduate schools. If you
don't recognize this as a Kroeberian pattern, you may recognize it as Kuhnian
(1962), for Kuhn provided a vivid example of a Kroeberian pattern in science,
and others expanded it to apply in Kroeberian style. In any event, it may be
that the world systems approach is attracting institutional support and the
attention of the young. Civilizational theory may welI be in decline. My
attack on world systems may be the rear guard action of a civilizationist who
has put his energy into a pattern that failed to develop.
This need not be an unmitigated disaster for civilizationists. David
Wilkinson, after all, may be an epigonious Quigley follower as a
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civilizationist, but with the same theory, in the vanguard of world systems
theorists.
The core-periphery theory of world systems theorists (Chase-Dunn and
Hall, 1991 :26-27) is anticipated by civilizationists. Whereas the systems
theorists seem to stress the exploitation of the periphery by the core, the
civilizationists have noted the phenomenon of peripheral domination: the
ultimate conquest of the core by the periphery (Melko, 1969:50-51, 15153).
But civilizationists would probably be more sympathetic to the work
of Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills, who have become more interested
in tracing the world system back to earlier periods of history (e.g., Gills and
Frank, 1991 ). They study what the first American ISCSC president, Benjamin
Nelson, called "intercivilizational encounters" (Nelson and Kavolis, 1973).
It is true that most civilizationists would first establish and study their
civilizations, then turn their attention to the encounters. But there were many
periods, particularly feudal periods, when you would find more trade between
civilizations than within, particularly in lUxury goods, since feudal entities
produced products similar to those of their neighbors. So they fought with
those nearby, traded with those far away (Quigley, 1979).
Frank is as critical of the world systems approach as I am for its tendency
to focus on modern history. He is aware of both the chronocentrism and the
Eurocentrism of the world systems approach (Frank, 1990: 157 -58), and
suggests that Western hegemony may be temporary (229). He mildly chides
Chase-Dunn for being "reticent" about pursuing the study of world systems
back to earlier periods (176). The present world system, he thinks, goes back
at least to 2500 B.C., and probably earlier. It may be no accident that I was
first introduced to Frank by Wilkinson. For Frank, looking backward, covers
territory similar to that covered by Wilkinson looking forward. In fact, Frank
says, "our" system has been variously called "world island," "ecumene" and
"central civilization."
Frank has many perceptions that perhaps have been neglected by
civilizationists. He reminds us that the fall of the Roman Empire was partly
attributable to trade deficits and barbarian incursions (205-06) (Gibbon was
right after all). He notes that sometimes events that civilizationists would
see as discrete have a chronological connection. Between A.D. 742 and 755,
for instance, there were "fundamental changes, usually signalled by
successful political revolts, in every European Empire" among which were
the Carolingian, Abbasid, Uighur, Turkic and anti-T'ang, all of these
connected with Central Asia (Frank, 162, quoting from Beckwith, 1987). Or
again, citing Janet Abu-Lughod (1989), he calls attention to the extensive
13th- and 14th-century economic connections among Europe, Byzantium,
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Persia, Mongol Asia, India, Southeast Asia, and China (Frank, 190-92). All
of this would be of interest to a civilizationist with ecumenical concerns (in
two senses of the word) like Gordon Hewes (e.g., Melko and Scott, 1987: 1122).
Like other world systems theorists, however, Frank seems to be blind
to the influence of culture. In tracing back the world system, he is interested
only in economic and political interaction. He doesn't seem to consider the
possibility that Christianity may have been more important to the West than
silk. Occasionally culture creeps in, as when (203) he cites Jacques Gernet's
observation that Greek sculpture is preserved in the drapery folds, poses,
and faces of Chinese and Japanese Buddhist statues. This serves for Gernet,
and apparently for Frank, as "one of the finest proofs of the unity of our
world" (Gernet, 1985). It does not seem to occur to Frank, as it would to
any civilizationist but Wilkinson, that the same observation may attest to
the power of Chinese civilization to absorb and transform both Classical art
and South Asian religion.
And so far Frank seems to have focused more on what he cal1s "our"
world system (Frank, 228) than on other political and trade systems of the
past. In Wilkinson's terms, you might say he has been "centra1centric." Chase
Dunn and Hall, on the other hand, have been aware of the existence of other
systems of the past, but what I have seen of their work, including ChaseDunn's most recent book (1989), has been more oriented toward recent
Western history.
Not surprisingly, Frank downplays the civilizations themselves. He
quotes with approval (Frank, 163) John Fairbank's method of starting at the
end of the period he wants to study and working back (Fairbank, 1969:viixii) without seeming to notice that this is also Fairbank's method ofbounding
the civilization he is studying. In other words, Fairbank begins with China
and studies whatever is relevant to his understanding of his subject. He works
back in time as he needs to, but also out in space.
Frank asks in exasperation, after spending some time with
civilizationists like James Farmer and David Kopf, should we nol study both
comparison and interaction (1 75)?Well, I'm glad he asked. Indeed we should.
And as the younger postmaterialists move into the field (lnglehart,
1990) won't they expand beyond world systems materialism and become
interested in the cultural aspects of systems? If world systems theorists then
include systems of the past for comparison, they may see the present world
system very much as Toynbee did. Gills, if not Frank, may do pretty much
the kind of work a younger civilizationist might have done.
As I read Frank, and look at his bibliography, I think: he knows Toynbee,
but not Spengler or Kroeber. Shall I tell him about Kroeber? Nah. Let's be
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sure our younger civilizationists read Kroeber. Come to think of it, we
translated his configurations into ci vilizations. Let the younger world systems
theorists translate him in their terms.
Then perhaps it will turn out that the civilizationists will become the
viruses in the world systems pattern. Just as they think Wilkinson is a world
systems theorist with an idiosyncratic terminology, so they may perceive
civilizationists who understand Kroeberian patterns as "culturalists"
augmenting systems theory by studying cases from the past, as Frank already
does, but oriented toward cultural rather than material systems. Thus we
may subvert their journals, meetings, grants, and graduate programs without
their being aware that the cultural transactions occur between cultural systems
that we would call "civilizations." Such a subversion, in the longer term,
would be at least enriching, and perhaps the salvation, of world systems
study.
Wright State University

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1994

21

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 30 [1994], No. 30, Art. 20
20

COMP ARA nVE CIVILIZAnONS REVIEW

REFERENCES
Abu-Lughod, Janet. 1989. Before European Hegemony: The World-System
A.D. 1250-1350. New York: Oxford University Press.
Beckwith, Christopher. 1987. The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia. Leiden:
Brill.
Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1989. Global Formation: Structures of the WorldEconomy. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
___ , and Thomas D. Hall. 1991. "Conceptualizing Core/periphery
Hierarchies for Comparative Study." Pp. 5-44 in Core/periphery
Relations in Precapitalist Worlds, edited by Chase-Dunn and Hall.
Boulder, CO: Westview.
Coulborn, Rushton. 1956. Feudalism in History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Eckhardt, William. 1992. Civilizations, Empires and Wars. Jefferson, NC:
McFarland.
Fairbank, John K. 1969. Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Frank, Andre Gunder. 1990. "A Theoretical Introduction to 5,000 Years of
World System History." Review 13:155-248.
Gernet, Jacques. 1985.A History of China. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Gills, Barry E., and Andre Gunder Frank. 1991. "5000 Years of World System
History: The Cumulation of Accumulation." In Chase-Dunn and Hall,
1991, cited above.
Hewes, Gordon W. 1987. "Historical Maps of the Old World Ecumene." Pp.
11-22 in Melko and Scott, 1987, cited below.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kroeber, A. L. 1944. Configurations of Culture Growth. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
_ _ . 1957. Style and Civilizations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Melko, Matthew. 1969. The Nature of Civilizations. Boston: Porter Sargent.
_ _ .1990. Peace in Our Time. New York: Paragon House.
_ _ , and C.W.N. Archive. 1985. "The Period After the Fourth of the
Middle Modern General Wars." Soundings 68: 179-88.
Melko, Matthew, and Leighton R. Scott. 1987. The Boundaries of
Civilizations in Space and Time. Lanham, MD: University Press of
America.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol30/iss30/20

22

Review: Full Issue
21
Nelson, Benjamin, and Vytautas Kavolis. 1973. "The Civilization-Analytic
Approach to Comparative Studies." Comparative Civilizations Bulletin
no. 5:13-14.
Quigley, Carroll. 1979. The Evolution o/Civilizations. 2nd ed. Indianapolis:
Liberty Press.
Rostow, Walt Whitman. 1991. The Stages o/Economic Growth. 3rd ed. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Sanderson, Stephen K. 1988. Macrosociology: An Introduction to Human
Societies. New York: Harper & Row.
Spengler, Oswald. 1932. The Decline o/the West. Trans. by Charles Francis
Atkinson. New York: Knopf.
Toynbee, Arnold J. 1954. A Study 0/ History, vols. VII and IX. London:
Oxford University Press.
Wesson, Robert G. 1967. The Imperial Order. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Wilkinson, David. 1987. "Central Civilization." Comparative Civilizations
Review 17:31-59.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1994

23

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 30 [1994], No. 30, Art. 20
22

COMPARATIVE CIVILIZATIONS REVIEW

CONFUSION WORSE

CONFOUNDED: THROUGH
THE LOOKING GLASS OF
MATT MELKO IN
WONDERLAND
Andre Gunder Frank
To the question "have you stopped beating your wife'?" my answer is
that I am not married. It is even more difficult to answer Melko who confuses
and confounds so many imaginary wonderland enemies to engage in Faustian
looking-glass battle.
l. Melko valiantly comes out against modernizationists, with whom he
confuses world system theorists. But none ofthe latter I know is one. Certainly
not Wallerstein, Chase-Dunn or myself. We all began with a dependency
perspective, which itself did battle with modernization theory. We certainly
did not develop our world system analyses now to promote the modernization
theory that we, like Melko, have combatted for decades. On the contrary,
Wallerstein has been most explicit in critiquing Westernizing modernization,
which he contends has meant a setback and indeed absolute irnmiseration
for the majority of the world's people. Wilkinson (1993:235) sees an "even
less cheerful story" regarding modernization. I have myself insistently
inveighed against Eurocentrism and have insisted on a "unity in diversity"
world system perspective as an antidote both to Eurocentrism and to the now
popular "multicultural" alternatives which claim "equal time" for the
"political correctness" of each and any ethnic identity (Frank, 1991; Frank
and Gills, 1992, 1993). So Melko's anti-modernizationist fire is clearly
misdirected, at least regarding those of his friends, colleagues and others
from whom he fears world systemic perversion of ISCSC. So what about
his also laudable insistence on comparison?
2. Melko does come out valiantly for comparative analysis. So do ChaseDunn and Hall, which is exactly why they insist on studying world-systemS.
Indeed, they are so anxious to do comparative work that they categorize not
only all or parts of Eurasia, but also the Wintu Indians in California or
"indigenous" Hawaii as "world-systems." The more comparison we can
manage, the better; and there is no impediment to doing so by also lumping
different parts of the world into one world system if their interconnections
are great enough to make them mutually and systemically interdependent.
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That does not prevent comparisons among the members/parts of a system
any more than among members within a family, nation, civilization, or
whatever - or among any of these. However, for my part I prefer to use
the term "world system" without a hyphen and to reserve it for as much of
Afro-Eurasia, and later the "New World," as can legitimately be viewed as
sufficiently interconnected to have been parts of a single world system. This
whole (system) is more than the sum of its parts. The characteristics of each
part are influenced by its relation to the whole and to other parts. However,
this relation and influence does not prevent our making comparisons among
different parts or times within this world system. I just do not see what we
gain by calling the parts (mini) world systems.
Wallerstein and Braudel stress the difference between world
economy/system and world-economy/system. Wallerstein spells out the
difference a hyphen makes: "Note a detail in word usage that distinguishes
Frank and Gills from me .... They speak of a 'world system.' I speak of
'world-systems.' I use a hyphen; they do not. I use the plural; they do not.. ..
For me there have been very many world-systems .... My 'world-system' is
not a system 'in the world' or 'of the world.' It is a system 'that is a world.'
Hence the hyphen, since 'world' is not an attribute of the system. Rather the
two words together constitute a single concept. Frank and Gills's system is
a world system in an attributive sense, in that it has been tending over time
to cover the whole world" (Wallerstein, 1993:294-95).
Braudel writes similarly: "The world economy is an expression applied
to the whole world .... A world-economy only concerns a fragment of the
world, an economically autonomous section .... Immanuel Wallerstein tells
us that he arrived at the theory of the (modern) world-economy while looking
for the largest units of measurement which would still be coherent" (Braudel
1982:20-21, 70). In Gills' and my view, which on this score is shared by
Wilkinson, this largest unit has long been much larger and older than the
European centered "world-econom'y/system" of Braudel and Wallerstein
(Gills and Frank, 1990/91, 1992; Frank and Gills, 1993b). Since Wilkinson
(1987, 1993) emphasizes political coherence he sees "Central Civilization"
as only starting in 1500 BC and spreading out much slower than the economic
connections that he recognizes as being much earlier and more far-flung.
Gills and I use the latter as a major criterion for the identification of the
world system since at least 3000 BC and its much more rapid and wider
spread throughout Afro-Eurasia (Gills and Frank, 1990/91, Frank and Gills,
1992, 1993; rrank, 1993). For that reason, Chase-Dunn and Hall usefully
suggest that we refer to the "Central World System." A major case in point
is the incorporation of China, which we see around 600 Be. Interestingly,
Chase-Dunn and Willard (1993) observe that since that time cyclical phases
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of expansion and contraction of city sizes coincide between eastern and
western Eurasia. Nonetheless, Wilkinson does not include China in "Central
civilization" until the 19th century (Wilkinson, 1993). Nonetheless, be all
that as it may, of course Gills and I welcome all useful comparisons promoted
by Melko, Wilkinson, and Chase-Dunn and Hall (and indeed we do some
ourselves) both within this "central" world system and between it or any
part of it and other places. I simply think, and perhaps here Melko agrees,
that it is both unnecessary and undesirable to call these other (small) places
other "worlds" or even regard them as "world-like." Herein, the Chase-Dunn
and Hall usage seems confusing and confounds Melko among others.
3. Melko sees cycles but not in the world system. Too bad, for whatever
limitations world system analysis may have, the lack of a perspective on
cycles is not one of them. Cycles and "conjunctures" were prominent in
Braudel's work. Long cycles are central to the (economic) world system of
Wallerstein and the (political) one of Modelski and Thompson (1988) (for
a good summary see Goldstein, 1988). I have myself always argued, like
Schumpeter (1938), that cycles, unlike tonsils that can be extirpated, are the
heartbeat of the (world) system. Gills and I have written books and articles
specifically to indentify world system-wide cycles (Frank, 1978, 1993,
1994a,b; Frank and Gills, 1993 a,b; Gills and Frank, 1992). The difference
with Melko is that he sees cycles only in different parts of the system, and
I see them both there and across the whole world system itself. Indeed, I
have argued that the identification of simultaneity in cyclical ups and downs
in "different" areas is at least prima facie evidence and an operational criterion
for recognizing them to be different parts of the same world system (Frank,
1993, 1994a,b).
For instance, Han China, Kushan India, Parthian Persia, and Imperial
Rome all rose and prospered at about the same time from I no BC to 200
AD. Then from AD 200 to 500, all four and also Axum in Africa suffered
near simultaneous apparently cyclical "decline and fall" of the kind that
seems to interest Melko. Gibbon and others sought explanations for Rome
in "internal" decay and barbarian invasions that came out of nowhere in
Asia. Tainter (1989) reviewed dozens of cases and explanations of breakdown
in complex societies also at other times and places, but all of them also
focused only on internal causes and in some cases deus ex machina external
invasion. Yet Teggart (1939) already noted correlation and mutual causation
between wars and other events in Rome and China. Gills and Frank (1992)
go a step further and suggest that all four societies (civilizations?) rose and
declined in tandem as part of a long world system-wide cycle, of which the
"internal" affairs of each were only parts. We did the same also for other
times and places between 1700 BC and AD 1700, and J carried the
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investigation back to 3000 BC in "Bronze Age World System Cycles" (Frank,
1993). Wilkinson (1992), Chase-Dunn and Willard (1993), and Bosworth
(1992) have taken the trouble totestGills' and my cycledatings. As Goldstein
relied on some of my post-1500 cycle datings for his own, I relied on Melko
and Wilkinson (1992) for some of my pre-I 500 ones (Frank 1993)!
4. Melko has reservations about Sanderson, who is promoting this whole
debate. Perhaps Sanderson pays too little attention to "culture" or
"civilization." However, I do not see the evidence for that charge against
Sanderson, perhaps because I am equalIy amiss. On the other hand, Sanderson
(1991) expressed reservations about Gills' and my claim of world systemwide inclusiveness. However, Sanderson welcomes debate and as a result
some of his reservations have recently been alIayed by his acceptance of
some of the evidence, including that adduced by GilIs and Frank. So much
the better for me, and so much the worse for Melko.
5. Melko neglects to mention that Wilkinson introduced us at a cocktail
party reception. which caused him so much dismay (and he does not quite
clarify which part of this cocktai I did the damage). Yet he ends his comments
by promoting mutually supportive research between world systemls people
and civilizationists. I join him in that wholeheartedly, and in my own
conclusion here I am glad to express my agreement with all he says in his
final three paragraphs. It's high time for us to have another drink. Cheers!
University of Amsterdam
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COMMENTS ON FAUSTIAN
DELUSION II
Andre Gunder Frank
Melko's second version of his Faustian delusion argument requires
little additional comment from me, but perhaps from others who can speak
with more authority on their own work, which Melko (mis?)interprets. For
by my reading, for instance, Chase-Dunn and Hall envision world systems
that go much farther back than only five hundred years. Wilkinson's "Central
Civilization" is not "Western" by another name, but on the contrary originated
in the Asian "East" and spread out from there only belatedly to engulf what
Melko rightly terms an outlying peninsula at the western end of Asia.
Whatever Coulborn may have said, and what Melko attributes to him,
does not correspond to my recollection; "feudalism" is not characteristic of
times of recovery. On the contrary, as Melko himself points out earlier in
the same sentence, "feudalism" occurs during bad times when a society or
civilization suffers involution or turns in upon itself as the had times crisis
breaks the external ties, which were forged during the expansion and recovery
from the previous crisis. Examples are the "dark ages" in much of Asia from
about 1700 to 1500 BC, and especially again from 1200 to 1000 BC. The
"dark ages of feudalism" in western Europe were associated with recovery
only insofar as this outlying region did not participate in the periods of
recovery that swept across Asia from AD 500 to 800 (including Tang China),
though Europe did eventually participate in the generalized recovery from
about AD 1050 to 1250 (including Song China). Of course, it is a world
system perspective, if not "model," that permits us to see "feudalism" in this
context. As for myself, on comparison and interaction, I did not cite the
civilizationist James Farmer (Melko's selective misperccption) but the
historian Edward Farmer. Fairbank was a sinologist, but his "rule" to study
history backwards can apply equally or even more so to the history of the
world (system) as to that of China, wherever "its" history may be bounded
in space. On that, we could consult (worldwide) Trade and Diplomacy on
the China Coast, where Fairbank set out his rule. On Kroeher, thanks but
no thanks for not telling me about his book that I have had since I studied
anthropology in graduate school. On culture, I plead guilty to henign neglect.
My anthropologist friend Sidney Mintz and I have been arguing for 40 years:
he keeps telling me "culture matters," and I keep responding "structure
matters." A chicken/egg question? Melko seems to have missed my
concession, at least in principle: the three-legged stool of ecology/economy,
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power/politics, and culture/ideology. All three keep the stool itself upright.
They are (equally?) necessary for sitting on the stool- or even for analyzing
its balance. Can civilizationists and world systemizers sit together on the
same stool?
University of Amsterdam
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THE CASE FOR A WORLDSYSTEMS APPROACH TO
CIVILIZATIONS: A VIEW FROM
THE "TRANSFORMATIONIST"
CAMpI
Thomas D. Hall
INTRODUCTION AND DISCLAIMER
Many scholars are involved in the "world-system~" perspective. 2 They
may be divided into several camps, all maintaining more or less generally
amicable relations - a general peace in Matthew Melko's (1992) terms. I
begin this paper with a summary of its main points. I follow this with a brief
sketch of the world-systemS territory. Next I address the issues raised by
Melko in "World Systems Theory: A Faustian Delusion?, 1" (this volume).
I take care to correct some misrepresentations in that essay. I will conclude
- again following Melko's lead - with an argument for symbiosis. My
goals are to facilitate further discussion, to clarify the areas of agreement
and disagreement, and to discover what we may learn from each other.
THE PUNCHLINE

In standup comedy the punchline should be a surprise, hut an academic
paper should preview the conclusions. The punchline here is that
civilizationists and world-system analysts are not in opposition, but travel
different roads toward the same goal: understanding how our world came to
be. The subtext here is that, contra Melko's protestations, comparative
civilizationists and world-systemists are doing very similar things, albeitto borrow a metaphor from the stage - from distinct camera angles and
with very different lighting. That is, we are both engaged in the comparative
study of civilizations in order to better understand them.
AN INTELLECTUAL MAP OF THE WORLD-SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE

A geographer once explained to me that a map need be neither precise
nor accurate; it need only get you where you are going. It is in that spirit
that I sketch the territories of the world-system~ perspective.
Immanuel Wallerstein (I 974a, I 974b) claims, among other things, that
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in the long sixteenth century (1450-1650) a new form of social organization
appeared on the earth, the capitalist or modern world-system. The term
"world-system" is properly hyphenated because it refers to a unitary concept
and social system that makes up a self-contained "world.'" This world-system
by the late twentieth century became a global system, engulfing the entire
planet. Wallerstein's analysis stresses the systemic nature of this new entity,
in particular that the social structure and function of any component of the
system could only be understood in the context of its systematic relations
with all other components.
In methodological terms, the system itself is the fundamental unit of
analysis. All subcomponents, explicitly including so-called "modern" nationstates, are not completely autonomous actors but part of a larger system. As
is well known, a key aspect of this argument is Andre Gunder Frank's (1969a,
1969b) concept of the "development of underdevelopment." That is, the
development of the core states of this system depended on the exploitation
of peripheral components. Furthermore, peripheral dependence was not only
vital to core development, but necessarily entailed the simultaneous and
consequential underdevelopment of peripheral components. 4
The empirical evidence supporting this general claim for the modern
world-system is massive and impressive, as are the many subtheories it has
generated. Christopher Chase-Dunn' s Global Formation (1989) is the single
best summary of those findings.s Because they are not compellingly germane
to this argument I will not summarize them here. However, I will note that
a major contribution of world-system theory has been to solve a sociological
conundrum: some social processes seem to have opposite results in core and
peripheral countries. Some have read this as evidence of the impossibility
of a universal sociology. World-system theorists, however, see this as a
consequence of world-systemic processes. Thus, in core countries
development, or modernization, promotes class formation and undermines
status divisions. especially racial and ethnic ones, improves the status of
women, and leads to democracy. However, in peripheral countries, class
formation is undercut, racial and ethnic di visions are rife, the status of women
declines with development, and totalitarianism prevails over democracy.6
This, then is the "modern" world-system camp. Here "modern" and
Western are virtually interchangeable terms. This is not, however, due to
racism or Eurocentrism of the garden variety, but to a recognition that the
economic and political hegemony of the core carry cultural hegemony as
well. It is not a statement of what is natural, or inevitable, or right, but a
recognition of what is. Japan, of course, is problematic. I will have more to
say on Japan below. It should be noted that this modern, Wallersteinian,
camp of world-system theory has been accused of being "Eurocentric" in
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its lack of attention to peripheral and semiperipheral areas (see, for example,
Amin, 1989, 1991; Hall, 1986, 1989a, 1989b).
Archaeologists and anthropologists quickly saw a potential in worldsystem theory to clarify several sets of continuing problems. These included
the distortions of development among "indigenous" peoples due to their
contact with Europeans, and for archaeologists a way to study seemingly
systematic interconnections among prehistoric societies. The former might
be glossed, in civilizationist terms, as the confrontation of "barbarians and
civilizations," while the latter might be glossed as either civilization building
or inter-civilization contacts.
The anthropological camp has met with considerable success, spurred
by Eric R. Wolf's Europe and the People Without History (1982). For those
not familiar with this book, the title is a somewhat satirical comment on
Eurocentric scholars who have tended to view non literate indigenous peoples
as having no "history" prior to contact or "discovery" by Europeans. Wolf's
point is precisely that they do have histories, and that we cannot understand
their societies without understanding how their histories have shaped their
sociallivesJ A major enterprise in anthropology, history, and ethnohistory
has been writing the histories of "the people without history" (see Krech,
1991).
Brian Ferguson and Neil Whitehead's title essay to War in the Tribal
Zone (l992a) extends this critique by examining the interaction of state
expansion and "tribal" peoples. x They find two consistent effects of war in
the "tribal zone." Not unexpectedly wars between state and nonstate peoples
increase and intensify when states expand into tribal territories. What is less
obvious is that wars among "tribal" peoples increase in frequency and
intensity with state expansion. Conflicts often center around access to statesupplied goods.
These effects are not unique to modern contacts, but have occurred in
most ancient civilizations or world-systems. Ferguson and Whitehead
criticize world-system theory for failing to address these issues adequately.9
The impact of Central Asian nomads on the course of several civilizations
is well known (Bentley, 1993; Frank, 1992; Hall, 1991b). But many other
important, if less dramatic, state-nonstate interactions have shaped
civilizational history. Finally, much evolutionary and historical analysis has
been distorted by assumptions that the reports of the violence found among
nonstate societies was "natural," when in fact it was a product of interactions
with states (civilizations). Analysts of precapitalist world-systems differ in
the attention they devote to such interactions.
Archaeologists using world-system theory, however, have met with
more frustration. Again, I will eschew reciting the history of archaeological
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theorizing and empirical findings. lo The reaction to extreme diffusionism
led many cultural ecologists to become overly focused on circumscribed,
local processes, to the neglect of intersocietal interactions in the production
of social and cultural change (Schortman and Urban, 1992).
Several archaeologists have attempted to use world-system theory to
overcome this narrow focus. They have struggled to modify, stretch, or
transfonn world-system theory to make it useful in "precapitalist" settings
- that is, settings that predate Wallerstein's long sixteenth century. Most
have experienced frustration in that attempt largely because it is so "modern
world-system-centric," that is, because it is almost an ad hoc theory focused
only on the last five hundred years.11 While this "camp" has yet to produce
its own complete, more generalized, world-system theory, it is still struggling
with extant theory in an attempt to generate a more useful alternative.
Recently several people have entered this fray and are developing
"precapitalist" world-system theories. Precapitalist world-system analysis
seems to have four separate "rootS."12 Probably the oldest is that associated
with Ekholm and Friedman (Ekholm, 1980; Ekholm and Friedman, 1980,
1982; Friedman and Ekholm, 1982, 1992; Friedman, 1982; Friedman and
Rowlands, 1977, 1978) who claim that capital accumulation has been a
continual process since the formation of the first states in ancient
Mesopotamia. Their point is that there were capitalist-like processes in
ancient states which did not become dominant until circa C.E. 1500. They
see these accumulation processes as fundamental to the generation of
inequality within societies and critical to pushing constant expansion.
A second root is found among those anthropologists and archaeologists
who sought to explain intersocietal interactions, in particular the seeming
connections between pre-Columbian Mesoamerica and what is now the
American Southwest (pailes and Whitecotton, 1975, 1979, 1986), or in
complex developments in Oaxaca, Mexico (Blanton and Feinman, 1984), or
early state fonnation in Mesopotamia (Kohl, 1978, 1979). These (and others)
argue that local development or social change is highly conditioned or shaped
by the quality and extent of connections with other societies.!3
A third root is found in the work of those world-system theorists who
see a possibility of a major cyclical change coming sometime in the next
century and seek to understand that change by looking at past major changes
in world-systems. Chase-Dunn (1987, 1990) has been primary among these.
He has also been concerned with the complex roles of semiperipheral
components in the world-system, both the modern world-system (1982) and
ancient world-systems (1988).
The fourth root is found in the work of Andre Gunder Frank and Barry
K. Gills (Frank, 1990a, 1990b, 1992; Frank and Gills, 1990, 1992; Gills and
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Frank, 1991). They argue, paralleling Ekholm and Friedman. for a continual
accumulation of capital since the first appearance of states. They argue that
the locus of accumulation oscillates between private families and the state.
They further argue that this accumulation process takes place within a single,
sporadically growing world-system. Here they readily link up with David
Wilkinson's argument for the emergence of "central civilization" (l987a,
1987b, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1993). There are obvious close parallels in the
first and fourth roots.
I should also note William McNeill's (1990) call for attention to things
like world-systems. My own work primarily grows from roots two and three.
My study of the Southwest (Hall, 1986, 1989a) led me to sec the importance
of connecti0ns to Mesoamerica and to see the importance of the role of
nonstate societies in social change (Hall, 1983, 1984b) in the Southwest.
Later, I extended that work to preeapitalist Central Asia (Hall, 1991 a, 1991 b).
These four roots, and much work by others, have given rise to a split
among world-system theorists into the "pre-" and "post-" 1500ists (Bergesen
1992a, and this volume). Within the "pre-1500ist" camp there is a split
between the "continuationists," represented by Ekholm, Freidman, Frank,
Gills, and Wilkinson, and the "transformationists," represented by ChaseDunn and Hall (Chase-Dunn, 1992; Hall and Chase-Dunn, I Y93, 1994). The
eontinuationists argue for one continual - if episodic - world-system that
began with the first states (or civilizations) in Mesopotamia some 5,000
years ago. They see the "modern world-system" that Immanuel Wallerstein
has described in much detail as the current manifestation of this worldsystem.
The transformationists, however, argue that there have been many types
of systems, and their transformations have been and continue to be
problematic. They further argue that future transformation can only be
foreseen, and possibly shaped by human action, by studying the logic of past
transformations (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1991 a, 1992, 1993, 1994). They
argue further that their initial assumption of different systems is scientifically
conservative in the sense that if the continuationists are, indeed, correct, then
this will become readily apparent in the course of pursuing a
transformationist, comparative study of world-systems.
Some additional issues germane to the dialogue with civilizationists
should be mentioned. First is the issue of boundaries. There arc close parallels
in bounding civilizations and bounding world-systems (Mclko and Scott,
1987; Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1993). One area of rapprochement between
these two approaches may be that both are talking about the saIlle fundamental
entity but using different boundary criteria: culture versus the combination
of trade in bulk goods, war, and trade in luxury goods. Both approaches
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clearly recognize that the bounding of the relevant entities under discussion
is problematic. This is closely linked with a second issue: the relevant unit
of analysis, or the fundamental entity being discussed. A major contribution
of the world-system approach is the focus on the system itself as the
fundamental locus of social change. Here, too, there seems to be a close
parallel with civilizationists, in that they too attribute significance to a unit
of social organil.ation larger than individual states.
A third component of the world-system approach is the attention to
nonstate societies in the processes of change, or history. Hall (1991 a, 1991 b)
has argued that to ignore the role of nomads in civilizational and worldsystem change is to misunderstand historical processes. Frank (1992) argues
that Central Asian nomads have played a central role in the evolution of the
continuous world-system. As noted above, Ferguson and Whitehead (1992)
establish the importance and historical depth of state-nonstate interactions.
Finally, there is that frightful e-word, evolution. World-system analysts,
like archaeologists and anthropologists, find it a friendly and useful term.
Some civilizationists seem to find it to be something of a grand bugaboo.
While properly the subject of the next section of this paper, it is important
to note here that "evolution" as used in world-system approaches refers to
patterns in the processes of social change (here "social" is a covering term
including, political, economic, and cultural change) that led from a situation
some 10,000 years ago of as many as 100,000 more-or-Iess autonomous
societies to the present state of an emerging global society or civilization.
The term explicitly does not imply a teleological process, or a unilinear one,
but rather refers to multi stranded, complex, and historically contingent
processes. A goal of the world-system approaches is to describe and
understand those processes.
Obviously. the entire precapitalist world-system research agenda is still
expanding and still sorting itself out into camps and positions. What these
camps all hold in common, besides obvious debts to Immanuel Wallerstein
and Andre Gunder Frank's early work on dependency, is a focus on
intersocietal interaction systems. Beyond that the fundamental difference is
between the continuationists and the transformationists. Clearly, I write from
inside the "transformationist" camp, hence the subtitle of this paper.
It is now appropriate to address some of the issues raised by Melko.

THE ILLUSION OF A "FAUSTIAN DELUSION"
First, I want to repeat a disclaimer. Much of what I refer to below is
new, at least with respect to world-system approaches to civilizational
studies. Hence, Professor Melko's critique is understandable even if, in my
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opinion, it is considerably off the mark. Rather than argue with or vilify him,
I will use his remarks as an opportunity to clarify the world-system position,
or better positions, and, I hope, to open further dialogue.
As may be apparent in the preceding discussion, several terms are used
differently by world-systems analysts than they are by Melko. Key here is
the term "evolution." The notion of unilinear evolution as the model inherent
in the analysis of everyone who uses the term is a double chimera. First,
none of the neoevolutionists working in the last few decades uses the term
that way. Rather, as noted above, they refer to historically contingent
processes that follow general patterns, which, while explainable in general,
are quite diverse in their specific results. Second, even nineteenth-century
evolutionary thinkers were closer to the current model than to the unilinear,
"the West is the best," teleological strawman implied in Melko' s comments.14
Melko is, in a quaint nineteenth-century phrase, "much exercised" about
the concept of "modernization" as garden variety ethnocentrism elevated
into "scientific dogma" (an oxymoron to be sure). It may surprise him and
many others to know - and this despite the critiques of world-system theory
for being Eurocentric (e.g., Amin 1989)- that no less a world-system analyst
than Immanuel Wallerstein pronounced "modernization theory" dead
(Wallerstein, 1976). He was at considerable pains to tic his requiem to the
concept of underdevelopment.
"Underdevelopment" in the dependency and world-system literatures
is explicitly not a unilinear evolutionary term, as it in fact is in modernization
theory. Rather, "underdevelopment" refers to the systematic changes
introduced into economic development, and social change in general, in
peripheral areas as a direct consequence of interaction with morc dcvelopcd
areas. The so-called "backwardness" of these areas is not due to lack of
development, but to a peculiar kind of "development" that results when a
region is exploited for its resources, whether those be in the form of raw
materials or comparatively cheap labor. Melko's major point, critique, and
worry is that a world-system approach to civilizations will emphasize the
processes of interaction, especially economic interaction, to the neglect of
both the internal conceptual integrity of civilizations and the comparative
study of civilizations. He cites the lack of attention to culture and the problem
of influence of Japan on the West. These are serious concerns that, it seems
to me, vary in seriousness of threat to the various world-system camps.
In general, world-system analysts study the interplay. feedback, or
dialectic (pick your favorite buzz word) between the internal structure of the
components of a system and its position in the system. While each of the
structural positions - core, periphery, semiperiphery - has a "typical social
structure" (at least in the modern world-system), the social structure of any
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component of the system significantly shapes its potential for change in
position in that system. It is the interplay of these two processes that is the
focus of most modern world-system research.
Now enter the question of the existence of earlier world-systems and
their roles, if any, in the emergence of the modern world-system. It seems
to me that the only way this question can be addressed empirically is by
studying earlier world-systems. It is here that the division between the
continuationists and the transformationists becomes singularly salient, and
why I subtitled this paper "a view from the 'transformationist' camp." If, in
fact, there have been many different types of world-systems, the
transformation from one type to another is an important problem, and one
that can only be addressed comparatively. This also applies to the
continuationist camp, but there it is less clear why this is so.
Both camps also face a fundamental problem: how does interaction
between world-systems take place? This is especially problematic in a tight
definition of a "world-system" as "self-contained." If world-systems are in
regular contact and exchange anything (material or ideational), they are no
longer self-contained. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1993) address this problem by
conceptualizing the boundaries of world-systems as theoretically and
empirically problematic. They see three levels of interaction: bulk goods,
military/political interaction, and luxury goods. Each level is successively
larger, with the smaller ones nested within the larger ones. Interaction within
each level is at least partially independent of interactions within the other
levels.
A closely related problem for both camps is how one world-system
absorbs or incorporates another. My own work (Hall, 1986, 1989a) shows
that incorporation even at the very fringes of the modern world-system in
its weakest form (Spanish colonization of what is now New Mexico) is an
extremely complex process which has been seriously understudied and
undertheorized by world-system analysts. Indeed, one of my own research
questions focllses on the generality of the specific processes of incorporation
which occurred in what is now the American Southwest. This is an issue
that can only he studied by a multifaceted comparative strategy: comparing
processes of incorporation among areas of the Spanish empire, between
different European empires, and among world-systems.
In examining the history of Afro-Eurasia (Hall, 1993), I found that the
three boundaries often did not coincide. It appears that a distinctive feature
of the modern world-system is that these three boundaries do coincide, so
their partial independence has not been problematic for analysts of the modern
world-system. Thus, one can analyze the interaction of world-systems in
terms of incorporation at these different levels. Following McNeill's phrase
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"the Closure of the Eurasian Ecumene" (1963: 195), Eurasia became one
large world-system at the lUxury goods level in the last centures B.C.E. In
the next millennium a considerable amount of Africa was drawn into the net
(Moseley, 1992; Willard, 1993). Only with the Mongol conquest was AfroEurasia united at the military/political level, albeit briefly. Finally, in the
nineteenth century it was united at the bulk goods exchange level.
Despite these differences and gaps, it seems to me that the comparative
logic is the same for world-system analysts and civilizationists. These two
approaches differ primarily in what they see as similar and what they see as
different among the world-systems/civilizations they compare. This is where
Melko's other major concern becomes paramount. Civilizations and worldsystems are not the same thing, but they seem to be close cousins. Both
concepts share a frustrating vagueness of definition which seems, at least in
part, to be due to a fuzziness of the actual boundaries of each. IS What is
different are the criteria each uses to bound systems.
Enough of countercritiques of Melko' s article. Following his lead, how
might a symbiotic relationship be built? An answer might be found precisely
in the different concepts of world-system and civilization.
TOWARD A SYMBIOSIS: ANOTHER ROUND

Civilizationists, it seems to me as an outsider recently invited in for a
visit, focus primarily on cultural or ideational elements as opposed to material
criteria. This, does, in fact, point to significant differences between the two
approaches. While it is a cliche - and a tired and incorrect one at that that world-system analysis is overly materialistic or economic, there has
been increasing attention to culture and its role in world-system processes
(see Bergesen 1992b for list of citations). This attention goes beyond culture
as epiphenomenon and examines it as an important component of worldsystem processes.
Alice Willard's (1993) recent article on west African trade and religion
points to one way these issues might be joined. She highlights the role of
Islam in facilitating trade across the Sahara, noting world-systemic pressure
driving the trade. Here there are interesting parallels with Jerry Bentley's
(1993) discussion of religion in all sorts of exchanges in first- and secondmillennium Eurasia. This is not the place to address the old debate about the
causal priority of material or ideological processes in social change. Rather,
I seek to highlight that the two tend to move together and the patterns of
world-system exchanges, especially of lUXury goods, often facilitate, and
are facilitated by, the spread of new ideologies, typically in the form of
religion. What remains unanalyzed at this point is the role of ideology in
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incorporation processes.
Indeed, both Wallerstein (1992) and especially Albert Bergesen (1992b)
have pointed out that if hegemony in the modern world-system is in the
process of shifting from the United States to Japan, this will be the first time
(for the modern world-system) that a hegemonic shift coincides with a
civilizational shift. Bergesen argues that Godzilla and transformers (the toys
and the cartoon characters) are a beachhead of the Japanese cultural invasion
of America. Whether Japan is actually becoming hegemonic, and if so,
whether Godzilla is the pointman of the cultural invasion, is not the point.
The point is, if such a shift is taking place it is unprecedented in the modern
world-system.
It seems to me that this type of problem, again, can only be studied
comparatively. Furthermore, it seems to me that civilizationists are most
likely to have knowledge and insights into how to study the issue. On the
other hand, world-system analysts offer a variety of ways to study
intersocietal interaction systematically. Much more is involved than simply
knowing that civilizations exchanged things and ideas: What were the things
and ideas exchanged? How important were they in the respective
civilizations/world-systems? How were they produced? How was production
changed by the demand for external exchange? Why did the exchange begin?
What sustained it? Why did it end? And so on.
The contribution of world-system analysts, and this is what I read in
McNeill's autocritique (1990), is that the system itself - no matter how
inchoate or ramshackle - provides the fundamental context within which
these questions must be answered. It is only by giving attention to the
formation and transformation of such systems that we can begin to grasp
how we got from some 100,000 small, autonomous bands around 10,000
years ago to our modern global village. The puzzle is sufficienlly complex,
enticing, and important to warrant a large variety of attempts to solve it. It
is precisely because civilizationist approaches are so different from the worldsystem approach that they are interesting. World-system analysts are not
seeking hegemony in the comparative study of civilizations, but rather a
theoretical multiculturalism.
DePauw University
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NOTES
I.

An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the ISCSC meeting,
Scranton, PA, June 3-6, 1993 for a panel entitled: "Are There Better
Approaches to Civilizational Studies?" Stephen Sanderson kindly
represented my position in my absence. While the usual disclaimers
apply, special thanks are due to Professor Sanderson for comments and
sharing a number of his unpublished papers. Professor Matthew Melko
did likewise, "agreeing to disagree." Finally, I must acknowledge the
contribution of my students in Social Change, Fall 1993, who insisted
on clarifications and asked probing questions.

2.

I capitalize and italicize the final "s" to emphasize the plurality of
theories. For those readers familiar with Kuhn's (1970, 1977) concept
of paradigm, I am using "perspective" as a close synonym, the point
being that there are a number of world-system theories.

3.

For a shoot-out over the hyphenation ofthis term, see Wallerstein (1983)
and Thompson (1983).

4.

The concept of underdevelopment has a long intellectual pedigree which
is reviewed by Chirot and Hall (1982). The empirical evidence for
Wallerstein's claims has been challenged; see especially O'Brien
(1982), Bairoch (1986), and Stern (1988a, 1988b), along with
Wallerstein's reply (1988).

5.

Global Formation received the Political Economy of the World-System
section of the American Sociological Association prize for
distinguished scholarship in 1992. This is clear recognition by worldsystem scholars of his work on the modern world-system.

6.

On the status of women see Ward (1984, 1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1993)
and Mies (1986). Ward's critique of world-system theory (1993) is
especially insightful.

7.

Wolf's extension of this analysis to the problem of "culture" may be
of particular interest to civilizationists (1984). For one world-system
interpretation of Wol f, see Hall (1984a).

8.

The term "tribal" is in quotes because in practice it is a very imprecise
term which carries a great deal of theoretical and ideological baggage.
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These issues are summarized in Hall (l991b, 1989:Ch. 2).
9.

However, some writers have addressed this issue. For example, several
writers have used world-system theory to analyze Indian-White
relations in North America (Hall, 1989a, 1989b; Harris, 1990;
Jorgensen, 1978; Kardulias, 1990; Meyer, 1990, 1991).

10. The archaeological approaches to precapitalist world-systems are
reviewed with an extensive bibliography in Hall and Chase-Dunn
(1993).
11. See Santley and Alexander (1992) for a recent exception. There is a
major controversy lurking in the wings. Some social theorists, notably
Max Weber and many neo-Weberians, argue that there can only be
"secular histories," that is, histories and social theories applicable to
relatively limited time spans (a few centuries). Others, notably modern
positivists, argue that a universal history and social theory is possible
- even if exceedingly difficult to produce. Braudelians (of whom
Wallerstein considers himself one) argue that there are at least three
time scales: ordinary or daily time, cyclical time, and long-term time
(La Longue dureej. World-system theory as propounded by Wallerstein
operates at the cyclical scale. Archaeologists are trying to stretch it to
La Longue duree. John Hall (1980, 1992) and Fernand Braudel (1980)
discuss time scales in detail.
12. For mOfl~ detailed description of the different camps see Hall and ChaseDunn (1993) and Chase-Dunn's (1992) introduction to a special issue
of Review on "Comparing World-Systems."
13. McGuire (1980, 1983, 1986, 1989) has also contributed to this debate.
His 1989 article focuses on religion.
14. Sanderson (1990, 1991) makes this argument in considerable detail. I
do not mean to imply that there is no difference among evolutionary
thinkers. Rather, I seek to point up the ethnocentric, teleological image
of evolutionary thinking as overdrawn.
15. While I reject Iberall' s gas-liquid-solid model of societies or
civilizations (lberall and Wilkinson, 1993), a wave model of matter
might serve as a useful metaphor. In a drive for clarity combined with
the excessive reliance on linear mathematical models, social scientists
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have too often used "billiard ball" concepts (Wolf, 1982) rather than
probability concepts (Roth, 1992). In other words, the fuzziness is not
due to improper conceptualization of boundaries, but to an accurate
reflection of social reality.
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CIVIL SYSTEMS:
A REVIEW OF THE WORLD-SYSTEM
THEORIES OF ANDRE GUNDER
FRANK AND OF CHRISTOPHER
CHASE-DUNN AND THOMAS D.
HALLl
Roger Williams Wescott
I am too much an heir of lexicographcr Samuel Johnson to have
reconciled myself to the term "civilizationist." But I admit to being both a
student of civilization and a comparer of civilizations. In the former role, I
am drawn to world history and to world-systems theory. In the lattcr role, I
am drawn to ethnographies and to the comparative (as well as the contrastivc)
study of civilizations.
If it is objected that this is fence-straddling and that I should make up
my mind, I would reply by quoting the late Wallace Notcstein of Yale, who
reportedly told his students, at the beginning of each year, "All men must
be alike, or we wouldn't know they are men; and they must hc different, or
we couldn't tell them apart." In more general terms, we might rephrase this
formula to read: all phenomena are alike, by virtue of their common
phenomenality; and they are different, by virtuc of their common plurality.
This dichotomy of the one and the many - permanence and change,
identity and disparity - was debated by the Greeks from Heraclitus to
Plotinus, long before it resurfaced in modern scholarly polemics. 2 One way
in which it has recurred is in the question of the most suitable name for the
comparative study of religions. In the Victorian era, it was usually called
Comparative Religion; today, it is more often called World Religions.
Although I have taught it only under the oldcr title, I doubt that I would
experience any difficulty in presenting it under the newer one - or that the
content would change greatly as a result of the name change.
Like Chase-Dunn and Hall (hereaftcr CD & H), I am an "enthusiastic
disciplinary trespasser."l I concur with them and evidcntly too with Frank
that disciplinary parochialism impedes the study of civilization - as does
regional and temporal parochialism. To these thrce obstacles, I would add
a fourth, ideological parochialism, to be discussed below.
Among the strengths of Frank's Bronze Age article, I think, is his
avoidance of regional parochialism, as manifest in his inclusion of central
Asia and northern Eurasia in his early world-system. 4 Intercstingly, there is
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evidence of northern Eurasian influence not only on southern Eurasia,
through conquest, but also on North America, by means not yet elucidated.
The evidence is linguistic and consists of Indo-European and Uralic
vocabulary in the Penutian languages of California. 5
Another commendable aspect of Frank's writings, I believe, is his
acknowledgement of the uncertainty of Bronze Age dates, to some of which
he would be willing to add two centuries. 6 In my view, there are no firm
pre-Alexandrian dates for any region. Where firm dates are lacking, however,
my inclination, unlike Frank's, is to reduce time-depth, largely on the grounds
that Hellenistic scholars, like Manetho in Egypt and Berossus in
Mesopotamia, tended nationalistically to inflate the antiquity of their
countries.? The most drastic reduction of ancient chronology is probably that
of Gunnar Heinsohn or the University of Bremen, who grants civilization
worldwide an antiquity of little more than three thousand years.R Frank
himself implicitly admits the plausibility of such time compression when he
acknowledges, with some puzzlement, that economic cycles seem to get
shorter as time passes. For it is at least possible that the seemingly long
cycles of the early Bronze Age were actually no longer than subsequent
cyclesY
As long as we are on the subject of ancient dating, I should add that it
is not only absolute chronology about which I have doubts but relative
chronology as well. More precisely, I am not convinced that the conventional
Bronze Age-before-lron Age sequence is as reliable as the Stone Age-beforeMetal Age sequence. It is generally admitted that, in some areas, such as
Japan, iron was smelted at least as early as bronze. III And it seems that iron
ore was mined long before copper in Africa, even though the uses to which
the ore was put remain debatable. I I Here too, however, Frank concedes a
question about the conventional sequence by noting that iron finds in IndoChina precede bronze by over a century.12
Frank, I am relieved to note, does not fall into the familiar social science
pattern of treating all political and economic cycles as though they were
wholly and necessarily endogenous to human society. He acknowledges
intrusi ve factors such as climate, habitat, and disease.13 He even cites a
catastrophist, Peter James, on the subject of the dramatically sudden collapse
of various Bronze Age civilizations.14 Most congenial to me, he further refers
to legendary material on floods and other protohistoric disasters. 15 What
seems particularly significant to me about such references is that they
highlight a discrepancy that most historians and prehistorians have been too
ready, I think, to dismiss or ignore. This discrepancy is the divergence of
professional archaeology, which depicts human development as
predominantly gradual and progressive, from worldwide oral tradition, which
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depicts the past as marked by extensive and traumatic catastrophes that have
left our species psychologically damaged.
There is only one matter of fact on which I find Frank in error and that
is (what I read as) his separation of Dorians from other Indo-Europeans.16
The Dorians, being Greek, were as Indo-European as the Romans, the Hittites,
the Persians and other early Eurasian speakers oflanguages related to modern
English, Russian, and Hindi.
Predictably, perhaps, I do not perceive as great a difference between
the world-system theories of Frank on the one hand and Chase-Dunn and
Hall on the other as I think they themselves perceive. Where they do differ,
I tend rather to lean toward Frank, for reasons that I hope to make clear
below.
Generally speaking, I find CD & H too prone to trcat conceptual
dichotomies in a discrete rather than a gradient manner. Questions which
they treat as either/or matters seem to me to be more-or-Iess matters. Ten
examples follow.
CD & H ask, "Is social change cyclical or transformational?"17 What
they take to be a question of fact, I take to be one of interpretation. An
illustrative example is the ancient Roman political shift from kingdom to
republic to empire. Those who call this change cyclical can point quite
convincingly to the fact that both kingdoms and empires (as domains ruled
by emperors) are monarchies. Yet those who call the change transformational
can argue, equally persuasively, I think, that imperial Rome was so different
from Tarquin Rome that the two should not be equated, even in terms of
governance. In other words, the question posed is less one of objective
ontology than of subjective hermeneutics, even though the subjectivity
involved may be collective rather than individual.
CD & H characterize Frank as belonging among "the radical apostles
of continuity."18 By contrast, they themselves are presumably conservative
with regard to the positing of continuity. In concrete terms, Frank gives the
world system an antiquity of about 5,000 years, while they give it one of
about 3,500 years. To me, Frank's position seems more liberal than radical.
A radical construction of systemic continuity, to my mind, would be one
that extended it well into the Neolithic Age. But again, this is a matter more
of impression than of fact.
CD & H place themselves among "those theorists who study interaction
networks rather than distributions of cultural characteristics."19 Presumably
they mean that their focus is on activities, like trade and conquest, rather
than on traits, like literacy and urbanism. A cataloguer of traits, however,
might well list commercialism and imperialism as cultural traits typifying
advanced societies. Yet, conversely, an interactionist might class writing
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and city-building as intrinsically interactive behavior patterns. Either way,
however, the dichotomy loses its sharpness.
CD & H describe Hawaii as representative of "geographically isolated
systems."21l In literal terms, one can hardly dispute their assertion, since the
Italian source-word isola means "island." But the cultural closeness of Hawaii
to the rest of Polynesia makes it clear that Hawaii was nautically accessible
to sister islands. And recent research seems increasingly to erode the picture,
once dear to arm-chair scholars, of oceans as insuperable barriers to travel.
CD & H reject the view that transmission of sweet-potato cultivation
from Peru to Hawaii makes these two regions participants "in the same worldsystem."2! In the absence of a strict definition of world-systems, I think the
question moot. All I would readily concede is that, in this case, systemicity
(not "systemness," please) is minimal.
CD & H describe groups of people as "interacting importantly" with
immediate neighbors but proceed to insist that "the search for a certain
number of separate small-scale systems is a senseless task."22 Importance,
it seems to me, is far more a matter of attitude than of demonstrability. The
same goes, to an even greater degree, perhaps, for senselessness.
Before presenting their Working Hypotheses, CD & H pose the
provocative question, "Do all world-systems have core/periphery
differentiation and/or core/periphery hierarchies?"23 To this, both they and
I answer in the affirmative, although, I suspect, with slightly different
rationales. For them, peripherality apparently correlates with powerlessness
vis-a-vis a powerful core area. For me, peripherality correlates with stylistic
distance from an archetypal core area. If we take Western (or neo-European)
civilization as a system, I would rate Germany as more peripheral to it than
the Netherlands, Poland as more peripheral than Germany, and Russia as
more peripheral than Poland. But CD & H, I infer, would postulate a different
sequence, based more on demogfaphic and political than on geographic
criteria.
CD & H seek to distinguish those elements in world-systems that "are
meaningfully different" from "those that are meaningfully the same."24 As
regards sameness and difference, I would repeat what I observed above: that
all comparison involves both. As regards meaningfulness, I would take a
relativistic position: that anything that seems meaningful to anyone is, ipso
facto, at least minimally meaningful. On the same page, they announce their
intention "to compare large numbers of world-systems." As a comparativist,
I share their goal. But, insofar as a world-system is a civilization, I would
say that the feasibility of the project depends on the level of discourse and
of classification. At the global level, there is and always has been, I would
say, only one civilization; whereas, at every less inclusive level, there are
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many.25 At the local level, I would add, the number of civilizations may be
equated with the number of cities. (My conceptual model here is biological
taxonomy, in accordance with which there is now and always has been only
one biosphere, though this unit is divisible into both a hierarchy of taxa and
a number of biotic zones.)
To avoid simplistic predictions of our collective future, CD & H
recommend "examining earlier major transitions."26 The prohlem, however,
of distinguishing between major and minor transitions is like that of
distinguishing between meaningful and meaningless differences. To most
historians in the Western world, the transition from the 'Medieval' to the
'Modern' era has seemed so momentous as to punctuate the history not only
of Europe but also of the world at large. To many comparativists, on the
other hand, the distinction has seemed relatively parochial. Spengler, in
particular, characterized the global AncientlMedieval/Modern periodization
as "incredibly jejune."
Much the same observation can be made concerning the distinction
made by CD & H between "Iumpers and splitters" in the study of worldsystems,27 Here, as in so many other fields involving classification, whether
implicit or explicit, one man's lumper is another man's splitter. Among those
comparativists who have given explicit counts of civilization, for example,
Carroll Quigley listed 16 civilizations. To Toynbee, who (between 1939 and
1961) listed 43 civilizations, Quigley seemed to be a lumper. To Othmar
Anderle, however, who listed 7 civilizations, Quigley seemed to be a
splitter. 2R
The principle here is much the same, again, as that in hiotaxonomy,
where the number of organic kingdoms recognized by systematists varies
from two to six, as below.
I. plants
2. animals
3. protistans (such as amoebae)
4. monerans (such as bacteria)
5. fungi
6. viruses
Classificatory minimalists list only the first two kingdoms. To them,
those who list three or four kingdoms seem to be splitters. Classificatory
maximalists, on the other hand, list all six kingdoms. To them, those who
list only three or four seem to be lumpers.
As an anthropologist, I am naturally appreciative of Chase-Dunn's
ethnographic sophistication, as evidenced in his writings on indigenous
peoples of East Africa and North America. 29 One of the few ethnographic
matters on which I would be somewhat critical of his position has to do with
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social control. As I read his "Typology ofWorld-Systems,"3o those societies
which lack overt polities depend for authority structure on kinship systems.
Although he mentions age-groups, he seems to treat them solely as biological
phenomena. Yet they are in fact important social institutions among most
tribal peoples, particularly (and ironically) those of East Africa. For many
of these peoples - such as the Sidamo of Ethiopia, the Nandi of Kenya,
and the lie of Uganda - age-groups outweigh kin-groups in power and
influence.
Looking hack over my remarks thus far, I realize that I may be
handicapped by my failure to have read earlier work by world-systematists.
The term "world-system" itself leads me almost reflexively to ask, "Whose
world? Which system?" Even if we grant that the word 'world' is almost
intrinsically imprecise, it seems that we should be able to define the word
'system'. Is it any bounded aggregation, as the phrase 'solar system'
suggests? Is it inherently restricted to living aggregates, as the biological
sources of Ludwig von Bertalanffy's General Systems Theory imply? Why
is it preferentially applied to civil, rather than to precivil, societies? Is it only
because Immanuel Wallerstein is a political sociologist and, because of the
absence of polities from foraging societies, consequently uninterested in
pre urban communities? My fellow contributors may well be able to answer
these questions - if, indeed, they have not already done so.
To the extent that I still prefer 'comparative civilization' to worldsystems theory. I do so for reasons that are more than theoretical. All
world-systematists seem to me to write abstractly, preferring concept to
percept and logic to experience. Their discourse is marked by polysyllables
like 'substantivism', 'accumulationism', and 'continuationism'. What I miss
in their publications is the often sensuous texture of actual cultures, both
literate and preliterate, which I find in Spengler's Decline of the West perhaps because of his intellectual apprenticeship to ethnologist Leo
Frobenius.
Earlier I spoke of disciplinary, regional, and temporal parochialism,
expressing my admiration of Frank, Chase-Dunn, and Hall for having avoided
all three. To these three parochialisms, however, I added a fourth, ideological
parochialism, which I feel that they have not avoided. For them, it seems to
me, empires and trade-networks are the essence of world-systems. The
resultant political and economic reductionism, as I see it, has led them to
neglect artistic and symbolic aspects of civilization and the pervasive element
of cultural style. Here again they appear to be at the opposite discursive pole
from Spengler, whose sensitivity - perhaps oversensitivity - to stylistic
factors led him idiosyncratically to refer to Western civilization as Faustian,
Hellenic civilization as Apollinian, and Levantine civilization as Magian.
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Many humanists, I believe, would concur in thc prcceding critiquc, sceing
social scientists gcnerally as too pronc to focus on 'hare!' political and
economic facts at the expcnsc of 'soft' vcrbal and iconic valucs, Few,
howcvcr, would be likcly to takc thc furthcr stcp proposcd by biochcmist
Rupcrt Shcldrake, author of thc theory of "morphic rcsonance" Shcldrakc' s
theory might bc dcscribed as an cxtension of thc thcory of "stimulus
diffusion" put forward by thc anthropologist Alfrcd Krochcr. Krocbcr's
contribution to thc debatc betwccn invcntionists and dillusionists was the
suggestion that somc cultural coincidcnccs - including CVCIl that of thc Old
World and Ncw World pyramids -might bc cxplaincd by oral transmission
of ideas in the ab~cnce of migration, conqucst, or tradc.
Sheldrakc, howcvcr, went considcrably furthcr. Starting with thc
embryological puzzlc of morphogcncsis and solving it (to his satisfaction)
by postulating a "ficld of influcncc" surrounding thc fcrtilized gcrm-plasm,
hc cxtended this notion to othcr domains, including human culturc. In his
paradigm, such familiar exprcssions as "winds of doctrinc" and "climatc of
opinion" are to bc takcn almost litcrally, with thc rcsult that both conccpts
and imagcs can bc assumcdto diffusc cvcn in thc ahscncc of verbal contacl."
Although most of Shcldrakc's scientific collcagues havc dismisscd his
positcd proccss as intrinsically impossible, somc ingeniollsly controllcd
expcriments support his hypothcsis. If thcrc is validity in it, morphic
resonancc must almost incvitably affect all systcm-Iormation and,
consequently, all systcms-thcory.
Southbury, Connccticut
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The four sources on which I have relied primarily are Christopher
Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, "Comparing World-Systems:
Concepts and Working Hypotheses," Social Forces, 71, 4, June 1993;
Thoma, D. Hall and Christopher Chase-Dunn. 'The World-Systems
Perspective amI Archaeology: Forward into the Past," The Journal of
Archaeological Research, I, 2, 1993; Andre Gunder Frank, "Latin
America at the Margin of World-System History," Comparative
Cil'ili;:iltion.l Rel'iell',1993;
n, Spring
and Andre Gunder Frank,
"Brollle Age World-System Cycles," Current Anthropology, 34, 3,
August-Octoher, 1993. Two of the four arc especially relevant to my
interest in prehistory.
Bertrand Russell. A Histor\" of Western PhilosophY, Simon and
2.
SchustL'f, New York, 1945, pp. 4X-55, 6X-71, and 2XX-90.
3.
"The World-Systems Perspective and Archaeology" (hereafter WSP),
p. 123.
"Bron/e Age World-System Cycles" (hereafter BAC), pp. 392 and 396.
4.
Catherine A. Callaghan, "An 'Indo-European' Type Paradigm in Proto5.
Eastern Miwok," American Indiiln and !Jldo-Ellropean Studies,
Mouton, The Hague, Paris, and New York, 1980; and Otto 1. von
Sadov~lky, "The New Genetic Relationship and the Paleolinguistics
of the Central California Indian Ceremonial Houses," The LACUS
Forulll. 19X3, 516-30. Here it should he noted that Callaghan regards
the pronominal suffixes of Miwok as only seemingly Indo-European:
where,ls Sadovslky treats the Oh-Ugrian lexcmes of California
Penuti,1Il as Uralic cognates rather than, as I do, only as loan-words.
6.
Frank, BAC, pp. 397 and 399. Roger W. Wescott. "History. ProtoH is tory, and the Search for Synchron ism s." Ciltilstroph iSIll (lnd Ancien t
Histor\", January 1990.
X.
Gunnar Heinsohn and Herihert Illig, Wann Lehten die Pharaonen')
Scarahaeus hie Eichhorn, Frankfurt-am-Main, passim.
9.
Frank, BAC, p. 405.
10. Percy Knauth, The Metalsmiths, Time-Life Books. New York, 1974,
p. 13.
II. Raymond A. Dart, Foreword to The God-King.1 and The Titilns: The
Nne World Ascendwlcy in Ancient Tillles hy James Bailey, SI. Martin's
Press, New York, 1973, p. 14.
12. Frank, BAC, p. 4()().
13. Frank, BAC, pp. 3X3, 403, and 404.
14. Frank, HAC, p. 39X.
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CIVILIZATIONS ARE WORLD
SYSTEMS!
David Wilkinson
The title of this article states my position in the rieh and burgeoning
civilizationist/world-systems debate about as succinctly as possible.
Civilizationists and world-systems analysts should be studying the same
entities. This will occur if and when civilizationists accept that the many
local civilizations of the past have become the single global civilization of
today; and whcn world-systemists accept that the single, global world-system
of today is thc fusion product of a substantial number of smaller-scale world
systems of thc past; and when both accept that the plural civilizations of the
past, and the plural urbanized world systcms of the past, were, and that
today's singular civilization and singular world system are, identical.
A joint intellectual undertaking could then be pursued, probably with
different but complementary emphases. CiviliLationists might cluster their
efforts more (but not exclusively) toward the earlier, more pluralistic epochs
of civil izationa I evolution, world-systemists toward the later, more monistic.
Civilizationists already tend, I think, to interest themselves more in the
cultural aspects of a society than in the political. and more in the political
than in the ec()nomic; world-systemists tend oppositely; neither group need
surrender its inclinations, though each would have to take account of the
other's propo~itions.
Few readers will he shocked to learn that my proposals suit my own
established predilections; tor their benefit I should place my cards face up
on the table. In 1966 I was urging my graduate students in international
relations to find ways of integrating the work of Spengler and Toynbee with
what was then called a systems analysis approach to international relations
theory, whose chief representatives then were Morton A. Kaplan (1957) on
the deductive. theoretical. normative side, Stanley Hoffmann (1960, 1965)
on the historical-sociological side, Richard N. Rosecrance (1963) combining
hoth - all three were my teachers -- and George Modelski (1961). This is
the kind of assignment which one usually winds up having to carry out
oneself. That duly occurred, and in 1967 I found myself producing for my
students' henefit, or dismay. a manuscript called "Civilizations and World
Politics:' whose then incarnation drew on most of the aforementioned. plus
Charles McClelland (195R). A.F.K. Organski (195R. esp. chs. R. 12, and 17).
Martin Wight (1946). Raymond Aron (1966). hut most centrally the
civilizationist Carroll Quigley (1961 ). for the desired theoretical synthesis.
It didn't work.
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It didn't work because it vacillated between accepting the assumption
of the international-systems analysts that the contemporary glohe contained
one and only one system, which produced the interesting and important
phenomena of balance-of-power, states-system-and-empire, order-anddisorder, peace-and-war, and the assertion of the civilizationists that the
contemporary globe contained several distinct civilizations, defined by
common cultural forms, for which the above-mentioned phenomena were
the results of their internal processes.
Examining that manuscript at this distance in time, I am struck by the
fact that I had all that I needed to reach the resolution I in fact accomplished
much later. On the systems side, Modelski had drawn attention to
"homogeneity"' (one vs. many parallel "traditions") in a social system as an
important variable (1961: 126-30). Aron, following Papaligouras' (1941: 174)
contention that multiple parallel international legal processes had
authoritatively posited mutually contradictory international legal norms, had
argued that "the distinction between homogeneous systems and
heterogeneous systems" was fundamental (Aron, 1966:99-100), and had
defined as "heterogeneous" those international systems in which states were
organized according to different principles and obeyed different values
(1966:94,98-100, 128). Hoffmann, extending Papaligouras' argument of
(1941: Ch. VII -VIII), had argued that heterogeneous or "uneven"
international systems were also unstable or "revolutionary," because the
stakes of conflict therein were unlimited (1965:92-93). In contrast,
Rosecrance, following Ashby's cybernetics, had contended that the degree
of "variety" in international systems' disturhance and regulation was an
important empirical variable in accounting both for breakdown and for
stabilization (1963:220 ff). On the civilizationist side, Toynbec, in his
Reconsiderations, had defined "society" as the total network of relations
between human beings, "societies" as particular networks that are not
components of any larger network, "civilization" as a state of society in
which a minority of the population is liberated from economic activities,
and "civilizations" as that species of the genus society whose members are
particular historical exemplifications of the abstract idea "civilization"
(1961:271,278,280,282,287). I also had Quigley's preliminary criterion
of cities (and writing) as the external identifiers of a civilization (1961 :3132). But I tried to compromise among incompatible world-views by adopting
the criteria of all simultaneously. I proposed to examine, as civilizations and
world systems: large and coherent social areas with a large and fairly dense
population, cities, and writing; which comprised social-transactional network
structures with closed boundaries; in which wealth is created, savings
accumulated, a nonproducing class supported, and economic inventions
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created and exploited; and having unity of cultural form. These criteria
simplified empirical and comparative study famously, as nothing got past
them.
My work along these lines accordingly stagnated, though I watched
with interest the extension of Kaplan's model to a smaller scale by my thencolleague Anthony Martin (1970), the new work of Modelski (1972, 1987)
and Modelski and Thompson (1988) on the evolution of the world system,
and the beginning of what was to prove continuous development of the worldsystems approach of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), none of which, however,
could quite resolve my difficulties. Martin was examining a regional
subsystem, a core, rather than a whole system. Modelski and Thompson
brought a very useful reflection on geopolitics, and particularly the changing
meaning of naval power in systems of different sizes and hence spatial
configurations, without resolving for me the problem of the unit of analysis.
Wallerstein (like Modelski) went farther back in search of relevant history
than most systems analysts, but not as far as Quigley, whose political
economy seemed more persuasive.
After participating in the refoundation of the International Society for
the Comparative Study of Civilizations in the United States (Philadelphia,
December 1971), and in response to the dialogic initiative of Matthew Melko,
reading Melko's 1969 work The Nature of Civilizations and the manuscript
works of John Hord (q.v.), and having a 1977 redraft of "Civilizations and
World Politics" (which tried to produce a Quigleyan model, but in process
found coherence and closure to be incompatible criteria and ended by
proposing that the contemporary world constituted a single incoherent
civilization with a core-periphery structure) commented on by both, I was
impelled, in Melko's ISCSC "Boundaries" sessions of 1978-1983
(documented in Melko and Scott, eds., 1987), to a reaffirmation, a radical
simplification, a change of direction, a complete abandonment of the
coherence criterion, and new concltlsions, as follows.
1. Civilizations are world systems.
2. Their relevant criteria are cities and closed transactional networks,
not size, nor writing, nor a Quigleyan "instrument of expansion," nor cultural
coherence/homogeneity (Wilkinson, 1987b).
3. On applying these criteria to the roster of candidate civilizations, we
find that many of the "usual suspects" - Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Far
Eastern, Indie, Japanese, Peruvian, Mexican - pass muster. But many others
- Western, Islamic, Russian, Greco-Roman, Medieval - are not closed
societies; they are parts of a larger, culturally heterogeneous network-entity.
This civilization, of which these other putative "civilizations" are then
regions or epochs, needs a name. I have called it "Central" civilization
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(Wilkinson, 1987a, I 987b).
4. There was a plurality of civilizations/world systems on the globe
until the late 19th or early 20th centuries. Now there is only one survivor,
Central civilization, whose network expanded to global scale and absorbed
all others (Wilkinson, 1987a).
5. Civilizations typically show the alternation between political disunity
and political unity posited by Toynbee in his revised "Helleno-Sinic model"
(1961:157, 170-209). However, the unity - the phase of the "universal
state" (Toynbee), "universal system" (Kaplan), "world state," "universal
empire" (Quigley), or "world empire" (Wallerstein) - is usually brief and
fragile, for reasons having to do with the structure and succession of
leadership (Wilkinson, 1983, 1988).
6. The chief social bond scaled to the dimensions of the civilization is
politico-military-diplomatic. Cultural bonds have smaller scales. Until the
growth of Central civilization to global scale, economic bonds had larger
scales, and defined oikumenes, trading areas that were larger than the areas
in which states could rule, fight or ally (Wilkinson, 1992, 1993).
7. Central civilization is only the most blatantly heterogeneous of
civilizations. Other civilizations too are polycultures (Iberall and Wilkinson,
1993), though when (e.g., Japan) they have possessed a universal state of
long duration it has usually had a homogenizing ideology and utopia (cf.
Mannheim, 1936) and policy.
8. The civilization-formation process was still continuing - that is,
cities were appearing on preurban social terrain, not as extensions of or
reactions to the political impingements of neighboring cities, hut often as
reactions to the economic impingements of oikumenes - perhaps as late as
the 17th, even the 18th century in Africa (Wilkinson, 1993, 19(4).
9. Central civilization formed in the first instance in the mid-2nd
millennium BC, in consequence of the expansion, collision and fusion of
two pre-existing civilizations, Mesopotamian and Egyptian. It grew by
expanding against, and engulfing, other civilizations, without ever fully
homogenizing them or itself (Wilkinson, 1984).
10. The heterogeneities of other civilizations may be the result of the
same processes. That is, a trade network extends itself into a preurban social
terrain; a city forms, perhaps so that a local political elite can avail itself of
the local surplus thereby generated; but a larger expanding civilization, its
familiars driven by similar motives, in due course recruits the new city to
its polity. The motives to recruit it to its (anyway heterogeneous) culture are
weaker, and a diversity of languages (and dialects), religions (and cults and
schisms), races (and physiognomies and ethnicities and families), apparels,
etc. persists. Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Indic, Far Eastern, Mcxican, and
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Peruvian civilization could fruitfully be examined comparatively, with a
view to relating their various heterogeneities to the order and independence
of their urbanization processes.
This summary leads naturally to the main topic ofthis paper: the current
debate in our overlapping fields, and the positions of the participants. I shall
try to locate myself with respect to each of a large number of participants.
Toynbec. I draw very heavily on Toynbee, both in agreement and in
opposition, but almost exclusively on his extensively revised model of 1961,
from Reconsiderations, rather than on the much better-known earlier volumes
of A Study of History. My definition of a civilization/world system takes
off from his rethinking (1961 :278-87). My roster is based on a critique of
his list and Quigley's. In an empirical test of his civilizational kinematics
(phase transition sequence), original and revised versions, vs. those of
Spengler, Philip Bagby (1958), Melko, and Quigley, my data fit the
expectations of his revised theory perfectly; those of his original theory came
in next best (Wilkinson, 1986:29). Toynbee is however seduced by the
mythos of cultural coherence - not entirely, no one is, and he provides a
useful model of cultural contradiction and connict, but he relates it integrally
to breakdown. He is replete with fertile notions, and, I believe, is the most
liberal of civilizationists, in the oldest sense ofthat word; an excellent teacher.
Quigley. Carroll Quigley provides a single, powerful, illuminating
insight into the dynamics of civilizations, the concept of the instrument of
expansion, which I view as a nonpartisan and nonsupersessionist
empiricization of the Marxian "mode of production," and as such an
improvement, with extensive research and practical implications. Some hint
of the latter can be found, on suitable occasions, in the kaleidoscopic
consciousness of Quigley's one-time student, William Jefferson Clinton.
Where many if not most civilizationists have centrally focused on culture,
Quigley focuses centrally on economics, and will probably be easiest for the
world-systems tradition to come to grips with. However, after spending some
time tryi ng to validate his proposition that growing civilizations are pervaded
by a single instrument of expansion, I judged that I had disconfirmed it
instead, gave up expecting macrosocieties to display much institutional
coherence, and began to consider the structure of their incoherence. In that
incoherence, I think that many of Quigley's propositions will be partially
confirmed, and that the location and limits of their application will be
significant.
Spengler. Spengler is the Antaeus of civilizationists, brilliantly,
perversely, powerfully wrong in more ways than any two others combined.
Spengler's kcy proposition, to the effect that each civilization develops a
single prime symbol, an all-pervasive style, is especially brilliantly wrong
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(the Gramscian doctrine of cultural "hegemony" being less so, except insofar
as it is doctrinaire, an answer instead of a question), and should point us to
the study ofthe failure of repeated attempts in that direction, and the resilience
of deviant, oppositional, variant, heretical, inverted, oppressed symbols, as
thematic of polycultural history. Is this failure correlated with the failure to
develop a single prime mode of production, class struggle, durable world
state and cosmopolis? I suspect so.
Melko. Melko accepts that today many civilizations coexist, and objects
to the idea that the only way we can study contemporary civilization
comparatively is to do so by reference to history. That is indeed the logical
consequence of my acceptance that today only one civilization exists. Our
respective rosters are properly derived from different definitions; we can
agree on some phenomena common to the civilizations that appear on both
our rosters. However, while he, like Spengler (1926: Table III), sees a feudal
state-imperial polity sequence (1969:101-32), I perceive no
holocivilizational feudal phase. Feudalism does indeed appear in
semiperipheries, with regard to which I find Rushton Coulborn's arguments
(1956:364-66) about feudalism as "a mode of revival of a society whose
polity has gone into extreme disintegration" in marginal regions - religion
being the general and core-area recovery modality - quite convincing. As
for states systems and empires, I find not a supersession but an alternation,
following Toynbee's Helleno-Sinic model, in which, consistent with Robert
Wesson's work (1967,1978), the states-system phase is more robust.
Melko is also doubtful, as is Chase-Dunn, about my admission to
civilizational status of very small-scale societies, with only one or two cities
- Melko questions my "Chibchan" civilization, Chase-Dunn my "Irish."
More recently - since I have responded only by accepting even smaller
civilizations into my roster (Wilkinson, 1993, 1994), Melko has suggested
that I will have to locate still others, for example, in Central Asia. My point
(10) above concurs with him. I hadn't closed my roster of civilizations in
1982 or 1987 (Wilkinson, 1980-1982, 1987b), and I am not ready to close
it now. Current candidates not treated then include several African
possibilities, and a second (!) Colombian candidate, Tairona "civilization."
Hord. I view all of John Hord's papers (q.v.) with great interest. Our
definitions of "civilization" are irreducibly different, but I believe that the
relatively homogeneous political-cultural entities he studies under that label
are genuine, and his understanding of them creative and novel. The
persistence and the fissility of his constitutional traditions has helped to
persuade me that (my) civilizations are characteristically, not just
incidentally, polycultures.
Sorokin. I have discussed Sorokin more fully elsewhere (forthcoming,
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1995). In brief: I concur with Sorokin's powerful critique (1950:113-20,
206-17; 1956: 163-64; 1963:413-19; 1966: 121-22,548-49) of civilizationists
- Spengler, Nikolai Danilevsky (1920), and especially Toynbee - who
observed social groups and thought they observed cultural groups. Sorokin
however resolves the difficulty by refusing the analytic concept of
"civilization." I resolve it by treating civilizations as social groups and not
as cultural groups, each, just as Sorokin complained (1950:213), "a cultural
field where a multitude of vast and small cultural systems and congeries partly mutually harmonious, partly neutral, partly contradictory - coexist."
Huntington. Sorokin's comment is worth recalling in another context.
Samuel P. Huntington has lately (1993) brought a political scientist's
perspective to the study of civilizations. He defines civilizations as cultural
groupings and cultural identities, accepts the plurality of contemporary
civilizations, presents a largely Toynbeean civilizational roster (23-25), and
hypothesizes that in the next phase of world politics "the fault lines between
civilizations will be the battIe lines of the future" (22). His argument is
detailed and provocative. I believe Sorokin would rightly contend that
Huntington's "major civilizations"-"Western, Confucian, Japanese,
Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African
civilization" (25) - are "cultural fields" rather than either systems or
potential actors. I would add that they are cultural subfields in the global
cultural field of a single civilization, a social and not a cultural entity. I
consequently doubt the hypotheses that "conflict between civilizations will
supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form
of conflict" and that "international relations ... will increasingly ... become a
game in which non-Western civilizations are actors ... " (48). More likely,
nostalgic ideologies of lost civilizational isolation and cultural status will
be used to mobilize support for struggles for power and prestige within a
solitary, incoherent civilization in which the ideologues have neither the
capacity nor the intention to creat~ a coherent cultural system, let alone a
culture capable of functioning as an actor.
Melko has objected to my schema (which describes the general course
of macrosocial history as the fusion of many small civilizations into the one
contemporary global civilization) on the grounds that it destroys the
possibility of a comparative study of civilizations, except so far as that study
is also historical. That is indeed its logical consequence. But those who
nonetheless wish to examine dialogically Huntington's contention that the
next stage in global political conflict will be a conflict of civilizations can
still do so perfectly well, but employing the different (and to my mind more
precise) locution "conflict of cultures within a single civilization." We can
then proceed to use for our historical analogs not the past collisions and
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fusions between civilizations, but the more frequent, more complex and
delicate (and, I suspect, more dialogic and perhaps even less violent) interplay
of the parts of a single society's polyculture. As a first approximation, on
account of the analogy I consider appropriate I am probably a bit more
sanguine about the outcome of such a conflict, even while being less sure
of its coming rise to prominence, than Huntington.
Chase-Dunn and Hall vs. Frank and Gills. On the issue of whether there
are many different precapitalist world-systems with different modes of
production (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 199Ia:23), or a single SOOO-year worldsystem with a single developmental logic (Frank and Gills), I partly split the
difference and partly disagree with both. (I) I don't use the term
"precapitalist" to describe any empirical civilization/world system; while
capitalist (and socialist) ideals, ideologies, and utopias are rather recent, their
accumulative and distributive practices are very old, possibly both
contemporaneous with the startup of civilization. (2) I find many different
world-systems (like Chase-Dunn and Hall), but of such unequal size, duration
and terminus that one ofthem (essentially that focused on by Gills and Frank)
eventually engulfed the others; this is the political!civilizational structure I
call Central Civilization. (3) In consequence of not finding one pervasive
Quigleyan "instrument of expansion" in any civilization, I don't use the term
"mode of production" in any world-system-Icvel application, except as a
hypothesis I don't expect to see confirmed. Each of the civilizations is
heterogeneous, polycultural, incoherent with respect to its politico-economic
patterning; though at some times in each some new or reinvented form has
looked like it would spread throughout and extirpate all others, it is
"institutionalized" (in the Quigleyan sense, i.e., detlectcd and corrupted) and
reaches a limit well short of that. This pattern of failure is as interesting as
the variety of forms and their mutual displacement processes, and should
keep a generation or so of macrosocial theorists productively employed in
verifying, describing, and explaining it.
This said, I find the projects of these four researchers intriguing and
productive, and extremely worthwhile discussing. I suspect that all of these
researchers are more sanguine than I am about the possibility of reducing
political to economic phenomena. This vision is appealing because it suggests
there may be economic (non-zero-sum) solutions to political (and apparently
zero-sum) problems. Without necessarily rejecting the vision, I would treat
economies and polities as different though always linked. Critical evidence
that this is an empirical, and confirmable, proposition is the difference in
historical scale between the political-diplomatic constellations of
civilizations and the trade-networks of oikumenes/world-economies until
the 19th century. A critical case for future discussion is the relationship
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between Rome and China, in which China, politico-diplomatically and
militarily inaccessible to Rome (and not part of the same civilization/world
system), seems inadvertently to have inflicted severe economic damage on
it (currency drain, implying location in the same world-economy/oikumene).
This proposition is related to, and strengthened by, F.J. Teggart's contention
(1939:239-41) that Chinese statesmen who consciously chose to make wars
on their western frontiers caused, without intending or knowing it, invasions
of Rome's eastern frontiers, "conflicts and devastations in regions of which
they had never heard," by disrupting silk route (and fur) trade. Rome and
China in this period present the classic case of states belonging to the same
world-economy. or oikumene, and different civilizations, different worldpolities, and - in my meaning - different world systems.
Chase-Dunn. Since the 1970s I have held that all civilizations are world
systems; but since the 1960s I have accepted that there are some world
systems which are not civilizations, that is, very small, nonurban
polycultures. Christopher Chase-Dunn is now in the lead on this line of
research, which should help to detail the differences between the smallest,
city less, world systems and the next level larger, the one- and two-city
protocivilizations, of which I now believe several, probably many, more
must have existed (most only briefly, "abortive" in a sense analogous to
Toynbee' s) than have as yet been found. One appropriate line of comparativecivilizational fieldwork for the future will, with luck, be the search for lost
and forgotten cities, carried on with new and superior technical means
afforded by aerial and satellite photography, with searches for patterned,
centric, and radial disturbances of soil and vegetation, showing the patterns
of points and lines that usually represent civilizational geometry. The first
fruitful zone for such exploration will I think be the forested areas of Africa
south of the Sahara.
On another issue (not yet discussed in print), Chase-Dunn is
considerably more skeptical, and I considerably more receptive, to the socialphysics or complex-systems-physics ideas of Arthur S. Iberall, which I have
found productive of useful hypotheses (as to, for example, why and how the
several early-born civilizations initially formed near simultaneously (lberall
and Wilkinson, 1986); the relation of polyculturality to civilization (Iberall
and Wilkinson, 1993); what might be the order of magnitude of the number
of cities and civilizations "missing" from current records and to be searched
for (Wilkinson, 1994, forthcoming).
Gills and Frank. Currently the best short compilation of their
contentions, examined at length in Frank and Gills (1993), is Frank's five
propositions (1993:2). (I) The "existence and development of the present
world system stretches back at least 5000 years": I date its existence back
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3500 years, when there was a critical fusion of its predecessors or roots,
which go back at least 5500 years; in essence we concur. (2) The "same
process of capital accumulation has played a, if not the, central role in the
world system for several millennia": I say "a, but not the" central role, in
this and all other civilizational world systems (but not in the nonurban world
systems Chase-Dunn studies). (3) The "Center-Periphery Slructure .. .is also
applicable to the world system before 1492": having accepted Quigley's
(1961) argument on this point when he made it, I more than agree; the
structure is applicable to all civilizations, that is, to all civiJizational world
systems (but not necessarily to nonurban world systems); I have provided a
more detailed account (Wilkinson, 1991). (4) Hegemony "and rivalry for
the same a!so mark world system history long before" 1492: I agree as to
rivalry, extending my agreement to the other world systems; but there is a
lot less hegemony achieved than is believed, and most of the best-known
"hegemons" (e.g., 19th-century Britain, the United States after World War
II) simply aren't. (5) The "world system cycle" of A phases and B phases
extends back many centuries before 1492: I agree fully, and have confirmed
this independently (Wilkinson, 1992, 1993), for other world systems as weIl.
Aside from differences over the centrality of economics and the
frequency and nature of hegemony still to be resolved, I see another topic
for argument - within basic agreement - over the balance between statist
and marketive capital accumulation. There may be periods in which states
are the main engines of accumulation, and other periods in which private
families are; more likely there are areas in each period where one or the
other form dominates. But I suspect the prevailing pattern and persistent
substratum is the cheek-by-jowl coexistence of very different forms even at
the very local spatial scale, with a process change at the house threshold, at
the market gate, at the cultic center (see my argument about the classical
Athenian economy [I 987a]).
I conclude as I began. The best way to deal with the discussions between
civilizationists and world-systems analysts is to aver that the entities we are
studying largely are, and ought to be, the same. Our theories ought to be
merged. Having attempted to develop such a merger since encountering the
civilizationist literature in the 1950s and the international-systems literature
in the early 1960s, I can only view the current interaction with great pleasure.
University of California, Los Angeles
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HOLD THE TILLER FIRM:
ON METHOD AND THE UNIT
OF ANALYSIS
Immanuel Wallerstein
Historical/social analysis is like sailing a boat in rough waters. The
dangers come from all sides. It requires not merely good judgment, but the
ability and the will to hold the tiller firm. When I first started writing The
Modern World-System in 1970, I thought the issue was primarily substantive,
that is, that I was entering into a debate about what is the most useful
interpretation of what happened historically. World-systems analysis was
for me a set of protests against prevailing modes of interpretation, at first
primarily against modernization theory (see Wallerstein, 1979). But I soon
came to see that, in order to arrive at a useful interpretation of what happened
historically, one had to dispose of a useful method. And that has turned out
to be not merely an even more controversial matter than the question of the
substantive interpretation of historical reality, but a more slippery one as
well.
In my venture into worrying about method, I decided that one key issue
was the "unit of analysis," which is why one speaks of "world-systems
analysis." The assumption is that the appropriate unit of analysis is a worldsystem, by which I at least originally meant something other than the modern
nation-state, something larger than this nation-state, and something that was
defined by the boundaries of an effective, ongoing division of labor. Hence
I started with spatial or geographic concerns. The basic metaphor of
core/periphery is in origin and etymology a spatial metaphor.
But as I proceeded, it seemed to me that space could never be separated
analytically from time, and that the unit of which we were talking was
therefore one kind of TimeSpace (see Wallerstein, 1991), specifically that
which I denoted as structural TimeSpace. To give it a language of easy
reference, I thought of structural TimeSpace as divided into "historical
systems." I liked the term because it caught what I thought of as the essential
tension of structural TimeSpace, that it is a system (meaning it has continuing
rules of relation/process, and therefore contains cyclical rhythms) but that
it is also historical (meaning that it is different at every moment, and therefore
contains secular trends). By combining in one concept both cyclical rhythms
and secular trends, I was clearly using an organic analogy. An historical
system has a life: it is born or generated, it lives or proceeds, it dies or
disintegrates. Each of these three moments of the organism can be analyzed
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol30/iss30/20
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and located in TimeSpace.
From its institutional outset, what came to be called in the nineteenth
century the "social sciences" was beset by a Methodenstreit. The classical
formulation of this methodological debate was posed in terms of two
alternative epistemologies. On the one hand, there were those who believed
that the object of research was the discerning of general laws of human
behavior, true of all time and space. Their avowed model was to imitate the
methods of classical physics to the degree possible and thereby replicate its
scientific (and social) success. Windelband called this the nomothetic
method, and its proponents became dominant in the emerging university
"disciplines" of cconomics, sociology, and political science. On the other
hand, there were those who believed that the search for general laws was
not merely futile but dangerous, in that it pushed scholars away from what
this group saw as their primary task: ascertaining empirical reality, which
was always particular, indeed idiosyncratic. What really happened, in the
famous phrase of Ranke, could indeed be discerned and, once discerned,
empathetically reconstructed. This was called the idiographic method, and
its proponents hecame dominant in history and for the most part in
anthropology.
This difference between nomothetic and idiographic, between
synchronic and diachronic, between objective and subjective, between
structure and agency, has been renewed and rediscussed under many labels
and in many avatars. While the organizational linkages of epistemology and
specific disciplines largely reflected university realities between say 1880
and 1945, it has tcnded to break down since then, particularly since the 1970s.
That is to say, the debate is still there, but the persons on each side are not
so easily recognizable by the name of the university department in which
they teach.
Of course, this debate was seldom crude. From its subtleties emerged
not two but a thousand positions. Nonetheless, the cleavage was profound.
Furthermore, there were always schools of thought which specifically refused
the terms of the debate, and suggested either that the dilemma was false, or
that the correct position was an intermediate one or one proceeding from an
Aufhebung. This group was always a numerical minority, if a vocal one. I
count myself among them, and I have called this conducting a "war on two
fronts" (Wallerstein, 1980).
In the period since 1945, there have been a growing number of scholars
who became unhappy with Establishment social science (including of course
history) on the grounds that its methodological imperatives (whether they
were nomothetists or idiographers) had pushed them de facto into the study
of the infinitely small in time and space, and that thereby the problems, the
realities oflarge-scale, long-term social change had become eliminated from
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the purview of scholarship. There was a call for intellectual renewal, and
for new (actually revived) foci of analysis. This call had many names:
dependency theory, ci vilizational analysis, world history, world-systems
analysis, historical sociology, long-run economics, international political
economy, and still others. The list is long. Let me call this the family of
dissidents, in the sense that they all were dissenting from the views that had
dominated, still largely dominate, the universitics.
The seas are rough in two senses. Historical/social real ity is enormously
complex. Indeed, it represents the most complex of all realities. And we
know so little still. But the seas are rough in another sense. The study of
historical/social reality is a highly sensiti ve subject, which has immense
consequerlces for the existing structures of power in our existing worldsystem. Hence, the analyses are closely surveyed, pressured, and kept in
check. The Establishment views are not only wrong; they are powerfully
protected by extra-intellectual means. If we are to procecd in such rough
seas, we must hold the tiller firm, and in particular we mu~t not fall prey to
the temptations of the world, which are primarily three: to become
nomothetic, to become idiographic, to reity. I see very many persons in the
family of dissidents paying, in my view, insufficient attention to these
dangers. I shall discuss each in turn.
THE NOMOTHETIC TEMPTATION

Since all explanation is ultimately in terms of a covering law, however
implicit and even if specifically denied, it is tempting to wish to make the
covering laws we use as general and as simple as possible. But, of course,
there is a price to be paid for generalizing our laws. The more general, the
more different things they explain, but the fewer aspects they explain about
each thing. It depends on what we want to have explained. For most things,
if we use too general a law, the explanation is vacuous, and if we use too
narrow a generalization, the explanation is specious. So there is a pragmatic
judgment to be made, in terms of payoff. We need to do constant, if not
always explicit, cost-benefit analyses.
In world-systems analysis, Christopher Chase-Dunn and others have
put to themselves a very simple, obvious proposition. If our unit of analysis
is a world-system, and if there are several kinds of world-systems (not an
enormous number, but more than one), would it not be u'ieful to compare
the three or four or five kinds of world-systems with each other, to discern
their similarities and differences, and thercfore to arrive at more general
explanations of the functioning of world-systems? This is a nomothetic
temptation. Chase-Dunn has put his case this way:
The world-systems perspective has expanded the temporal and
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spatial scope of theorizing about social change. Our understanding of
modernity has been radically transformed by the study of the Europecentered world-system over the past 500 years. But the analysis of a
single system encounters methodological and theoretical limitations.
If we would fathom fundamental change we need to comprehend the
causes of those structural constants which are usually taken for granted
in the modern world-system. These structural "constants" exhibit
variation when we broaden the scope of comparison to include very
different kinds of world-systems. Are interstate systems of
core/periphery hierarchies inevitable features of all organizational
wholes')

Do all

world-systems

share a similar underlying

developmental logic, or do systemic logics undergo fundamental
transformations? These questions can only be scientifically addressed
by a comparative perspective which employs the corpus of evidence
produced by historians, ethnographers, and archaeologists regarding
human activities over very long periods of time much longer than the
five hundred year span of the modern world-system (Chase-Dunn,
1992:311).

Hence, Chase-Dunn is ready to compare the "world-system" of Cahokia
within the middle Mississippian tradition with Mesopotamia and with the
modern capitalist world-system. To do this, he adds that "concepts developed
for the analysis of the modern system be applied with care; some of them
need to be redefined in order to avoid projecting contemporary reality on
the past."
This may work, but I remain skeptical. One of the major reasons I
remain skeptical is that I wonder if one can take a set of concepts developed
for the analysis of one historical system, consider the concepts one by one,
redefine each in some more general form (of which consequently the form
in the modern world-system becomes but one variant), and then recombine
them for the analysis of Cahokia or Mesopotamia. This presumes a certain
independence of the concepts from each other which, it seems to me, is
doubtful. To be specific, the concept "core/periphery" is not analytically
dissociable from the concept "class contlict" or the concept "interstate
system" or the concept "endless accumulation of capital." That is to say, the
set of concepts developed for a fruitful analysis of the modern world-system
is a set. Dissociated, redefined (in the sense of giving different values to
each), and reassembled, they may have the coherence of an awkwardly
patched pottery bowl.
There are no doubt similarities one can find between Cahokia, as an
example of a stateless, classless (?) structure; Mesopotamia, as an example
of a world-empire (if that is what it was); and the modern world-system, as
an example of a capitalist world-economy. But are these similarities and
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therefore the differences analytically interesting for problems we wish to
solve? There might be some, but looking at these problems does not seem
to be the line the "comparative study of world-systems" has been following.
The work up to now has emphasized the comparison of the rules governing
the system, which I would call looking at the ongoing lives of the systems.
Here, I think we are comparing apples and oranges, and I don't think we'll
get much further than saying they're both fruit and not vegetables.
What might possibly be a fruitful line of enquiry is to compare both
the geneses and the terminal crises of systems, to sec if there are any patterns,
which could then (a) give us some insight into "world history," if by that
we mean the synchronic unfolding of human social existence, and (b)
illuminattc how system bifurcations (vide Prigogine) w()rk in historical
systems, which in turn might help us with (c) the practical question of how
best to navigate the current bifurcation (or systemic demise, or transformation
from one historical system to one or more other such systems).
I have said that where we draw the line in our work in this
nomothetic/idiographic divide (or intrinsic tension) is a pragmatic matter,
and I have suggested reasons to believe that the "comparati ve study of worldsystems" is not where I would place my bets in terms of useful interpretations.
But of course I may be wrong. I would feel more comfortable about this line
of work if its practitioners were more cautious about the nomothetic
temptation.
THE IDIOGRAPHIC TEMPTATION

In the same article cited above, Chase-Dunn critici/es two extremes
on a continuum, what he calls the "Iumpers" and the "splitters." "The extreme
lumpers are those who see only one global system far back in time ....
Extreme splitters are those who focus only on local processcs to the exclusion
of more distant connections" (1992:317). He comes out sensibly for an inbetween position. But the way he puts it, the story is not quite clear. One of
his extremes is temporal (too much time), and the other is spatial (too local).
Of course, both are in reality spatio-temporal. Most important of all, the two
"extremes" are in fact only one: they are both forms of the idiographic
temptation. To say that everything is one single thing, or to say that every
"unit" is local, that is, different from all the other units, are both ways to
avoid structural explanation. In one case, there can be no variation and
therefore no alternative structures; in the other, there is nothing but variation,
and no two things can be lumped together as structures.
We readily recognize in localism a familiar particularizing face, the
standard undergirding of idiographic analysis. Presumably. the dissidents of
whom I spoke above have all been allergic to such self-defeating localism.
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But one big single story is just another form of the idiographic temptation,
and this is the route Andre Gunder Frank has chosen to take in his recent
writings about "world system history":
I now also stress and examine "systemic connections in a single
historical process" extending back much earlier than 1500. I now
examine these systemic connections in a single historical process over
a much wider social and geographical range, including at least the
entire Afro-Eurasian ecumene, of which Europe and its world is only
a part. Thus the historical and socio-geographical scope of this process
is no longer seen as beginning and centered in Europe, which, on the
contrary. joined it rather late. I will also question the supposed
historical uniqueness and perhaps the social-theoretical relevance of
the modem capitalist mode of production (Frank, 1990: 164).

This is not the place to review Frank's version of the evolution of world
history. Here we are only raising methodological doubts. Everything that
can be denoted as a system can be shown to be "open" at some points of its
perimeter. One can always take this opening and insist that the presumed
system is really part of some larger system. It will not take long to arrive at
the largest of all possible systems, the universe from the beginning of its
existence to now. Whether even this supersystem is open is itself a matter
of philosophical and scientific debate. And in this sense everything is
determined by the big bang, if there was a big bang. But while it is salutary
to remember this, it is not very useful to build our analysis on this quicksand,
which will very rapidly engulf us. Once again, the question is pragmatic.
Frank says the story does not start in AD 1500, but rather in 3000 Be
(or so). Perhaps, but by what logic do we stop at 3000 Be? Why not 10,000
Be? Why not go back to Australopithecus, or to prehominids? Once again,
it depends on what question we want to answer. And that depends on your
chronosophy (Pomian, 1979). If you think the history of the world has been
a linear upward curve, then it is very important to pursue Frank's line of
argument. It is explicitly aimed at uhdermining a Eurocentric reading of
world progress. Basically, it says that the Europeans, whether circa 1800 or
circa 1500, did nothing special. They were a part, a "rather late" part of the
story of humanity'S achievements. This is the salutary message Frank bears.
And I sympathize with it, except that I do not think that the history of the
world has been a linear upward curve. I think, to put it crudely, that the curve
essentially went up with the so-called agricultural revolution (despite its
social negatives), then essentially went down with the arrival of a capitalist
world-system (despite some pluses which have been much exaggerated), and
may go up again (but then again may not) with the future demise of the world
capitalist system. If this chronosophy is adopted, then it positively impedes
clarity of vision to efface the 1500 line. Rather we must exert much more
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energy than we have up to now on the question of genesis - what it was
about the situation of the Europeans that accounts for their taking this major,
backward step (see Wallerstein, 1992). And we need to spend much time as
well on the question of bifurcation, demise and/or transition, which may
require a comparative look (along the lines I suggested in my discussion of
Chase-Dunn).
It is always easy, as I said, to find generalizations that are plausible (if
often not very interesting). It is always possible to insist that every particular
situation is different from every other in some way, and that therefore all
the generalizations are false. And it is always easy to prove continuity of a
single reality, in that there are always some things which do not seem to
have changed. In any case, there are no caesuras in history that are vacuums,
or unbridgeable chasms. The world goes on, microsecond by microsecond.
The hard thing is to find the appropriate balance, and to be certain that it is
the most relevant balance for the question you wish to answer.
THE TEMPTATION TO REIFY

Analysts do not manipulate data, though many of them like to think
that is what they are doing. Rather, analysts manipulate concepts. Concepts
become our friends, even our children. They take on a certain life of their
own, and it is tempting to stretch their usage beyond the purpose for which
they were created. This is what reification is about. In the context of the
study of long-term, large-scale social change, one of the concepts most
frequently and lovingly employed is that of civilization. Indeed, most of us
have a fairly standard list in mind when we use the word: the West (or
Christianity), perhaps Russia (or maybe the whole Orthodox world), Islam
(or the Arabo-Islamic world), Persia, India, China, perhaps Japan and Korea
separate from the Sinic world, and then the ones no longer surviving:
Byzantium, Mesopotamia, the Incas, Pharaonic Egypt, classical Antiquity
(or are Rome and Greece separate?), and so forth. Are there African
civilization~, or one African civilization? The list is of course open to
amendment, but that is beside the point. It is a somewhat limited list, usually
20 or 30 examples at most.
What is a "civilization?" It is hard to say because different analysts use
different criteria. For most analysts, it usually involves a linguistic element,
a religious (or cosmological) element, a distinctive pattern of "everyday
life," a spatial locus (however blurred or shifting) and therefore perhaps an
ecological element, and perhaps least convincingly continuous ethnicity and
some genetic coherence. This list too could go on. If one looks at the names
listed above, the one that appears to have the longest continuous history is,
by common accord, China. We talk of a Chinese civilization that presumably
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol30/iss30/20
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goes back to the earliest dynasty and continues to today. What continuity
does this imply? We can of course find continuities - not perhaps the same
exact language, but mostly (sic!) related ones; not the same religion(s), but
some links between older forms and later ones; not the same patterns of
everyday life, hut some long-lasting peculiarities; more or less the same
geography, provided one is not too fussy about the breadth of the boundaries;
a limited case for ethnic and genetic descendence.
As with the case for a single world history, one can make a case for a
single Chinese history at about the same level of plausibility, or perhaps at
a stronger level. And certainly we can make the case that many/most Chinese
today (Chinese thinkers, Chinese politicians) believe in this continuity and
act in function of this belief. Suppose, however, that someone were to
postulate that China since 1945 or since 1850 is closer overall on a multitude
of measures of social relations to Brazil since 194511850 than it is to the
"China" of the Han dynasty. We could not reject the case out of hand.
Of course, one can avoid the decision by a common sense dismissal of
the issue - in some ways the one, in some ways the other. The question
doesn't thereby disappear. For many purposes, we have to decide whether
it is more profitahle to consider contemporary China and Brazil as two
instances of the same phenomenon (say, very large underdeveloped nations
within the modern world-system or the capitalist world-economy) or to
consider the China of today and Han China as two instances of Chinese
civilization, comparing it then (I suppose) with the Brazil of today descended
from an uncertain something else of 1500 years ago as two instances ofI'm
not sure what (perhaps Christian civilization).
Would it not be more useful if we didn't reify civilizations? One way
to think about China is to think of it as a name linked to a geographical
location in which there existed successive historical systems, which had a
few features in common, and each of which sustained (for a good deal of
the time) myths concerning civilizational continuity. In that case, instead of
China, the civilization, we are perhaps talking empirically of five, six, or
seven different historical systems (each of which could be grist for the
eventual fourfold tables that will derive from the nomothetic temptation).
At least, I wouldn't like to close off this way of viewing "Chinese history"
by a too rapid embrace of "civilizational analysis." (Of course, one can see
why there would be social pressure against adopting such a perspective on
"China" or "the West" or most of the names we use for "civilizations.")
China is no doubt the strongest case for a civilizationalist thesis. It becomes
harder to demonstrate inherent cultural continuities everywhere else. To be
sure, if we narrow our analysis to the scale and scope of a single historical
system, then a "geoculture" is part of its "systemness."
I have discussed the ci vilizational hypothesis under the heading of the
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temptation to reify.1t is of course most frequently a variant of the idiographic
temptation but occasionally a variant of the nomothetic temptation. But
reification as such is a recurring problem because we deal in concepts, and
concepts are inherently ambiguous tools. Civilization is by no means the
only concept we reify, but for the purposes of the analysis of long-term,
large-scale social change, it is the exemplary one.
CONCLUSION
What is there to conclude? I suppose that the scholar should be
intellectually monastic, and resist temptations. But product that I am of
"American civilization," I urge that the resistance be modulated by
pragmatism. I see no other way. The issues are too important that they not
be faced, and they are too urgent to be closed off to analysis by failing to
fight the war on two - indeed on all - fronts at the same time. Above all,
I urge prudence in any haste to shout Eureka!
Binghamton University and Maison des Sciences de I'Homrne
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Pre vs. Post 1500ers
Albert Bergesen
The world-system school has its first major theoretical schism: the Preversus the Post-1500ers. Post's, like Immanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin,
see the logic of the world-system as that of capitalism, which they believe
began in the 16th century, although Amin allows some protocapitalist
development in earlier centuries. The Pre's trace earlier origins. Stepping
back a few centuries is Janet Abu-Lughod (1989), who pushes the starting
date to the 13th century and adds the most provocative idea of recent years:
Europe emerged by virtue of the decline of the East rather than the rise of
the West. It's a thought as pregnant with theoretical implication as A.G.
Frank's (1969) now classic "development of underdevelopment" phrase,
which captured the process whereby the development of one sector of the
world (the North) retarded the development of another (the South). Others
push further back. Gills and Frank (1991) trace the history of the modern
world-system back 5,000 years, arguing that there has been a common set
of geopolitical cconomic dynamics over this period: one world-system, with
one logic, over the past 5,000 years. Finally, Chase-Dunn and Hall (1991)
trace origins all the way back to hunter-gatherer intersocietal networks.
How are we to account for this difference in world-system starting
dates? Let me suggest that this search for ever earlier origins of the modern
world-system is part of a more general rethinking of what constitutes the
basic framework of human collective existence. As the 20th century draws
to a close it is clear that the great 19th-century paradigms of sociology and
Marxism seem to have lost their grip on our imagination. Is it sl)cial logics
that determine our life chances, or is it the dynamics of the international
system? Or is it both, and ifso, how Ipuch of each? Simple social determinism
- our 19th-century heritage - is now in profound doubt. Also, social science
believes less in the power of social structural dynamics and more in the
power of culture, ideology, and discourse. The so-called literary turn toward
models of explanation rooted in questions of interpretation, hermeneutics,
and meaning represents a clear preference for determination by consciousness
and culture rather than by formal social structure. If this preference has its
origins on the European Continent (Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Kristeva)
there is an Anglo-American turn from social-structure-as-explanation seen
in the growing interest in the pre-sociological models of utilitarian thought
reborn as rational choice theory. Whether the turn is to the vagaries of culture
or to the individualism of rational choice, the social, as in class, economy
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and social structure, is in low regard as the 20th century draws to a close.
With ideas about society and societal dynamics faltering, a window of
conceptual opportunity has opened to retheorize the basic unit of human
association at which the most primal and determinative social processes are
thought to exist. For 19th-century sociology and Marxism this has been at
the national or societal level. But this is changing. With faith in the societal
level of explanation weakening, new theoretical contenders have arisen to
challenge for the allegiance of social thought. Let me add that there is also
a strong strain of nihilism contending too, in postmodernist arguments against
anything closed or fixed, whether the structure of language or of society.
The postmodernist position is for a world of play, irony, unsutured
formations, and life as infinitely regressing signifiers (Bergesen, 1992, in
press a,b).
Our theoretical paradigms (Marxism, sociology, neoclassical
economics, modernization theory) consti tu te the intellectual hailing wire that
binds historic time and space together to produce believable units for analysis
and objects for purposeful transformation. We cannot separate belief in the
existence of societies, economies, and institutions from the theories of their
existence and operative logic. For a hundred years now we have focused on
the social formation, class relations, mode of production, and the "social"
as the appropriate unit of study. The social has been our context where
structures of hierarchy and oppression exist that require transformation for
the project of human emancipation. The social, therefore, was as much a
part of our secular religious life - the object of everything from revolutionary
struggle to liberal politics to conservative institutional preservation - as
our practical social science. All that is changing as various models of world
dynamics vie to replace the societal as the primary unit of explanation.
Through this window of opportunity stepped Wallerstein (1974) with his
conception of the modern world-system. He tried to re-bind the unraveling
sense of collective existence at a new level, that of the world as a whole
starting in the 16th century. In the now classic phrasing, there is no longer
a first, second, and third world, but only one world with a top (core, North,
developed regions) and a bottom (periphery, South, underdeveloped regions).
There were initial intellectual successes: modernization theory as an
explanation of why countries develop was thoroughly discredited, and a line
of empirical research articles began in the 1970s to link a region's economic
dependence to slower rates of growth and greater income incquality (ChaseDunn, 1977). This, though, turned out to be the only major victory for
Post-ISOO theory, which has had little or no intellectual impact upon other
issues in advanced capitalist countries. Questions concerning post-industrial
society and the legitimation crisis of advanced capitalism and explanations
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for the new social movements of women, race, ethnicity, gender and
environmentalism, were largely untouched by the central propositions of
world-system theory.
In time the question arose as to why the modern world-system should
have begun in the 16th century? Wasn't that somewhat arbitrary? Some
thought so, and the unraveling of historical structures to be reabsorbed into
a now pre-I500 world-system began. How far back did this systemic
interconnectedness of human life go? Wallerstein had said back to the 16th
century, Abu-Luhgod back to the 13th century, Wilkinson and Gills and
Frank back to 3000 BC, and Chase-Dunn and Hall all the way back to
intersocietal networks between hunter-gatherers. By the late 20th century it
was safe to say that the theory of collective life was a wide open issue, from
the postmodern nihilists arguing that no order exists to those who see a
continuous world-system going back to the origins of social life itself.
As it now stands, all the world-system positions contend for a following
and they argue back and forth as to who is right. Does the economic logic
of something like capitalism only begin in the 16th century (Wallerstein) or
can it be found in ancient civilizations too (Gills and Frank)? Is there one
common socioeconomic logic throughout the entire history of the world
(Gills and Frank) or has that history passed through a number of worldsystem types, defined by different modes of production (Chase-Dunn and
Hall)?
How are we to decide among these positions? Which is right, which
wrong? Since much of this is about history that has already happened,
interpretation will probably always be contentious. But let me suggest a
criterion for evaluating the strength of these schemes: their answer to the
question, Have they produced any new theory or principles of explanation
other than what we already have? The Posts clearest success has been
dependency theory's explaining underdevelopment better than
modernization theory.
What about the Pres? It would seem that the long-term
interconnectedness of human life has been sufficiently systemic to warrant
the designation "central civilization" (Wilkinson), "world history" (Gills and
Frank), or "intersocietal networks" (Chase-Dunn and Hall). But that has not
been enough to supplant the Post-l 500 argument, or to make a significant
dent on present social science models. This is not because human history
isn't some sort of continuous web - it no doubt is - or because this web
didn't become world wide - it did - but such a long-term perspective has
yet to give rise to any new principles, laws, or models that seriously alter
what we already have. This is important. The conceptual opening to consider
larger units was created by paradigm crisis, and it will only close around a
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Pre or Post world-system scheme that manages to produce a new world
framework that absorbs and thereby replaces the social logic of today. The
move from sociology to something that could be called globology, then, will
occur only when world-system thinkers produce some distinctly world
models and not just stretch or aggregate today's societal logics. From this
point of view, perhaps the basic flaw in world-system theory is to have
conceived of the world as only the sum of so many societies, rather than
being a corporate collective entity with a life of its own independent of that
of its societal subdivisions.
For example, Chase-Dunn and Hall (1991) argue that different types
of world-systems are defined by different modes of production. The problem
here is that what they call "world-system types" turns out to be nothing more
than the old Marxian and social evolutionary stages of societal, not world,
development. Their world-system "theory" is really not a new theory about
global dynamics but a batch of societal theories aggregated to a global level.
Take their very definition of a world-system: "Intersocietal networks in
which the interaction (trade, warfare, intermarriages, etc.) is an important
condition of the reproduction of the internal structures of the composite units
and importantly affects changes which occur in these local structures"
(Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1991 :7). In this logic, societies and their modes come
first and then interact and form networks, much as international relations
theorists have states coming together to form international regimes
(Bergesen, 1990). You can ask, What is wrong with such an idea? How else
would a world-system exist if it were not because of the interaction of
different societies? That is a good question for which there is no answer,
except the conceptual leap that is the paradigm revolution of considering the
world-system as the primary unit and societies within as subdivisions. It's
a very basic change in thinking: it is not societies that form the world-system,
but the world-system that forms societies. For instance, we don't argue that
economic, religious, educational, and political institutions come together to
form a society. They are subdivisions of society. They don't exist on their
own independent of each other, and the same logic holds for the global
system. Societies do not align in a rational choice fashion to form a worldsystem. Societies are but the cellular infrastructure of an already existing
world-system.
What I am suggesting here is to repeat the theoretical leap that occurred
a hundred years ago with the advent of sociology. Today's rational choice
theorists, like their 19th-century utilitarian brethren, still argue against this
logic. They argue, first individuals, then their interaction, and then out of
that come social institutions and society. But sociology inverted that logic,
and this is what is needed today, except instead of individuals being the parts

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol30/iss30/20

86

Review: Full Issue
85
and society the whole, societies should now be the parts and the worldsystem the whole. This is a conceptual shift in explanatory logic that is
revolutionary in nature, for all that is social is now derivative from all that
is global.
Chase-Dunn and Hall, though, still operate with a sort of global
utilitarianism, where instead of individuals and their wants and needs coming
first we have societies and their modes of production coming first, and then
their trade and exchange comes second, with the institutionalization of these
relations constituting the network component of their definition of a worldsystem as nothing but an "intersocietal network." But if the world-system
were the basic unit, then there wouldn't be any network relations, except
between different world-systems. The missing assumption in contemporary
world-system thinking is that the world collectivity has an existence of its
own, independent of its societal parts.
In sociology it is the social formation, not the individual, that has a
mode of production; it is the social formation, not the individual, that has
class relations; it is the social formation, not the individual, that is
hierarchically structured; it is the social formation, not the individual, that
has feudalism, capitalism, and slavery as systems of production. What then
are the analogous modes, classes, relations and hierarchies that are unique
to the world formation and that do not belong to each individual social
formation? Some would say the core-periphery division of labor. But that
is not a structural relation; it is not a question of ownership or control of the
world means of production, but of the exchange of commodities produced
by societal modes of production. If there are 150 or so national economies
in today's world, are there 150 modes of production? And if there is one
world-economy why isn't there one world mode of production? I see no
reason. But, world-system theory as presently conceived doesn't think this
way; instead it argues that there are multiple modes of production within a
singular world economy, or if a mope is identified, it is in fact social, not
global.
Wallerstein, for example, argues that the world-system is characterized
by the capitalist mode of production, and yet he identifies no ownership of
the world means of production and speaks of no world classes. He speaks
only of unequal exchange and commodity chains. What he really means is
that the capitalism of national formations produces commodities that are
then exchanged globally, and that unequal exchange is what he calls
capitalism. This is fine - a neo-classical economic definition of capitalism
as Brenner (1977) noted - but it involves no theory of capitalism as a world
formation with world relations of production and world classes. It is simply
linked societal modes of production (Wallerstein calls them commodity
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chains). This analysis will not move us from sociology to globology until
theories of production within societies are replaced by a theory of production
on a world scale, until societal modes are replaced by global modes, and
until social class relations are replaced by something like world class
relations.
World-system theory's failure, then, is that the analytical notion of a
mode of production is frozen with relations between social classes, such that
it cannot be used to conceptualize production processes on a distinctly world
level of analysis. Capitalism is defined by relations between wage earners
and owners of capital. On a world scale the rich countries do not have a
wage relation with the poor countries. Classes, not whole regions of the
world, haOle wage relations. They are related in a different way, through a
different logic. Discovering that logic, figuring out how it is that the
relationship between core and periphery generates the periphery's
underdevelopment should be the task of world-system theorists; the task
should not be stretching the old paradigms of social process to fit over the
global formation.
World-system theorists, whether they consider their system from the
16th century or the past 5,000 years, have not devised such global theories
but have stretched and pulled societal models to make them seem worldwide
in scope. Wallerstein takes the idea of a capitalist mode of production and
just asserts that it exists worldwide without providing any evidence of what
would constitute worldwide relations of production, or global classes, or the
logic of a distinctly world mode of production. Chase-Dunn and Hall,
following Amin, repeat 19th-century evolutionary theory by talking about
"world system types." They list three stages of develop men I in terms of three
general modes of production: (1) the kin-based mode, (2) the tributary mode,
and (3) the capitalist mode. But this is nothing but the older evolutionary
scheme of (1) hunter-gatherer societies, which tended to be more tribal and
kin-based, followed by (2) a kind of Greco-Roman slavery and the settled
agriculture of ancient empires through European feudalism, right up to (3)
the advent of capitalism in the 19th century or, following Wallerstein, the
16th century.
There is simply nothing international, intersocietal, or
intercivilizational going on here at all. Chase-Dunn and Hall tell us (1991 :21),
"The central theoretical distinction we will use in studying system logic is
the neo-Marxian notion of mode of production." Exactly, and exactly the
problem for world-system "theory" if it is ever to develop its own logic at
a distinctly world level of analysis. In using the notion of mode of production
as the logic of the world-system, Chase-Dunn and Hall miss the point that
this seemingly abstract concept has a very specific level of analysis built
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into it: societies, or social formations, or class structures.
The key theoretical point is this: by using the notion of modes of
production the conceptualization of the production process remains
imprisoned within the societal parts of the world-system, leaving nothing
but the exchange of such produced commodities to be the only systemwide
process. But this need not be so. There is nothing natural about relations
between classes within a society that leads one to stick with traditional modes
of production and not go ahead and formulate distinctly world, or
civilizational modes of production. To specify a level of relations between
groups at the class level, rather than between family members, clan members,
neighborhoods, or territories, is a theoretical decision, not a fact of nature.
Modes of production at the societal level are not a fixed reality. Remember,
in the neoclassical economic paradigm the basic unit is the rationally choosing
individual, not thc class. This basic unit is actually below the level of class,
which for the economic paradigm is fine. For the sociology paradigm, it is
raised a notch and put at the level of social class and social group. Now, for
there to be a world-system paradigm, a science of globology to succeed the
social science of sociology, the basic unit of analysis will have to be raised
yet another notch to the world level. Production must be specified at the
world level or world-system theory will remain social theory projected onto
global history.
So, let's clear away some prejudices. There is no reason why the idea
of production in human life cannot be considered to occur on a world scale.
Production can just as easily be considered a world or global process as its
present incarnation as a social process. The process of production must be
freed from its societal imprisonment if a global or civilizational world-system
theory is truly to exist. Remember, at the cultural level civilizational studies
see a common logic systemwide, such as East versus West, so why not a
common systemwide logic in the economic realm? Why must the hands that
pick cotton in the antebellum American south be considered part of a slave
mode of production while the hands that weave it into cloth in Britain are
part of a capitalist mode of production? Why aren't all these hands part of
a common worldwide mode of production? I see no reason.
Like sociology a hundred years ago, something like globology is crying
out to be born. Societies are but the cellular infrastructure ofthe global entity,
not separate things that come together to form a world-system. Marx argued
something to the effect that it wasn't men buying and selling that made
capitalism; rather, it was capitalism that made men buy and sell. The same
logic holds on the global scale, only the units change: it is not unequal
exchange, war, hegemonies, and colonialism that make a world-system, but
a world-system that produces and enforces unequal trade, propels nations
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into war, creates hegemonies and produces colonial domination. First the
whole, then the parts; sociologically, first the relations of production, then
the existence of classes; globologically, first the global system, then the
relations between the developed core and the underdeveloped periphery.
Contrary to Wallerstein, Amin, and Chase-Dunn, it is not the core-periphery
division of labor, or unequal exchange, or the intersocietal network, that
makes the world-system, but the world-system that produces the inequality
and division amongst the world's nations and peoples.
In a way our history and descriptive powers are ahead of our theory.
We see the world as a singular historical system, but its animating logic
remains lodged in theories ofthe component parts rather than in the collective
logic of [he world civilizational whole. The key determinant process, the
motor that makes the system go, is at present trapped within the theoretical
logic of the societal subparts; or, if there is world-system process, it is not
of aprimal sort, as all core-periphery divisions oflabor (Wallerstein), unequal
exchanges (Amin), and intersocietal networks (Chase-Dunn and Hall) appear
only after the more fundamental production process has transpired. The
theory of production remains a societal theory, not a global theory, that
occurs within societal modes of production governed by societal class
relations. It is only within the secondary acts of exchange and networking
between already existing social entities that present-day world-system theory
says anything distinctly global. Relations of production do precede relations
of exchange. And the way it stands now, production takes place within this
or that localized mode of production governed by this or that set of class
relations, whereas the only truly global or world-systemic economic process
is the exchange of already produced products by already existing social
relations of production.
This is the one basic reason why world-system theory has not gone on
to become a general model and challenge the more dominant paradigms of
social science. It has yet to formulate a theory of the human production
process at a world level. World-system theory specializes in world exchange,
world networks, world divisions of labor, but not in world production. Until
that limitation is overcome, world-system theory will always remain a
secondary footnote to more basic social science.
Late 20th-century social theory is open to conceiving of larger units
for the analysis of our collective existence. Most thinkers still think societally,
but a growing number think in terms of a world-system. Some see it operating
since the 16th century, others since the 13th century, and still others for at
least 5,000 years. On the question of human interconnectedness there will
be no debate. But the conceptual window of opportunity to consider world
units appeared precisely because of a theoretical crisis in received models
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of social science, and until a new theoretical framework appears with
processes and operations different from the 19th-century societal ones,
world-system theory, Post- or Pre-ISOO, will remain a limited theoretical
paradigm. So, neither the Pre's nor the Post's have ihe advantage, as neither
has generated any new ideas that are not already part of the fundamental
package of received social science knowledge.
University of Arizona
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EXPANDING WORLD
COMMERCIALIZATION: THE
LINK BETWEEN WORLDSYSTEMS AND CIVILIZATIONS
Stephen K. Sanderson
From the rise of the first states around 5,000 years ago until the last
few hundred years, the dominant form of social organization has been the
agrarian state, or what Collins (1990, 1992) has called agrarian-coercive
societies, Kautsky (1982) traditional aristocratic empires, and Marxistoriented scholars the tributary mode of production (Amin 1976; Wolf 1982).
Regardless of their various differences, agrarian societies share at least four
fundamental characteristics. First, they are characterized by a class division
between a small landowning (or at least land controlling) nobility and a large
peasantry. The peasantry is compelled on threat of violence to pay tribute
in the form of rent, taxation, labor services, or some combination thereof to
the nobility for the latter's economic benefit. This relationship is one of
naked exploitation backed by military force. Second, the noble-peasant
relationship is the principal economic axis in the society, and it is a
relationship of production-for-use rather than production-for-exchange.
Production-for-exchange exists to some degree, but it is subordinate in
importance, often greatly so, to production-for-use. Indeed, the social actors
who dominate production-for-use, the urban merchants, were typically
looked down upon by the aristocracy as money-grubbing individuals who
dared to dirty their hands with the soil of commerce. Merchants sometimes
enjoyed great wealth, but their social status was almost invariably low. Third,
despite the class division between nobles and peasants, there is no overt class
struggle carried on between these two classes (Kautsky 1982; Giddens 1985).
There is, of course, a marked contlict of class interest, but this does not
manifest itself, other than in the most minimal and sporadic way, in deliberate
actions by one class against the other. Finally, agrarian societies are held
together not by any sort of ideological consensus or common world-outlook,
but by military force (Giddens 1985). Agrarian societies are virtually always
highly militarized societies, and such militarization is essential to the aims
and ambitions of dominant groups. Military might is devoted to the twin
aims of internal repression and external conquest.
Agrarian societies have been most intensively studied by historians,
and especially by those historians who think of themselves as
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"civilizationists," many of whom claim allegiance to the works of Arnold
Toynbee (1934-61) and Pitirim Sorokin (1957). Civilizationists can be
identified by a number of characteristics, but two stand out. First, they exhibit
a tendency to think of the agrarian civilizations in a mentalist or idealist
sense. Civilizations are defined and bounded by their cultural themes or
motifs, which include such things as philosophies, art styles, religions, and
other abstract systems of thought and feeling. Civilizationists have paid some
attention to the political features and dynamics of agrarian societies, but they
have given little attention to the economic side and certainly have not given
it any prominent role in civilizational dynamics. Second, unlike most
historians, civilizationists have searched for patterns or regulari ties in history,
the patterns identified usually being cyclical in nature. Thus we have
Toynbee's notion that all civilizations tend to go through a life cycle
containing four stages - genesis, growth, breakdown, and disintegrationand Sorokin's famous idea that civilizations exhibit a cyclical alternation
between ideational, idealistic, and sensate forms. In contrast to most
historians, civilizationists have therefore adopted a nomothetic rather than
an idiographic stance. Nevertheless, the cyclical nature of their nomothetic
view has seemingly excluded from consideration the type of linear
developmental patterns stressed by those other students of agrarian societies
(and all other types of societies), viz., social scientists who espouse an
evolutionary view of history.
I would like to suggest that civilizationists need to pay more attention
to economics and to developmental rather than cyclical patterns. (I am not
rejecting the notion that there may be cyclical patterns, but only asserting
that there are developmental or evolutionary patterns of profound
importance.) In recent years a number of social scientists have begun to
study agrarian and other types of preindustrial societies from a very different
point of view, one that does in fact emphasize both economics and longterm social development. These are scholars who identify with the
world-system perspective originally developed in the 1970s by Immanuel
Wallerstein (1974, 1979, 1980, 1989). The success of this perspective in
interpreting the nature and dynamics of modern capitalist civilization has
led to the notion that it may have more general utility - that there may have
been other historical world-systems that can only be properly understood
from a holistic point of view rather than by considering the parts of the
system in relative isolation. The pioneers of this view have been, inter alia,
Jane Schneider (1977), Kajsa Ekholm and Jonathan Friedman (1982), Janet
Abu-Lughod (1989), Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall (1991,
1993), and Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills (Frank 1990, 1991; Gil1s
and Frank 1991, 1992), some of whom have contributed articles to this issue.
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My initial reaction to the attempt to apply a world-system perspective to
precapitalist and preindustrial societies was rather mixed (Sanderson 1991).
One of my initial objections concerned the attempt to apply a perspective
focusing on relations of economic exchange to societies in which productionfor-exchange was clearly subordinated to production-for-use. My argument
was that precapitalist societies, agrarian societies included, contained so little
production-for-exchange that it would be difficult to apply a world-system
perspective to them. Or, to the extent that such a perspective could be applied,
it would apply to only a tiny portion of economic action, and thus be of very
limited use. However, I had an open mind and continued to read and study
the works of the "precapitalist world-systemites," hoping that a payoff would
eventually be realized.
I did not have long to wait. I gradually came to accept the view, argued
most forcefully by Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills, that agrarian
civilizations had much more commercialism in them than had generally been
recognized, and that in fact there had been a long-term process of the growth
of commercialism beginning around 3000 B.C. Frank and Gills have referred
to this process as one of capital accumulation and have suggested that the
rise of modern capitalism after the sixteenth century was only a quantitative
extension of the process, not aqualitative shift from a "feudal" to a "capitalist"
economy. I break with them on this particular point - it seems to me a
considerable overstatement - but I regard their argument for the gradual
growth of commercialism over the last 5,000 years as basically sound. Since
I see this process prior to A.D. 1500 as having occurred within essentially
noncapitalist, tributary societies, I prefer to refer to it as one of expanding
world commercialization rather than capital accumulation. Before A.D. 1500
the growth of commercialism occurred within societies in which early forms
of capitalism (perhaps best called "protocapitalism") existed, but capitalist
relations were not yet dominant in the economy. For me, expanding world
commercialization is a historical process of tremendous significance that we
are only perhaps now coming to appreciate, and it is the link (or if not the
link, then at least a link) between the concerns of traditional civilizationists
and the new precapitalist world-systemites. This is, or at least can be, a
common focus for both groups of scholars.
As I see it, the process of expanding world commercialization is one
that can be assessed primarily in terms of growth in the size and density of
trade networks. Some trade existed prior to the rise of the first civilizations
in 3000 B.C., but its scale began to increase substantially after that date.
Early trade was primarily local or confined to relatively small regions, but
in due time it expanded to include much larger regions, and then eventually
true long-distance trade emerged to link East with West. It is possible to
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mark off three major stages in this process (McNeill 1982; Curtin 1984).
The first stage begins around 2000 B.C. and ends around 200 B.C. During
this phase trade was largely local or, at best, regional in scope. By 200 B.C.
there emerged the first truly long-distance trade with the estahlishment of a
trade axis that ran all the way from China to the Mediterranean. After about
A.D. 1000 there was another big leap forward in which trade networks
expanded and deepened, especially in the period he tween 1250 and 1350.
It is interesting to note that the emergence of a long-distance trade axis
after 200 B.C. corresponds fairly closely to Rein Taagepera's date for a
sudden surge in the size of agrarian empires (600 B.C.). Taagepera (1978,
1990) has studied changes in the size of agrarian empires over approximately
the last 5,000 years. He shows that there has been a significant increase in
empire size during this time and marks off three phases of empire growth.
The first phase begins with the rise of the state itself. Before this time there
were no political units with a size greater than 0.1 square megameters (one
square megameter = 386,000 square miles). During the first phase of empire
building the single largest agrarian empire seemed to maintain a size of at
least 0.15 square megameters and to have at least occasionally attained a
size of about 1.3 square megameters. A second phase of empire building
was inaugurated around 600 B.C. After this time the single largest empire
was never smaller than 2.3 square megameters, and the maximum imperial
size attained was 24 square megameters. Obviously, then, there is a
substantial increase in the size of empires after 600 B.C. Taagepera believes
that the increase in empire size during the second phase prohably resulted
from increasing sophistication in the art of power delegation, especially
through impersonal bureaucratic roles rather than personal relationships. But
it is also likely that the size increase was made possible hy important
developments in the areas of transportation and communication. as Taagepera
himself notes. Empires could not become effectively larger until the means
were available for controlling and integrating much larger areas. Expanding
world commercialization and the growth of empires are undouhtedly causally
related, for as E.L. Jones (1988) has argued, truly long-distance trade
networks only became possible with the rise of very large empires. Only
empires of that size had developed the technology of communication and
transportation needed to facilitate worldwide trade.
Philip Curtin (1984) has described some of the basic characteristics of
the worldwide trade network that was in effect between 200 H.C. and A.D.
1000 (cf. Chaudhuri 1985). As he notes, during this period trade became
regularized between the Red SeaiPersian Gulf region and India, between
India and Southeast Asia, and between Southeast Asia and both China and
Japan. In the middle Han period, Chinese merchants traveled to the west
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through central Asia and established an overland trade route between East
Asia and Europe. Chinese trade with India had become extensive by the first
century A.D., and Chinese goods were being sold widely in the Roman
Empire. During Roman times trade between India and the Mediterranean
was carried on through three different routes: an overland route through
Parthia, the Persian Gulf combined with an overland route, and the Red Sea
combined with an overland route to Egypt or some part of the Fertile Crescent
region. Maritime trade flourished in the South China Sea and the Bay of
Bengal, with Canton being an important port for trade to the south.
William McNeill (1982) has described what he regards as a new and
major burst of world commercialization beginning around A.D. 1000, and
centering heavily on China. It was during this time that China had by far its
greatest burst of economic acti vity prior to modern times, one that lags behind
only late medieval Europe and Tokugawa Japan in scale and scope. Mark
Elvin (1973) has referred to this as an "economic revolution," most of which
occurred during the period of the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960-1275). Elvin sees
the Sung economic revolution as involving agriculture, water transport,
money and credit, industry, and trade (both domestic and foreign). He argues
that improvements in agriculture gave China by the thirteenth century the
most sophisticated agricultural system in the world, and one that provided
a foundation for major thrusts in commercial activity. Commercial activity
was also greatly aided by improvements in water transport. These
improvements involved both the construction of better sailing vessels on the
one hand and the building of canals and removal of natural obstacles to
navigation in streams and rivers on the other. Industry flourished, especially
the production of steel and iron. The economy became much more monetized.
There was a much greater volume of money in circulation, and the money
economy even penetrated into peasant villages. Foreign trade, especially
with Southeast Asia and Japan, flourished. Markets proliferated and became
hierarchically organized. At this time China was the world's most
economically advanced society, and many observers have suggested that it
was on the brink of the world's first industrial revolution. However, beginning
sometime in the fourteenth century China began to decline and stagnate
economically and gradually to withdraw from foreign trade. It became
increasingly isolated and inward looking, a process that had become fairly
complete by the middle of the fifteenth century. The reasons for this economic
downturn are still very imperfectly understood today.
McNeill sees the enormous economic growth in Sung China as part of
a larger picture of world commercialization. As he says, "China's rapid
evolution towards market-regulated behavior in the centuries on either side
of the year 1000 tipped a critical balance in world history" (1982:25). And
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he elaborates (1982:50-54):
Though the capitalist spirit was ... kept firmly under control,
the rise of a massive market economy in China during the eleventh
century may have sufficed to change the world balance between
command and market behavior in a critically significant way.
Moreover, the growth of the Chinese economy and society wa<; felt
beyond China's borders; and as Chinese technical secrets spread
abroad, new possibilities opened in other parts of the Old World, most
conspicuously in western Europe ....
What seems certain is that the scale of trade through the southern
seas grew persistently and systematically from 1000 onwards, despite
innumerable temporary setbacks and local disasters. Behavior attuned
to the maintenance of such trade became morc and more firmly
embedded in everyday routines of human life ...
What was new in the eleventh century, therefore, was not the
principle of market articulation of human effort across long distances,
but the scale on which this kind of behavior began to affect human
lives. New wealth arising among a hundred million Chinese began to
flow out across the seas (and significantly along caravan routes as
well) and added new vigor and scope to market related activity. Scores,
hundreds, and perhaps thousands of vessels began to sail from port to
port within the Sea of Japan and the South China Sea, the Indonesian
Archipelago and the Indian Ocean ....
As is well known, a similar upsurge of commercial activity took
place in the eleventh century in the Mediterranean, where the principal
carriers were Italian merchants sailing from Venice, Genoa, and other
ports. They in turn brought most of peninsular Europe into a more
and more closely articulated trade net in the course of the next three
hundred years. It was a notable achievement, but only a small part of
the larger phenomenon, which, [ believe, raised market regulated
behavior to a scale and significance for civilized peoples that had
never been attained before ....
[t was precisely in the eleventh century, when China's
conversion to cash exchanges went into high gear, that European
seamen and traders made the Mediterranean a miniature replica of
what was probably happening simultaneously in the southern oceans .
. . . These separate sea networks were then combined into one single
interacting whole after 1291.

Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) has picked up the story where McNeill left
it. She describes in great detail for the period 1250-1350 the structure and
operation of a vast worldwide trade network from western Europe to East
Asia. This huge network contained eight overlapping subsystems that can
be grouped into three larger circuits centering on western Europe, the Middle
East, and the Far East. She claims that this world trade network (1989:353)
was substantially more complex in organization, greater in
volume, and more sophisticated in execution, than anything the world

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol30/iss30/20

98

Review: Full Issue
97
had previously known.
Sophistication was evident in the technology of shipping and
navigation, the social organization of production and marketing, and
the institutional arrangements for conducting business, such as
partnerships, mechanisms for pooling capital, and techniques for
monetization and exchange.

Additional corroboration for the notion of expanding world
commercialization throughout the agrarian era comes from research on trends
in world urbanization. Using data compiled by Tertius Chandler (1987),
David Wilkinson (1992, 1993) has shown that urbanization is a striking trend
in world history. Of course, commercialization and urbanization cannot be
strictly equated, but it is likely that urbanization is more a function of
increasing commercialization than of anything else. Cities may grow and
expand to fulfill important political functions, of course, and certainly for
various other reasons, but commercialization seems to be the main driving
force behind urbanization (Bairoch 1988).
The accompanying table presents data on world urbanization trends
from 22S0 B.C. to A.D. ISOO.1t is clear that urbanization has been a striking
feature of agrarian social growth over a period of nearly 4,000 years. A
particularly large leap in urbanization occurs in the period between 6S0 and
430 B.C. During this period the number of cities of 30,000 or more inhabitants
increased from 20 to SI , and the total population represented by these cities
increased from 894,000 to 2,877 ,000, a more than threefold increase. It seems
very noteworthy that this period marks the early beginnings of Greco-Roman
civilization and is the same period that Taagepera has identified as being
associated with a major increase in the size and scope of political empires.
There is another major urbanization spurt between 430 B.C. and A.D. 100,
during which the number of cities of 30,000 or more inhabitants increased
from SI to at least 7S, and also during which the total population of these
cities expanded from 2,877,000 to S; 181,000, an 80 percent increase. This
period is essentially the same period that McNeill and Curtin refer to as
involving the emergence of the first truly long-distance trade network
between East Asia and the Mediterranean.
It cannot escape attention that world urbanization suffered a setback
between AD. 100 and A.D. SOO. There were fewer large cities (those with
30,000-40,000 or more inhabitants), and the total population of these cities
fell from S,I81,000 to 3,892,000. This was, of course, the period of the
decline and eventual collapse of the Roman Empire. However, world
urbanization and commercialization suffered only a minimal and quite
temporary setback. By A.D. 800, the total population of the largest cities
(S,237,000) had regained the level achieved in A.D. 100. It took longer for
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World Urbanization, 2250 BC - AD 1500
Estimated
No. largest
Pop. range of
tot. pop. of
Civilintions
Year __________________________
cities
largest
cities __~~~
largest__cities
~~
~~~~
~______re~p~re.s~en~t~e~d_____
2250 BC

8

c.30,000

240,000

Mesopotamian,
Egyptian

1600 BC

13

24,000-100,000

459,000

Mesopotamian,
Egyptian,
Aegean

1200 BC

16

24,000-50,000

499,000

Central,' Aegean,
Indic, Far
Eastern

650 BC

20

30,000-120,000

894,000

Central, Aegean,
Indic, Far
Eastern

430 BC

51

30,000-200,000

2,877,000

Central, Indic,
Far Eastern

AD 100

75*

30,000-450,000

5,181,000

Central, Indic,
Far Eastern

AD 500

47

40,000-400,000

3,892,000

Central, Indic,
Far Eastern

AD 800

56

40,000-700,000

5,237,000

Central, Indic,
West African,
Far Eastern,
Indonesian,
Japanese

AD 1000

70

40,000-450,000

5,629,000

Central, Indic,
Far Eastern,
IndoneSian,
Japanese

AD 1300

75*

40,000-432,000

6,224,000

Central, Indic,
West African,
Far Eastern,
Japanese,
Indonesian

AD 1500

75*

45,000-672,000

7,454,000

Central,lndic,
West African,
Far Eastern,
Japanese
'Central civilization is Wilkinson's name for the expanded civilization originally centered
on Mesopotamia and Egypt. By 200 BC it had engulfed Europe.
An asterisk denotes the upper limit on the number of cities set by Chandler (1987).

Sources: David Wilkinson, "Cities, Civilizations, and Oikumemes: 1." Comparative
Civilizations Review 27:51-87, 1<)'.12; and "Cities, Civilizations, and Oikumemes: II."
Comparative Civilizations Review 28:41-72, 1993. Tertius Chandler, Four Thowand Years of
Urhan Growth. Lewiston, NY: St. David's University Press, 1987.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol30/iss30/20

100

Review: Full Issue
99
the number of large cities to return to the level reached in A.D. 100 - there
were 70 such cities in A.D. 1000 and 75 or more cities in A.D. 1300 - but
not that much longer. Moreover, after A.D. 1000 the scale of world
urbanization was clearly very large and continuing to grow, and, as already
noted, the period after A.D. 1000 has been seen by McNeill and Curtin as
involving another major leap in world trade networks.
What are the implications of recognizing a historical process of
expanding world commercialization over the period from 3000 B.C. to A.D.
1500? I see at least two. First, this process requires strong qualification of
what has long been the standard sociological wisdom on agrarian societies:
that they exhi bited thousands of years of lethargy and stagnation and had no
impetus to fundamental social change. This is a view that dates all the way
back to the eighteenth century. Its proponents have included Max Weber
([ 189611909] 1976), Gerhard Lenski (1970), John Kautsky (1982), and
Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), among many others. It is not completely
erroneous, but it is one-sided and misleading. While agrarian societies have
generally lacked any strong evolutionary impetus - any tendency toward
fundamental structural transformation into a new form of society - it is
clear that agrarian societies in A.D. 1500 were different - some might even
say profoundly different - from what they were like in 3000 B.C.
We might put the matter this way. A useful distinction can be drawn
between social growth and social evolution. Social growth occurs when there
is a quantitative change in one or more dimensions of a system of social
organization. Increases in, say, the size of a population, military might,
technological efficiency, or political power may be regarded as social growth
so long as they do not lead a society into a structurally new mode of
organization. This is essentially a distinction between quantitative change
(social growth) and qualitative change (social evolution), or between
something new rather than something greater. The crucial question is, of
course, Was there much social evolution during the so-called agrarian era?
The answer is no, there was not. But there was considerable social growth.
In addition to expanding world commercialization this included two
correlative forms of social growth: growth in the size of political empires
and in the concentration of political power (Taagepera 1978, 1990; Mann
1986), and technological advance (Lenski 1970; Mann 1986). However, I
believe that the growth of commercialism was the most important form of
social growth during the long agrarian epoch.
The second implication of acknowledging a process of expanding world
commercialization is perhaps even more important. Assuming that the
movement out of the stage of agrarian society was going to be a movement
into a specifically capitalist system of social and economic life - and
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historically, of course, this is the way things have worked out - it needs to
be stressed that the emergence of capitalism could not be some sort of sudden
leap forward to be achieved in a few dozen or even a few hundred years. It
was an economic transformation that required a long period of time because
of what might be called the "threshold effect." Because of capitalism's
requirement for extensive markets (both foreign and domestic), and because
of the general hostility of agrarian elites to it, it could only emerge slowly,
and as such would require a lengthy period of incubation before it could
reach a kind of "critical mass" essential to a tipping of the balance of economic
power in its favor. In retrospect we know that the time period actually required
was approximately 4,500 years from the beginning of the first agrarian states.
In another work (Sanderson 1994) I have attempted to develop this
implication at some length by way of formulating a new theory of the rise
of modern capitalism.
In conclusion, I feel compelled to say that this essay is only a bare
beginning toward understanding the worldwide growth of commercialism
over the past 5,000 years. This process cries out for understanding in much
greater detail, and many important questions remain to be answered. What
was the extent to which earlier forms of capitalism were "rationalized" in
the Weberian sense? Were ancient merchants profit maximizers? What was
the importance of financial arrangements in earlier forms of capitalism?
What was the relationship between technological advance and commercial
expansion? What role did the state play in ancient capitalism? Now that we
have begun to recognize that there was an important long-term process of
expanding world commercialization, these questions and many others await
civilizationists, worId-systemitcs, and all other inquisitive parties.
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
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CITIES IN THE CENTRAL
POLITICALIMILITARY
NETWORK SINCE CE 1200:
SIZE HIERARCHY AND
DOMINATION
Christopher Chase-Dunn
and
Alice Willard
The comparative study of civilizations requires us to study cities and
the networks of human interaction between city and countryside, one city
and other cities, and the relationships between citified regions and regions
in which people live in villages or are nomadic. One aspect of city systems
long used by archaeologists to make inferences about the degree of
centralization and hierarchy in a system is the city size hierarchy: the relative
distribution of the sizes of cities in a region. In this paper we use data on
the population sizes of cities to study the rate of urban growth and the city
size distribution in Europe and the Near East since CE 1200.
Recent phenomena in the modern world-system have caused specialists
in urbanization to conceptualize the notion of "world cities" (e.g., Friedmann,
1986). But the study of contemporary world cities needs to consider a
comparative framework which spans both broad spatial expanses and deep
temporal ones. In order to know what is new we need to know what is old;
in order to interpret and explain contemporary trends we need to understand
how and why change has occurred in the past. The contemporary global
political economy, with its core world cities and semiperipheral megacities,
is only the most recent formation in which large cities have played central
roles in the hierarchical and horizontal links among societies that are parts
of larger world-systems. Earlier regional systems also had their world cities.
These performed central economic and political/military roles for the systems
of which they were a part. The role of villages, towns, cities, and settlement
systems in the evolution of world-systems has been outlined elsewhere
(Chase-Dunn, 1992).
When we use a telescope we see different things than when we look
with the naked eye or with a microscope. Here we focus our gaze on the last
800 years and on the intersocietal network that eventually became the global
system in which we now live - the Central Political/Military Network.
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This study replicates an earlier study using a somewhat different unit
of regional analysis. Earlier work (Chase-Dunn, 1985) bounded the modern
world-system following the principles and prescriptions of the Fernand
Braudel Center at SUNY-Binghamton. In this paper we will utilize a different
principle for specifying the spatial boundaries of world-systems. This
changes the focus of analysis to some extent, and those who have studied
regional systems know that the way in which the subject is bounded is a
fundamental decision which affects everything else.
The approach to spatially bounding world-systems proposed by
Immanuel Wallerstein has been criticized by many world-system scholars.
Jane Schneider (1991) was the first to point out that luxury-goods trade often
has important and systemic effects on the regions which are so linked.
Wallerstein argued that "preciosity" trade was exogenous to world-systems.
Others have argued that using mode of production as a feature for spatially
bounding world-systems is mistaken (Chase-Dunn, 1989; Terlouw, 1992).
Wallerstein argues that the Ottoman empire was separate from the modern
world-system hecause it was not capitalist despite the extensive trade and
political-military interaction that the Ottomans had with Europe.
We adopt an approach to spatially bounding world-systems that
emphasizes all important interactional interconnections. World-systems are
networks of interconnectedness in which the interactions condition the
reproduction and the transformation of the social structures which are
connected (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1993). Connections must have regularized
and systemic consequences. But all such connections do not have the same
spatial characteristics. We note that in many world-systems bulk goods
networks are small, while political-military networks are larger and networks
of the exchange of prestige goods are larger yet (see Figure 1). We follow
the work of David Wilkinson (1987, 1992) in studying the city systems of
regularized political-military interaction networks composed of states and
empires, but we also pay attention to the larger networks of luxury trade
(called oikumenes by Wilkinson) ,as potentially important networks of
systemic interaction.
Following Wilkinson, we call the intersocietal system which engulfed
all others and which became the global political economy in which we now
live the "Central World-System." World-systems are often nested networks
of interaction as illustrated in Figure I. The whole system exists at the level
of the largest prestige goods network. In this paper we will use the
political/military subsystem as the unit of analysis for our study of city
systems. We contend that the political/military network (PMN) is the most
sensible territorial unit for studying city size distributions because it is the
unit within which states directly vie with one another for power. This new
unit of analysis - the Central PMN - is posited to be a more appropriate
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specification for studying the emergence of European dominance in the
modern world-system than the boundaries proposed by the Braudel Center
and used in the earlier study (Chase-Dunn, 1985a).

PRESTIGE GOODS EXCHANGE

PoliticallM.ilitary Interaction

0000000
Figure 1. A world-system with bulk goods and connict networks

nested Inside a prestige goods network.

The Central PMN (called Central Civilization by Wilkinson) emerged
with the coupling of the Mesopotamian and Egyptian PMNs in about 1500
BCE. The Mesopotamian and Egyptian systems had been linked into a single
network of prestige goods exchange since at least 2500 BCE and probably
much earlier. The Central PMN expanded, eventually engulfing all other
systems, incorporating India and Spanish America in the sixteenth century
and the Far Eastern and Japanese systems in the nineteenth century.l
The PMN approach to bounding city systems leads to somewhat
different conclusions about the history of large-scale interaction in the last
800 years from that of the Braudel Center scholars. From our point of view
Europe was never a separate system, at least since its incorporation into the
Mediterranean-centered prestige goods network in the Bronze Age
(Kristiansen, 1991). The European story is one of a penetrated and peripheral
region which eventually developed a new form of organization that enabled
it to dominate all of the Central World-System. The Roman power which
brought Europe into the political/military network was itself an upstart
semiperipheral marcher state that conquered the old Near Eastern core region.
After the fall of Rome the center of power moved back toward the Near East
where it had long been, and Europe was left to stew in its feudal juices. The
rise ofIslam further isolated Europe from the long-distance trade and brought
an even deeper devolution of political power and a parallel economic
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involution.
The recovery of Europe enabled a new mode of production, capitalism,
to become the predominant logic of accumulation in a regional subsystem,
and this subsystem eventually rose to transform the whole of the Central
System to capitalism. But capitalism did not begin in Europe; it only became
predominant in that regional subsystem. Markets, money, merchants, the
production of commodities, and wage labor were institutions which were
invented and spread within the tributary states and empires, and which grew
in the interstices between the empires of the Afro-Eurasian oikumene. The
first capitalist states on earth, states run by people whose main method of
gathering wealth was through the trading of commodities and the production
of commodities for sale, were the capitalist city-states operating in the
interstices between tributary empires. The Phoenician city-states are an
obvious example, but a much earlier case may have been Dilmun (now
Bahrain) linking the early Mesopotamian states with the urbanized states of
the Indus River valley.
These semi peripheral capitalist city-states were not the main players
in the systems in which they lived. The main players were tributary states
and empires that gathered wealth by taxation and tribute. But the
semiperipheral capitalist city-states performed the important roles of carrying
on trade between tributary states and linking dispersed peripheral regions
into larger trade networks. They were the protagonists of commodification
(Chase-Dunn, 1992).
At the same time, the tributary empires were themselves becoming
more sophisticated regarding their ability to exploit market trade without
extinguishing it. The Persian emperor Darius understood the wisdom of
allowing the merchants within the empire a certain degree of autonomy in
order to maximize his own revenues from taxing their trade. Imperial
monopolization was good for obtaining a quick return, but in the long run
a percentage of a larger pie was preferable. The Roman and Chinese empires
were among the most commercialized tributary empires, and the later Islamic
and Ottoman empires also had extensive commodification without yet
abandoning their primary orientation toward the logic of accumulation
through political-military control.
In Sung and Ming dynasty China capitalists and capitalism posed
significant challenges to the power of the Mandarins, but the logic of empire
was able to meet these challenges and to maintain and reproduce a strong
centralized state apparatus. The steppe-nomad and northern woodsmen
dynasties that conquered China also reproduced the logic of bureaucratic
empire (Barfield, 1989). The overall picture here is one in which the
money, commodified goods,
institutional hases of capitalism commodified labor, and commodified land - emerged slowly, unevenly,
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and in spurts and retreats as the territorial size of empires expanded from
the third millennium BCE on. This was uneven development in a number
of meanings. There were locations in which capitalists actually held state
power - the autonomous semiperipheral capitalist city-states. There was
also an oscillation within the tributary states between periods in which private
capital accumulation by wealthy families became relatively more important
versus periods in which state-controlled accumulation was more emphasized
(Ekholm and Friedman, 1985; Frank and Gills, 1993). These were not
capitalist systems, but capitalism was emerging in the interstices of the
tributary modes of accumulation.
The irony of Europe was that capitalism was able to become the
predominai:t logic of accumulation there precisely because states were weak.
It was the strong imperial states of the Near East and China which prevented
the emergent predominance of capitalism in those areas. The semiperipheral
status of Europe allowed it to evolve a new institutional mix in which market
forces and the political power of capitalists was greater than ever before.
The capitalist city-states of Europe - Venice, Genoa, Florence, and Antwerp
- were closer together and had a proportionally greater influence on trade
and the political interactions among continental states than earlier capitalist
city-states had. The operation of protection rent (Lane, 1979) as a regulator
of state action became increasingly important in a system in which the most
powerful states were increasingly coming under the control of capital.
CYCLES OF POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION

All hierarchical intersocietal systems go through sequences of
centralization and decentralization of economic, political, and social power.
Like states, chiefdoms emerged in sets in which chiefly polities interacted
and competed with one another, and these "interchiefdom systems" exhibited
a pattern of rise and fall in which the territorial and population size of the
largest chiefdoms rose and then declined (Sahlins 1972: 144-48; Mann,
1986:Chapter 2; Friedman and Rowlands, 1977). The dynamics of this
sequence in systems composed of chiefdoms, in which power was organized
around hierarchical kinship relations, differed in important ways from the
dynamics of rise and fall, political centralization and decentralization, which
operated in systems composed of true states.2
The cycle of the rise and fall of states occurs in all known interstate
systems. In some the competition among states takes the form of the rise
and fall of hegemonic core powers, a process which we know well in the
modern world-system. In others, and more frequently, the cycle of political
centralization/decentralization takes the form of the alternation between
interstate systems in which there are a number of competing states within a
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core region (these are called "states systems" by Wilkinson) and worldempires in which a single state succeeds in unifying an entire core area by
means of conquest (called "universal empires" or "world states" by
Wilkinson). Wi lkinson (I 992b:54 ) provides us with periodizations of states
systems and world states for eleven state-based "civilizations" defined as
interactive networks of polities that are fighting and/or cooperating with
each other in which there are cities of at least 10,000 people.
In addition to the cycle of the rise and fall of polities, there is a longrun trend toward the increasing size of polities and the decreasing number
of autonomous polities on Earth (Carneiro, 1978). Rein Taagepera's (1978a,
1978b, 1979) studies of changes in the territorial size of the largest empires
on Earth over the past 4,000 years demonstrate the cycles of political
centralization and decentralization discussed above. The combination of the
long-term trend of the increasing size of polities with the medium-term
process of political centralization/decentralization is illustrated in Figure 1.
Taagepera's studies show that the size ofthe largest empire on Earth oscillated
for long periods and then jumped up in rapid rises that correspond to the
wide conquests by semi peripheral marcher states who created empires across
whole core regions. Well-known examples are the Akkadian Empire, the
Assyrian Empire, the Alexandrian conquests, and the Roman Empire. Figure
2 is a simplified and idealized model based on Taagepera's studies of the
territorial size of the largest states and empires and Carneiro's (1978)
discussion of the long-term evolutionary trend from many small polities to
a few large ones.
In this paper we will examine the relationship between the processes
of political centralization/decentralization and changes in the relative
population sizes of cities located within a single interacting political/military
network - the Central World-System. In an earlier paper (Chase-Dunn and
Willard, 1993) we have compared the pattern of changes in the Central
system with those of the Far Eastern and Indic systems. The simplest
hypothesis is that city systems will become more hierarchical- that is, the
largest cities will be much larger than other cities in the same network when politicallmilitary power is more centralized. This is based on the idea
that political power is an important component of the ability of large cities
to gather the resources necessary to sustain large populations.
The phenomenon of urban primacy - the concentration of population
in a very large central city with only much smaller cities in the same region
- has been extensively studied in national societies in the modern worldsystem (e.g., Chase-Dunn, 1985b; Lyman, 1992). It is well known that France
has a very primate city-size distribution, as do most peripheral and
semi peripheral countries in the modern world-system. Urban primacy is seen
as a problem hy many contemporary urban and regional planners and they
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have constructed and tried to implement policies for encouraging the growth
of small and middle-sized cities (rather than further increasing the size of
the largest city in a country).
Figure 2. Cycles and Trend of Political Centralization
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SETTLEMENT SIZE HIERARCHIES

What do we mean by city size hierarchy? All human settlements interact
with other settlements. The size of individual settlements can be studied as
they grow or decrease, and the relati ve size of settlements can also be studied.
This means looking at the distribution of settlement sizes within a region.
Some regions contain settlement systems which are very hierarchical in the
sense that there is a single very large settlement which is surrounded by
much smaller settlements. Such settlement systems are called "primate"
because there is a single center which is much larger than any other settlement.
Geographers have developed theories which suggest that a "normal"
settlement size hierarchy will correspond to the rank-size rule in which the
second largest settlement is half the size of the largest, the third largest is
one-third the size of the largest, the fourth largest is one-fourth the size of
the largest, and so on. The rank-size rule is also called the "log normal" rule
because the distribution of settlement sizes approximates a straight line when
the settlement sizes are logarithmically transformed. Some settlement
systems are "flat" in the sense that the towns, cities, or villages of which
they are composed are all about the same size. So we can discuss different
settlement systems as primate, rank-size, or flat depending on the relative
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size of the settlements of which they are composed. The size hierarchy aspect
allows us to compare very different kinds of settlement systems to one another
because we are looking at the relative, rather than the absolute, sizes of
settlements. Thus a system composed of villages can be just as hierarchical
as a system composed of great cities if one village is much larger than the
others. The SPI reflects the relative degree of inequality of settlement sizes
amongst a group of settlements or cities.
Table One:

Central PMN SPis IUId Populations
1200 c.E. to 1988 C.E.

URBAN POPULATION

YEAR

SPI

1200

-2.44

850,000

1250

-0.283

885,000

1300

-0.04

1,013,000

1350

-0.074

910,000

1400

-0.295

1,045,000

1450

-0.13

1,025,000

1500

-0.26

1,165,000

1550

-0.026

1,610,000

1575

-0.056

1,590,000

1600

-0.146

1,869,000

1650

-0.615

2,275,000

1700

-\.093

2,510,000

1750

-1.196

2,386,000

1800

-0.468

2,656,000

1825

-0.148

3,653,000

1850

-0.335

6,942,000

1875

-0.039

10,456,000

1900

-0.222

18,476,000

1914

-0.82

25,119,000

1925

-\.506

29,629,000

1950

-0.503

39,629,000

1970

-0.849

70,377,000

1988

-0.94

99,500,000

SPls are based on a five city distribution.
Populations are the sums of the three largest cities.
Source: Chandler, 1987.

In order to make such relative comparisons a statistic called the
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Standardized Primacy Index (SPI) was developed by Walters (1985). The
SPI takes a value of zero when a settlement size distribution corresponds to
the rank-size rule. It takes on negative values when the distribution is less
hierarchical (flatter) than the rank-size rule and positive values when the
distribution is more hierarchical than the rank-size rule (primacy). Although
the measures of urban populations are subject to error, and to greater error
as we go back in time, the degree of error is reduced when we calculate the
SPI. The SPIs we calculate in Table 1 below are based on the largest five
cities within the Central Political/Military Network at each point in time for
which we have data from Chandler (1987).
Our data on the population sizes of cities is taken from Tertius
Chandler's (1987) Four Thousand Years of Urban Growth. We recognize
that the population estimates in Chandler are often in error according to other
sources and we applaud the recent efforts of other scholars to replace
Chandler's data set with a better one. In the meantime we can point out that
the SPI is fairly insensitive to errors in population estimates because it focuses
on the relative size of cities rather than their absolute size. For the most
recent year (1988) we use population estimates of the world's largest
metropolitan areas from Camp (1990).
POWER AND CITY SIZE DISTRIBUTIONS

Why should a city system have a steeper city size distribution when
there is a greater degree of concentration of power? The simple answer is
that large settlements and especially large cities require greater
concentrations of resources to support their large populations. This is why
population size has itself been suggested as an indicator of power (Taagepera,
1978a: Ill). But these resources may be obtainable locally and the settlement
size hierarchy may simply correspond to the distribution of ecologically
determined resources. In a desert environment populations c1 uster near oases.
It is not the political or economic power of the central settlement over
surrounding areas which produces a centralized settlement system, but rather
the ecological distribution of necessary or desirable resources. In many
systems, however, we have reason to believe that relations of power,
domination, and exploitation do affect the distribution of human populations
in space. Many large cities are as large as they are because they are able to
draw upon far-flung regions for food and raw materials. If a city is able to
use political/military power or economic power to acquire resources from
surrounding cities it will be able to support a larger population than the
dominated cities can, and this should produce a hierarchical city size
distribution.
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Of course the effect can also go the other way. Some cities can dominate
others because they have larger populations. Great population size makes
possible the assembly oflarge armies or navies, and this may be an important
factor creating or reinforcing steep city size distributions. The striking
difference between the contemporary world-system and earlier regional
systems is what we can describe as the declining significance of size.
Certainly size was never the only important component of power. Some
virtually city-less states (e.g., the Mongol empire) were able to dominate
urbanized civilizations for periods of time. But the correlation between city
size and power was much stronger in earlier world-systems than it is in our
own. We need to address why this change has occurred.
Our earlier paper (Chase-Dunn and Willard, 1993) examined the extent
to which changes in the degree of hierarchy in city-size distributions
corresponded to changes in the degree of political centralization since 2000
BCE in several different world-systems. We observed that, on the average,
all the political/military networks studied had city size distributions that were
significantly flatter than the rank size rule. This contrasts with studies of
city size distributions within modern national societies. These show average
distributions that are much closer to the rank-size rule (Chase-Dunn, 1985b).
The fact that political/military networks composed of many states have flatter
distributions than single national societies supports the notion that city size
hierarchies reflect relative distributions of power. Political/military networks
are generalIy larger and more politically multicentric than single nationstates.
We found a high degree of correspondence between changes over time
in city-size distributions and changes in the distribution of political power
within political/military networks (Chase-Dunn and Willard, 1993). The
periods designated by Wilkinson (1992, 1993) as those in which there were
"universal states" in political/military networks all exhibited relatively more
hierarchical city size distributions. The temporal and spatial focus we are
studying here, the Central PMN from CE 1200 to 1988, is one in which there
were no "universal states" that dominated the entire core region of the system.
The last world state in the Central PMN was the Roman Empire. But this
system has continued to go through cycles of political centralization and
decentralization even in the absence of universal states. This cycle has been
called the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers in the modern worldsystem. The broad similarities of this sequence of rise and fall to the earlier
pattern of empire formation and disintegration are important, but the
differences are also central to the argument that the modern capitalist worIdsystem operates according to a qualitatively different logic from the
previously dominant logic of the tributary modes of accumulation.
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A serendipitous finding reported in Chase-Dunn and Willard (1993) is
that the SPIs and urban growth sequences for the Central and Far Eastern
political/military networks are fairly closely synchronized from 430 BCE to
CE 1825, when the Central PMN incorporated the Far Eastern. We concluded
that the dynamics of the Eurasian prestige goods network and the formation
and disintegration of steppe nomad empires account for the synchronicities
of urban growth and changes in the city size distributions in the Central and
Far Eastern PMNs.
Table I shows the SPIs (index of flatness or hierarchy in the city size
distribution) and the total populations of the three largest cities at each point
in time for which we have data from Chandler (1987). The city populations
we used for both the SPI and the total urban populations are available for
inspection in Chase-Dunn and Willard (1993: Appendix). Negative SPIs
indicate a city size distribution that is flatter than the log normal rule. Note
that all the SPIs in Table I are negative, indicating that the city size
distribution of the Central PMN never hecame primate or more hierarchical
than the log normal rule. There is, however, significant variation in the degree
of hierarchy versus flatness over time. In CE 1200 the city size distrihution
was quite flat with an SPI of -2.44. This is the flattest point in all the years
from 1200 to 1988. By 1300 the SPI had moved to -0.04, a nearly log normal
distribution, indicating a significant shift toward a much more hierarchical
city size distribution over that 100-year period.
THE CENTRAL PMN SINCE CE J200

Our earlier paper (Chase-Dunn and Willard, 1993) examined the Central
PMN from 1360 BCE (just after the coupling of the Mesopotamian and
Egyptian PMNs) until CE 1988 and compared it with other regional worldsystems. Here we will focus on the more recent period from CE 1200 until
1988 and will focus only on the Central PMN. The purpose is to focus on
the PMN that contains the emerging European hegemony and to show how
the city-system of this unit of analysis changed over time. This constitutes
a replication of Chase-Dunn (1985a) with a new unit of analysis - the larger
political/military network of which the Wallersteinian "modern worldsystem" was a part. Figure 3 graphs the SPIs in Table 1, showing the changes
in the SPI for the Central PMN between CE 1200 and 1988. The overall
pattern since 1200 is a rise from flatness to near log normality, smallfluctuations until a descent back to flatness between 1600 and 1750, another
rise to log normality after 1750, another descent to flatness after 1900, and
another short rise peaking in 1950 and then a move hack toward flatness.
Figure 4 graphs the urban popUlation figures from Table I. These are
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the sums of the populations of the three largest cities for each time point.
This shows the general trend for cities to become larger, and also some
interesting

Figure 3: Central PMN SPls
from 1200 A.D. to 1988 A.D.
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variations in the growth rate. We exclude populations after 1825 because
the rate of increase after that time is so great that it masks the interesting
variations in growth rate that are visible in Figure 4. Comparison of Figures
3 and 4 shows the relationship between urban growth of the largest cities
and changes in the relative distribution of city sizes. There is no general
relationship between the two aspects of city system development, except for
a possible relationship between the declines in both in the 17th and 18th
centuries. This implies that changes in the relative distribution of power are
largely independent of changes in the rate of growth as indicated by the
increasing size of cities.
Let us now take a closer look at these broad trends. In CE 1200 the
city size distribution of the Central PMN was quite flat (SPI = -2.44) and
the urban population had fallen a bit from what it had been in 1150. The
urban population was still well below the level it had attained in CE 1000.
The two largest cities in 1200 were Fez (in Morocco) and Cairo, with 200,000
each; these were followed by Constantinople, Palermo, and Marrakesh.
Saladin ended the Fatimid rule of Egypt in 1171 and established the Ayyubid
dynasty. Seville was the sixth largest, Paris the seventh largest. Venice was
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fourteenth.
In 1250 we find the city size distribution jumping up to a hierarchy
with an SPI of -0.283. The largest city was now Cairo with 300,000, swollen
by the power of the Ayyubid dynasty. Second was Fez with 200,000, third
Paris with 160,000. These were followed by Marrakesh and Constantinople.
Constantinople had been taken by the army of the Fourth Crusade in 1204
and had declined from 150,000 to 100,000. The overall urban population
was continuing to grow but it had still not reached its former peak in CE
1000.

Figure 4: Central Urban Population
from 1200 A.D. to 1825 A.D.
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In 1300 we find an even steeper hierarchy that closely approximates
the rank size rule (SPI = -0.04). The overall urban population had grown
again. Cairo was still in first place but now had a much larger population of
400,000. The Mamluks had taken over Egypt during the 1250s and
successfully stopped the Mongol conquest of Syria and Palestine (AbuLughod, 1989: 148). Paris was second and had grown to 228,000. Then we
have Fez with 150,000 (its population down despite the founding of the new
city in 1276), Tabriz with 125,000, and Venice with II o,oon. Tabriz, in what
is now northwestern Iran, was the capital of the huge Mongol state headed
by Ghazan Khan in 1295. In 1300 Constantinople had fallen to seventh place,
having been sacked again in 1261 by Michael VIII, who restored the
Byzantine cmpire. Venice, now in fifth place, was at the highest rank it
would attain, although it matched this again in 1550.
Fernand Braudel' s (1984) picture of a world· economy in which
capitalist city-states such as Venice and Genoa were at the pinnacle of the
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whole system defines that system in a way that downplays the importance
of the land-based tributary states, which were still the most powerful actors
and had the largest cities. Venice was a prototypical semiperipheral capitalist
city-state operating within the interstices of a tributary system still dominated
by larger states and empires, and Braudel's work affirms this. The fact that
capitalist states later became the most powerful central actors should not
distort our understanding of these older systems.
In 1350 the SPI had gotten just a bit less steep but was still close to the
rank size rule. Cairo was still the largest city, but its population had dropped
to 350,000. The Black Death had struck Cairo in 1348. Paris was still second
with 215,000, down slightly. Fez was third, follwed by Sarai and Tabriz.
Sarai, near present-day Volgograd, was the capital of the Tatar "Golden
Horde." The overall urban population had declined a bit since 1300 but was
still higher than it had been in 1250.
In 1400 the SPI had fallen a bit flatter to -0.295. Cairo was still the
largest city and had grown to 360,000. Paris was still second and had grown
to 280,000. Tabriz was now third with 150,000, up by 50,000 since 1350
despite its capture by Tamerlane. Fourth place with 130,000 was held by
Samarkand, Tamerlane's capital. Fez was fifth with 125,000. The overall
urban population had grown.
In 1450 Cairo was still first with 380,000. Tabriz was now second with
200,000, Granada third with 165,000. It was the flourishing center of Moorish
civilization in Spain but was soon to fall to the conquistadors. Paris had
declined to fourth with 150,000, down abruptly from 1400. It had been
occupied by the English between 1419 and 1436 and had suffered famine
and the Black Death. The fifth was Bursa (in northwest Turkey), now grown
to 130,000 despite its having been sacked by Tamerlane in 1402. The SPI
(-0.13) had become more hierarchical once again.
In 1500 we find that the SPI (-0.26) had become a bit flatter again, but
not by much. Cairo had grown to 400,000 and Tabriz to 250,000.
Constantinople was third with 200,000 despite the fact that it had been
depopulated when it fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453. It recovered quickly
as the capital of the Ottoman empire. Paris was fourth with 185,000. Fifth
place was held by Fez. Urban population had grown once again, nearly
attaining the level it had in 1000.
In 1550 the SPI once again nearly approximated the rank size rule at 0.026. Constantinople, now capital of the Ottoman empire, was once again
the largest city with a population of 660,000, returning to its rank in 1100.
Cairo was now second with 360,000, down 40,000 since 1500. Paris was
growing again with 210,000. Naples was in fourth place with 209,000, and
Venice was fifth with 171,000. Urban growth reached its highest point since
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900. This was a system-level city size hierarchy in which the hegemonic
power was the Ottoman empire. Lisbon, allegedly the 16th-century city with
"global reach" according to Modelski and Thompson (1988), was the
twentieth city in the Central system.
In 1575 things had not changed much. The SPI was just a bit f1atter.
Constantinople had grown to 680,000, but Cairo had lost population to
275,000. Paris had grown just a bit, as had Naples. The Indic system was
now united with Central, and the fifth largest city was Agra (eventual home
of the Taj Mahal) with 200,000. It was established by Akbar as the Moghul
capital in 1566. Total urban population had lost a bit since 1550. The
Hapsburg bid to unite the European core into an empire state had been resisted
by France in alliance with the Ottomans (Zolberg, 1981 :263-65). The fact
that the Ottomans were crucial players in this critical conjuncture belies the
effort to consider them as exogenous to the developing modern world-system.
In 1600 Constantinople was at 700,000. The second largest city was
Agra with 500,000. Paris was still third with 245,000. Naples was fourth
with 224,000, and Cairo had dropped to fifth with 200,000. The SPI had
become a bit f1atter and was headed toward even more f1atness. The urban
population had grown rapidly and was now into its permanent geometric
ascent.
In 1650 Constantinople was still first but it had not grown since 1600.
Agra was gone. The Moghul capital had moved to Delhi in 1658, possibly
affecting Chandler's estimate for Agra in 1650. Paris was second with
455,000, up abruptly in fifty years. London was third with 410,000, having
more than doubled in size since 1600. Fourth place was held by Lahore
(Pakistan) with 360,000, and fifth was Isfahan (Safavid Iran) with 350,000.
The SPI (-0.6150) had dropped toward f1atness, but was on its way to much
greater f1atness. Amsterdam, now at the peak of its golden age as the world
city of the 17th-century Dutch hegemony in Europe, was at the eleventh rank
in the city size distribution of the Central system.
Even when we look only at Europe (Chase-Dunn, 1985:278),
Amsterdam was never higher than fourth in the city size hierarchy. This
supports the notion that the Dutch state's hegemony was intermediate
between the semiperipheral capitalist city-states and the full-blown core
capitalist hegemony of the British. Formerly capitalist states, such as the
Phoenician cities or Venice, had been semiperipheral city-states in the
interstices between tributary empires. Like these, the Dutch were specialists
in intercontinental trade and in naval power, but they were closer to being
a core nation-state and more important in the interstate system than any
earlier capitalist state had been. Even so, in the 17th century Amsterdam
was only a town compared to Constantinople.
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In 1700 we find that Constantinople was still first but with the same
700,000 it had in 1600. Second place was now held by London with 550,000.
Paris, now third, continued to grow and had a population of 530,000. Fourth
place was now held by Ahmedabad in northwest Indian Gujarat with 380,000,
augmented by a British trading post there in 1619. Fifth was Isfahan with
350,000. Sixth place was held by Amsterdam with 210,000. The SPI was
now at a rather flat point (-1.093). The rise of London marked the first time
in world history that the world city of a capitalist state moved toward the
first position.
In 1750 London was the largest city with a population of 676,000.
Constantinople was now second with 625,000, down from its former 700,000.
Paris was third with 556,000, Naples fourth with 310,000. Fifth place was
held by Amsterdam with 219,000. This is Amsterdam's highest position ever
in the city size hierarchy. Many have suggested a comparison between Venice
and Amsterdam, both the centers of international trade in their day (e.g.,
Burke, 1974). Like Amsterdam, Venice attained its highest rank in the city
size hierarchy (fifth) well after its own hegemony in international trade had
passed (in 1550). This was also true of Lisbon, which now attained the sixth
rank. According to Modelski and Thompson (1988: Chapter 7), Portugal had
been the "global leader" of the sixteenth century because it held the greatest
naval power among the European states and controlled intercontinental trade.
It is interesting that Lisbon only rose to the top tier of the city size hierarchy
in the middle of the 17th century, after hegemony had passed to the Dutch.
The SPI in 1750 was now at its flattest point in this cycle at -1.196.
The flatness was due to the rapid rise of the Western European capitals to
the size attained by the cities of the Near East and the very slow growth of
Constantinople. The multicentric geopolitical structure of the Central PMN
accounts for its difference in this period from the more constant size hierarchy
which existed in the Far Eastern PMN. In Western Europe the two great
powers, Britain and France, were leaders of coalitions of European core
states about to engage in a military struggle for control over territories in
North America and India, the Seven Years War (1756-63).
By 1800 a new city size hierarchy was beginning to emerge but the
distribution was still rather flat. The SPI was -0.468. London had grown to
861,000. The second city was Constantinople, still the capital of the Ottoman
empire. It had continued to fall in population and was now 570,000. Paris
was still in third place but had decreased slightly to 547,000. Naples had
430,000 and Moscow was now fifth with 248,000. The Napoleonic wars
were about to begin. The tale of two cities, of which we know so much,
leaves out Constantinople. It was still a major player despite being classified
by Immanuel Wallerstein as outside the modern world-system because of
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its noncapitalist mode of production.
In 1825 the SPI had moved further toward hierarchy at -0.148. London's
population was now 1,335,000. This was a very big city, but it was still
smaller than Peking. The second largest city in the Central world-system
was now Paris at 855,000. Constantinople was third with 675,000, up
considerably from 1800. St. Petersburg now held the fourth position with
438,000. Fifth was Naples with 350,000. British hegemony was well under
way and was reflected in the city size hierarchy of the Central world-system.
This was the true arrival of a system in which the largest city was politically
dominated by capitalists. The logic of capitalist accumulation had been
predominant since at least the 17th century in the European subsystem, but
now it was becoming predominant in the entire Central PMN.
In 1850 the SPI dropped temporarily back toward flatness because the
Far Eastern and Central PMNs merged (SPI = -0.335). London continued to
shoot up and now had a population of 2,320,000. It was the megacity of the
Earth. Peking, the second largest city in the Central (now nearly global)
system, also continued to grow, but not nearly as fast as London. It had a
population of 1,648,000. Paris had also grown and was now at 1,314,000.
Canton was now in fourth place with 875,000 and New York was fifth with
645,000. The amazing thing about the 1850 city size distribution is that the
drop toward flatness was not greater. Two massive urbanized city systems
combined into one, and yet the rapid growth of London still resulted in a
size hierarchy of cities.
By 1875 the hierarchy had moved nearly to the rank size rule (-0.039).
This was its most hierarchical peak since 1550 and a point to which it has
not returned in subsequent years. London now had a population of 4,241,000
and Paris was second with 2,250,000. New York had moved up to third with
1,900,000. Berlin was fourth, Vienna fifth. Peking had dropped to sixth place
from second, and now had a population of 900,000. This was the true arrival
of global European hegemony. All of the five largest cities on Earth were
European except New York, a formerly semiperipheral outpost of European
civilization which was rising to the peak. It was also the high point of British
hegemony within the core of the modern world-system.
In 1900 London was still growing mightily and it now had a population
of 6,480,000, but a new challenger was coming up quickly. New York was
second with a population of 4,242,000. The SPI had begun to flatten once
again and was at -0.222. Paris was third with 3,330,000 and Berlin was fourth
with 2,707,000. Another upstart city, Chicago, was fifth with 1,717,000.
In 1914 the SPI was flatter still. London was still first and had continued
to grow with a population of 7,419,000, but New York was now nearly as
large with 6,700,000. Paris had 4,000,000. Tokyo and Berlin were tied for
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fourth place with 3,500,000. Tokyo, a new non-European world city, was
moving up in the hierarchy.
In 1925 New York was first but just barely. It had 7,774,000 while
London had 7,742,000. The SPI was now very flat at -1.506, flatter than it
had been in 1750. This flat point corresponds to the transition between the
British and American hegemony in the world-system. Tokyo was now third
with 5,300,000 and Paris was fourth with 4,800,000. Berlin was fifth with
4,013,000. The Ottoman sultan was deposed in Constantinople in 1922 and
by 1925 the city was the thirty-ninth largest in the world.
In 1950 the city size distribution was again moving back toward
hierarchy but the SPI was still only -0.503. This was the high point of the
population peak for New York, which was now at 12,463,000, and also the
peak of the golden age of U.S. hegemony. London was still second largest
with 8,860,000. Tokyo was still third with 7,000,000. Paris was fourth with
5,900,000 and Shanghai was now fifth with 5,406,000. The hegemony of
the United States had just been consolidated by World War II. Berlin was
now the twelfth largest city on Earth with 3,707,000, down from fifth place
in 1925. Tokyo, despite having lost the war, had grown from 5,300,000 in
1925 to 7,000,000 in 1950.
In 1970 Tokyo had become the largest city on Earth with 20,450,000.
The SPI had once again begun to flatten along with the declining hegemony
of the United States. It was now -0.849. New York was second with
17,252,000. It had grown since 1950 but not nearly at the rate of Tokyo.
Another Japanese city, Osaka, was now in third place with 12,000,000.
London was fourth with 10,875,000. Moscow was in fifth place with
9,800,000. Paris had dropped to seventh place from fourth and Mexico City
was in sixth place with 9,000,000.
In the last year for which we have data, 1988, the SPI had become even
flatter (-0.940). Greater Tokyo was still the largest with 28,700,000. Mexico
City was now second with 19,400,000. New York was third with 17,400,000,
Sao Paulo fourth with 17,200,000. Fifth place was held by Greater Osaka
(Osaka-Kobo-Kyoto) with 16,800,000. Huge megacities of the
semi periphery (Mexico City and Sao Paolo) had appeared among the largest
cities in the system. This trend was already visible in 1970 when Mexico
City was in sixth position, Buenos Aires was ninth and Sao Paolo was tenth.
Urbanization has become so dense in the core that it is much more
difficult than it was in the past to determine the boundaries between urbanized
areas. The fact that two of the five largest cities on Earth are Japanese
corresponds to the emerging economic hegemony of Japan in the wOrldsystem.
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LONG-RUN PATTERNS

Let us now review the macropatterns of the seq uences of ri se and decl ine
of city size hierarchies and changes in the rate of urban population growth.
Look again at Figures 3 and 4 above. By looking at both figures we can see
that the city size distribution of the Central PMN recovered from an extreme
flatness which bottomed out in 1150. It became nearly a rank size hierarchy
in 1300 and then experienced a few small ups and downs until 1600, when
it again began a descent that bottomed out in 1750. It then rose again to
nearly a rank size hierarchy in 1825, wobbled a little, and then peaked in
1875. It then dropped to a rather flat distribution in 1925 and then rose again
to a slight peak in 1950. It has since descended but has not yet reached the
flatness it had in 1925.
How can we interpret this trajectory in terms of what we know about
changes in the distribution of political-military power? The extreme flatness
of the twelfth century was likely due to the effects on the Central PMN of
forces coming from Central Asia and the Far East. Pandemic diseases and
invasions by steppe nomads caused the decline of urban populations at the
end of the first millennium and flattened the city size distribution of the
Central PMN. While the city size hierarchy recovered quickly (by 1300) the
total urban population was much slower to recover. It did not reach the precrisis level until 1600 (see Table I and Figure 4). This sequence suggests
that the Central PMN was functioning as a subsystem within a larger AfroEurasian world-system in the 12th century. The simultaneities discovered
in Chase-Dunn and Willard's (1993) comparison of Far Eastern and Central
PMNs suggests that this had been true for at least the previous millennium.
The recovery of the city size hierarchy in 1300 was based on the rise
of the Mamluk empire in Egypt and its successful confrontation with the
Mongols (Abu-Lughod, 1989: Chapter 7). Under different dynasties Cairo
was the world city in the Central system until 1550, when it was replaced
by Constantinople, now the Ottoman capita\. The descent into flatness that
was under way in 1600 was due to the rapid growth of both Indian and
European cities. Unlike the earlier flatness, this one occurred in a context
of rapid growth of the overall urban population (see Figure 4). The flatness
occurred because the old centers were not growing as fast as the new centers.
This was a period of rapidly growing semiperipheral megacities similar in
some respects to the period after 1960.
The descent to flatness bottomed out in 1750. By this time the old
capitals of the Central PMN, except for Constantinople, had dropped way
down and the rapidly growing European cities were at the top. The flatness
was due, then, primarily to the fact that several European capitals were about
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the same size. This would tend to support the notion that the eighteenth
century was a period of multicentricity in the Central PMN in which core
powers were contending with one another for hegemony. Modelski and
Thompson (1988) show that the British already led in sea power in the 18th
century, and they argue that there was an 18th-century "cycle of leadership"
in which the British had already attained the position of "global leader."
London was indeed the largest city, but Paris was not far behind.
The British were already the leading power in terms of naval capability,
but their hegemony in the world-economy was only beginning. By 1825 they
had beaten the French in the Napoleonic wars and firmly established their
primacy in the world market. This was reflected in the peak of the now
hierarchical city size distribution, with London pulling well ahead of Paris
by 1825.
By 1850 the city size distribution had flattened a little because of thc
incorporation of Peking and Canton into the Central PMN. We have already
remarked about the surprisingly small effect that this had on the city size
distribution. In 1875 the British hegemony was at its peak, and it then declined
primarily because of the rapid growth of New York, Berlin, and Tokyo, new
rising challengers. In 1925 the distribution was flat again with an array of
core states having very large capital cities of about the same size - a
multicentric core once again. By 1950 the United States hegemony was at
its peak, with New York much larger than the second city, London. By 1970
the distribution shows the return of multicentricity, with Tokyo now being
the largest city, and this trend toward flatness continued until 1988.
It is our conclusion that the city size distribution of the Central PMN
reflects rather well the changes in the distribution of economic and politicalmilitary power among the contending states in the Central PMN. Our findings
about macropatterns are not greatly different from those reportee in an earlier
study of the city size distribution of the modern world-system (Chase-Dunn,
1985a), despite our having changed the spatial focus of the study somewhat
by using Wilkinson's definition of system boundaries (the network of
political-military interaction). If we compare Figure 3 of this paper with
Figure 12.2 in Chase-Dunn (l985a:277) we will see a reassuring similarity.
This supports the notion that errors in the estimation of the population sizes
of individual cities do not greatly affect the SPIs because this earlier study
was based, not only on a somewhat different spatial scope, but also on a
different city population data set, that of Chandler and Fox (1974). The SPI
is a fairly robust statistic.
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WORLD CITIES AND THE LONGUE DUREE

What are the implications of the above for contemporary studies of
world cities? The most obvious is that world cities are not a recent
phenomenon. City systems were not, until recently, national systems which
did not have important international links. Interactions among the great cities
of world-systems have been important since the first emergence of cities in
Mesopotamia 5,000 years ago. But what is new about world cities in the last
few decades?
Here we rely on a recent summary of the world cities literature by John
O'Loughlin (1992). It has been alleged that world cities are more strongly
linked to one another now than ever before. Surely this is the case in a
globalizing world-system. But the trends toward greater international
political and economic integration are themselves of very long standing. It
is true that these trends have now reached a very high point, but have they
really changed the fundamental logic of the system? That is the question.
There have always been important "international" interactions among states
and there have been city-states that specialized in long-distance trade and
finance. What has happened is that the proportion of all production and trade
in the system that crosses state boundaries has increased. And now it is not
only a few city-states that specialize in international trade. There are
proportionally more world cities and they are more tightly linked than they
used to be.
Chase-Dunn (1989, 1993) has argued that, if we properly specify the
systemic constants, cycles, and trends of the modern world-system, there
have been no major changes in systemic logic since World War II despite
all the claims of those who have discovered one or another new stage of
capitalism. The hegemonic sequence has proceeded, as have the Kondratieff
wave and the trends toward increasing international economic integration
and international political integration. All the jumping up and down about
"global capitalism" misunderstands the extent to which capitalism has long
been global. The "new world order" and the globalized economy are simply
larger and more intense than they have been in the past, but the basic logic
of the system has not changed.
The description of contemporary world cities as polarized postindustrial
phenomena needs also to be put in comparative and historical perspective.
The trajectory of New York is strongly reminiscent of London at the end of
the 19th century. Both cities experienced a growth of producer services and
became even more specialized as headquarters cities as their larger national
economies lost pride of place in world manufacturing. England's declining
position in manufacturing was followed by the rising importance of the City
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of London in world finance. And both New York and London experienced
polarization between the "citadel" and the teeming mass of recent
immigrants. The expanded informal sector composed of recent immigrants
to New York was matched in late 19th-century London by a flood of Irish
immigration to the East End that provided a cheap supply of labor for the
docks and the "casual labor market" (Jones, 1971).
It has been observed elsewhere (Chase-Dunn, 1989: Chapter 9) that
world cities outlive the hegemonies of their nation-states in many respects.
The continuing significance of Amsterdam, London, and New York in
contemporary global financial affairs illustrates this point.
But despite the above claims about long-run continuities, the telescope
we have been using to look at city-systems can also give us clues about
change. The literature on world cities has generally behaved as if the
important dimension for core world cities is the control of world trade and
finance. What is left out of most of this literature is any discussion of military
power. Indeed, Janet Abu-Lughod (1994) presented a paper on U.S. world
cities - New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles - to an audience at the
meetings of the International Studies Association without ever mentioning
Washington, D.C. Even stranger than her implicit assumption that military
power is not a relevant dimension of world cityness was the response of the
audience, primarily political scientists specializing in international relations.
They never asked about D.C.'
The long-run perspective we have employed makes this background
assumption stand out. Most of the largest cities in the Central PMN have
historically been capitals of militarily-powerful states. Those city states and
nation-states that performed central roles in international trade were
relatively small compared to the much larger metropoli of the tributary
empires. This began to change in Europe with the rising importance and
centrality of capitalism. Capitalist states moved into the core and the leading
capitalist states developed larger "home markets" that complemented their
international activities. Dutch hegemony can be seen to have been halfway
between that of Venice and that of London in this regard. The capitalist states
were primarily naval powers when they were small. Amsterdam and London
fit this category, but London was also able to field a sizable army. England
was the first core capitalist state to have sea power, land power, and economic
global reach, and London was the command center for all these types of
power. New York is only an economic capital, but it is in a core state that
includes an empire city of the older sort - Washington. The home market
of the United States has been a very large share of the world market, and it
is this that accounts for the somewhat unusual development in which the
declining hegemon has become a receiver rather than a sender of capital
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investment. Tokyo is unique in being an economic center alone without its
own military backup.
In this sequence from Venice to Tokyo we see a trend toward the greater
and greater importance of economic competition and the decreasing
importance of political-military competition in the modern world-system.
This trend is part of what many think of as globalization. It is alleged that
nation-states are no longer important actors because the global economy
makes them irrelevant. It is also alleged that hegemonic rivalry - the rise
and fall of hegemonic core powers in which core national segments of the
world capitalist class occasionally resort to warfare with one another in order
to determine who the new hegemon will be - is no longer thinkable. The
suprahegemony of a core-wide capitalist class has supposedly ended the
phenomenon of periodic core wars. Evidence for this is the growing
importance of the Group of Seven and the revitalized acti vities of the protoworld-state - the United Nations.
We hope it is true that political-military competition and conflict among
different segments of core capital is a thing of the past, but we worry about
this conclusion. The current separation between military capability (the
United States) and economic hegemony (Japan) would seem to shore up the
conclusion that the age of world wars is behind us. But how stable is this
distribution? Joshua Goldstein (1988) and William Thompson (1992) show
that wars among core states tend to break out late in a Kondratieff upswing.
If the long economic wave continues as it has for at least 200 years (and
probably much longer) we should approach the end of the next upswing in
the decade of the 2020s. 4 It is then that we will find out how strong the
institutions of global conflict resolution really are. If these do not prove
strong enough, a war among core states will surely be the biggest catastrophe
that has ever afflicted humankind.
With regard to the world city system, what can we predict? We already
noted that the emergence oflarge semi peripheral megacities is not an entirely
novel phenomenon. These have often appeared in upwardly mobile states
in the past. The upward mobility of Brazil and/or Mexico, the countries
containing the two semiperipheral megacities in the top five in 1988, is
certainly questionable. The unbelievable size of Mexico City and Sao Paolo
seems to be more of a burden than an advantage in the contemporary system.
There is evidence that the rapid growth of megacities in sem iperipheral areas
has slowed down. Portes (1989) and Lyman (1992) show that the earlier
trend toward increasing urban primacy within peripheral and semi peripheral
countries has leveled off since 1970.
It is likely that the global city size distribution will continue to flatten
until another hegemony is on the rise. The Japanese seem to have a leg up
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in this horse racc. Gennany has been distracted by its unification, and
European unification has been interrupted by the current economic
stagnation. In the absence of pressure from European unification the United
States will be less likely to pursue a regional rather than a global strategy.
It is not impossible that the political effort to retool the U.S. economy
for another cycle of economic hegemony will succeed, but it is unlikely. In
the absence of strong contenders, the Japanese will certainly continue to win,
and this will probably be for the good. As a small and militarily weak country
with global economic and raw material interests Japan has the most to lose
from a new period of core conflict and should, therefore, be a strong supporter
of world government. If this scenario plays out we might expect the
continuation of a fairly flat city size distribution with Tokyo at the top for
some time to come. If New York remains the home of the United Nations
it will continue to be one of the largest cities on Earth because, ironically,
its economic hegemony will be replaced by political centrality.5 The political
experience that the United States has developed with pluralism and
multiculturalism may be a new comparative advantage for leadership in a
multicultural world. The politics of New York can become the politics of
the world in a U.S.-led global federation. This scenario will not solve all the
problems of social justice and environmental degradation, but at least it holds
the promise of preventing another round of deadly core war.
Johns Hopkins University
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NOTES
1. Wilkinson (1991) gives a detailed account of the expansion of this unit
(which he calls "Central Civilization") as it moved out of West Asia
toward all points of the compass.
2. We follow Johnson and Earle (1987) in defining true states as polities that
are larger than chiefdoms and that have specialized institutions of
regional administration and control.
3. Of course it is somewhat unusual, even in the modern world-system, to
have separate economic and political-military capitals within the same
state, as does the United States. This is a feature of nearly all states
within the United States, which usually have large economic centers
and smaller political capitals located near the geographical center of
the state. This is a phenomenon associated with federal governments
in which territory is constitutionally assigned political power. Germany
has such a system, as does the Netherlands.
4. The factors affecting the probability of future core wars have been
examined by Chase-Dunn and O'Reilly (1989).
5. Our Earth will not soon be Trantor, the capital of Isaac Asimov's galactic
empire - a planet which was a single city encased in a steel shell.
Trantor required the food and resources of the galaxy for its existence,
much as did Rome. Asimov solved the problem of interstellar travel
by means of a doubtful trick. Even if Mars can be terraformed and we
have many space stations in our own solar system, Earth will not be
Trantor. Perhaps it will become the House of Earth as envisioned by
Warren Wagar (1992) a decentralized, low-density, but
interconnected settlement system of villages and towns. Whatever
happens, the long cycle of political centralization and decentralization
will probably continue, but it will operate according to new logics yet
to be invented. This assumes, of course, that we survive the window
of vulnerability to new core war and the growing threat to the ecosphere.
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FORUM:*
OIKUMENES
Oroon K. Ghosh
This communication has been prompted by two articles of David
Wilkinson ("Cities, Civilizations and Oikumenes," CCR No. 27 and No. 28)
and one of Andre Gunder Frank ("Latin America at the Margin of World
System History," CCR No. 28.
It appears to me that there have been several attempts at oikumenes.
Most of these were destroyed by militarism, some by cut-throat competition.
In two instances (China and India), antimercantile ideologies were partly
responsible.
For the present purpose we can divide the world into Eurasia, Africa,
and the New World.
WEST EURASIA: The first oikumenes were created by the
LevantineSyrians (Phoenicians) from about the 27th century B.C. and the
Cretans from ahout the 26th century B.C. Both serviced Egypt. The Cretan
in the Eastern Mediterranean was sacked by the Dorians in about 1000 B.C.
The Levantine-Syrian went to Carthage and Spain, and even traded with
Britain. It circumnavigated at least the western part of Africa. It was struck
down by Rome; the eastern end being overpowered by Alexander and the
Hellenes before this.
The Amber Route from North Europe to Greece from about 1500 B.C.
was another oikumene. In its path brilliant cultures grew up, including the
Urnfield Metallurgical Culture (1300-700 B.C.), the Hallstatt culture (700450 B.C.) and the La Tene culture ~from 450 B.C.) This last was snuffed
out by the Romans. The mantle of Crete fell on the Athenians, and their
successors, the Hellenic oikumene. After Alexander this had links with
Central Eurasia (West and Central Asia) and also South Eurasia (India). It
was taken over by the Romans.
The Romans inherited the Hellenic oikumene although the traders were
mainly Greeks, Phoenicians and Persians. it developed links with China,
through the Silk Route, across Central Asia, from the 3rd Century. Rome
*The Forum section of Comparative Civilizations Review is intended to encourage discourse
among the readership. Those readers interested in submitting material to the "Forum," should
address their correspondence to Wayne M. Bledsoe, Department of History, University of
Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, MO 6540 I.
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fell due to various causes, including Germanic sacking in the 5th century
A.D.
The Byzantines inherited the Roman oikumene, with Constantinople
as centre, from the 3rd century A. D. It traded also with the Russian lands
in the north, more than had been done by the Hellenic Greeks. The Turks
began to nibble at the Byzantine Empire from the II th century. The coup
de grace was given by Mehemet II in 1453.
Meanwhile the Viking pirates from Scandinavia terrorised West Europe
and Russia from the 9th century A.D., but also laid the foundations for a
West European oikumene from the 11th century A.D. This had links with
Byzantium also. The Turks blockaded the Eastern Mediterranean from the
15th century. The West Europeans then turned t other routes to the Spice
Islands, India and China. Technological discoveries and inventions enabled
them not only to circumnavigate Africa, and strike across to India, but also
to open up the Atlantic. The discovery of the new World by Columbus in
1492 was a landmark in world history. It was a great bonanza for West
Europe economically and demographically. There was cut-throat
competition between the Atlantic nations, Portugal, Spain France, Britain
and the Netherlands. Technological superiority after the Scientific
Revolution in West Europe enabled these nations to establish colonies all
over the world. This led to a globalisation of trade, basically without rules,
the law of the jungle prevailing. This was the basic cause behind World War
I.

Russia, opened up through West European assistance, withdrew from
the oikumene after the Communist Revolution and is now making its way
back.
After World War II the USA took the lead. And mainly under its auspices
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) has recently been
signed. This lays down, inter alia, the rules for trade behaviour and modes
of adjudication.
SOUTH EURASIA: The Indus Valley Civilization and Sumeria had
trade links from the 3rd millennium B.C. The Aryan conquest of the Ind us
Valley circa 1800 B.C. disrupted this. But later, Buddhist India, including
the Mauryas, had trade links with Babylon. And later, with the Hellenes and
Romans, and the Chinese via the Silk Route.
It also developed links with South East Asia, and also China, from the
1st century A.D. This was mainly by sea. The Arabs, with their lateen sails
overtook the Indians from the 8th century A. D. The Brahmans, fearful of
"dangerous thoughts," successfully prohibited crossing the seas, and so
oceanic travels.
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The Turkish conquest of India in the 13th century snapped land tradc
route links with West Eurasia and China. Mercantile revival really came
under British auspices from the 18th century. Following the Soviet model
there was a partial withdrawal from the global oikumene from 1947. It is
now slowly limping back again.
CENTRAL EURASIA: The roles of the Sumerians, Babylonians,
Hellenes and their successors have been mentioned. The Arabs were a great
mercantile people from the 6th to the 15th century A.D. Their range of
activities included Africa, India, South East Asia and China. The militaristic
Turks disrupted this from the 13th century.
EAST EURASIA: The Han Silk Route from China to the Mediterranean,
from the 3rd century, if not earlier, created an oikumene. The T'ang and
Sung were successors. And this went on, in a weakened manner, due to
successful Arab rivalry, till the Mings. From then on the feudalistic mandarins
had the upper hand in thwarting the merchants.
Japan was an outlier, although it traded with China and South East
Asia, especially from the Muromachi period in the 14th century. Trade was
conducted along with piracy, in Korea, Vietnam and China.
AFRICA: After the lIth century an Islamic-Negro oikumene grew up
in West Africa. There was much trans-Saharan trade with Europe, with
Timbuktu as an important centre.
In East Africa coastal cities grew up from the 7th century, stimulated
by the Arabs. Swahili was the lingua franca. The Indian Ocean was an
oikumene, the trade being conducted by Arabs, Persians, Africans and
Indians. The whole of Africa fell to West Europeans, commercially and later
politically from the 16th century.
AMERICA: The role of America (USA) after 1945 has already been
mentioned. It was marginal to West Europe, especially Latin America, until
the USA forged ahead after World War I. The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFT A) is a great break-through. the whole of the Pacific area
may soon be included within the ambit of the USA in some form or other.
The idea of the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) has already
taken concrete shape.
FUTURE TRENDS: Besides APEC, South America is likely to become
a part of the American oikumene.
The European Community is an oikumene. The Commonwealth of
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Independent States may grow up into another.
If Africa is divided vertically, the western portion may have powerful
links with the European Community and the New World. The eastern portions
may have such links with the Indian Ocean countries and West Asian ones.
The Indian Ocean (Erythraean Sea to the Greeks) was an oikumene
from the 1st century A.D. It may grow again and include not only the Indian
sub-continent, and East and South Africa, but also South East Asia, Australia
and New Zealand. The lattertwo will also have links with the APEC countries.
West Africa can become another great oikumene.
Politically and military rivalries, with a 19th century mindset, in West
and South Asia (bar Israel) prevent the emergence of a truc golbalisation,
which the world deserves, in the 21 st century. However, GATT is a hopeful
pointer.
Calcutta, India
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BOOK REVIEW"S
NORWEGIAN, IRISH AND
AFRICAN ROOTS OF
WESTERN CIVILIZATION
Franz Borkenau, End and Beginning: On the Generations of Culture
and the Origins of The West, edited with an Introduction by Richard
Lowenthal. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. 493 pp.
The editor's Introduction is an excellent summary of the book, vividly
expressed. The press editor persuaded Richard Lowenthal, a lifelong friend
of Borkenau, to edit and translate Borkenau's essays and manuscripts. We
learn exactly the various sources and the editor's handling them in Appendix
l. The resulting book is approximately half as long as Spengler's Decline
of the West. Borkenau is another name to list with Vico, Spengler, and
Toynbee, since Borkenau (1901-1956) is their equal.
Borkenau holds that Toynbee's notion of the affiliation of one
civilization to another is an oversimplification of history, even though, in
affiliating Western Civilization to the Graeco-Roman Civilization, Toynbee
improves on Spengler's exclusiveness. Later civilizations assimilate parts
of worldviews. The historical evidence shows that a civilization is likely to
draw upon several other civilizations. Insofar as there is a mere affiliation,
as in China in the early Christian centuries, the old culture of the past may
work to the detriment of the society.
There is no getting around the fact that the great cultural innovations
that led to the formation of Western Civilization approximately 800 A.D.
were Christian. Western Christian authors found stimulation partly in
Byzantine and Egyptian Christianity. The ideas of their own secular society
also inspired Western Christian authors, all of them monks and clerics.
Norwegian ideas strongly stimulated the Irish in the eighth century.
This Abortive Far Western Society of Toynbee, the Irish Civilization, was
not an abortive society; it was an Iro-Norse culture. Probably Pelagius was
Irish. He was a devout, sincere cleric, and his remarkable optimism, coupled
with his strong moral sense, led him to hold that Christian man is able to
achieve salvation by his own efforts. Thus he went too far, and presented a
pagan doctrine, though he was a sincerely Christian author. He was, however,
an influential author among his Western readers. Moreover he represented
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a way of thinking in the West during the early centuries of the Christian era.
He probably reinforced a stratum of philosophical or religious individualistic
trust in the efficacy of the human Will, and a stratum of religious optimism.
The historical development is highly complex. There was, in the earliest
Western Christian Church only one place where the populace took to
Christianity as their religion: Africa. We can speak of the African Church.
It later produced a Tertullian and an Augustine. This African Church, Roman
Catholic, of course; figures importantly in the origins of Western Civilization.
Early Western theology was African theology, that of the Punic region. It
established a church discipline around the see of Rome and thus a Christianity
that was independent of the Eastern church. Western Civilization, with the
special character that I call Faustian thereby became possible.
There is something else. The early Merovingian society, in the land of
the Franks, fell into utter degradation. The Frankish kings became mere
puppets of ruffians and scoundrels; the commotion thoroughly disrupted the
Frankish society and their church. Eventually an enormous guilt-inspired
despair prevailed in the Frankish people. It took the form of paranoia.
Borkenau describes this demoralization with the Nordic and German epics,
particularly the Nibelungen and sagas. That the Western Church could
become an appendage of Eastern Christianity (and, thereby, of what I call
the Eastern ChristoMagian Civilization) was a real possibility. Then there
would have been no Western Civilization with its technology, its
individualism, and its interest in the human Will. There was another, similar,
breakdown of Frankish society following the death of Charlemagne, and a
similar resurgence of guilt and pessimism.
In 851 ,the monk Gottschalk, at Corbie Monastery in France, a Saxon
nobleman, acted against Pelagius. He revived the doctrine of predestination
in its most extreme form. He was as extreme as the contemporary Muslim
theologians in Baghdad, who held that God decides all, and man nothing.
His superiors punished him for denying individual responsibility; the
Carolingians, in their immense guilt (ca 850) could easily have gone the
Eastern route. Paschasius Radbertus, however, abbot ofCorbie twenty years
earlier, had proclaimed the dogma of Transubstantiation, namely of the
physical presence of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist. It was a timely
proclamation; for in the barbarity and brutality of the contemporary laity,
the doctrine appealed to many Franks and Germans partly as a protective
magic, the materialization of the spiritual. What is more important, in those
terrible days after Charlemagne, a metaphysical doctrine of salvation and a
sacramental ritual based on it enabled a Western church and a Western
Civilization to survive. Western religion did not, then, become another
appendage of Eastern Christianity. The moral problems raised by the
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Northern individualism of total responsibility find a solution in a transformed
version of Eastern Christianity." (Lowenthal: p. 25)
The point is that certain elements of Pelagianism entered into the
foundations of Paschasius' new doctrine. The Eucharist seems worlds apart
from Pelagius' moralism, but the old Pelagian concern with sin-a
preoccupation very different from those of the Eastern church-remained
the central problem of Western Christianity. Pelagius' doctrine that one could
save oneself, unaided, from damnation, is not there. His moralism, though,
is present with its sense of sin and of radical freedom of the will. This and
other sacraments were not the magic spells of earlier religions. Its healing
was not irresistible, man himself must work his salvation. The dogma of the
Eucharist is thoroughly concerned with the basic moral problems. Thus
Paschasius is an immensely important figure.
It is a remarkable fact, a great amount of historical evidence points to
the source of the peculiarly Western traits of individualism and radical
freedom of the will. Their origin lay in the Iro-Norse Culture of the early
Christian centuries, or, more simply, in the Irish monastic culture. The Irish
church developed through Irish contact with the Greek, the Eastern Christian
church. The hermit life, and especially the monastic life, for which early
Egyptian Christianity is famous, produced the structure of early Christian
(and non-Roman Catholic) Ireland. Earliest Irish history is shrouded in
mystery. The Irish sagas, nevertheless, unlike the Germanic, are not tragic;
they reveal a society that was relatively peaceful and calm, no great upheaval,
nO deep paranoia, no enormous guilt, no tremendous pessimism. It was in
this kind of situation that the Irish quietly and calmly adopted Christianity.
Pelagius was St. Augustine's great adversary. But the optimistic, self-reliant
Pelagius greatly affected the Irish church. His influence is a well-established
fact.
The great Irish missionary to Europe, Columbanus, is not a pivotal
figure, but his failed monasteries in France at least left a tradition to be taken
up again. He is significant in the way that Pelagianism layover Irish
Christianity, even if Pelagius was pagan-like and a heretic. Columbanus
stressed in his many monastic foundations, not contrition but morality
according to the law, not inward penance but a struggle with nature. This
has an optimistic cast of mind about it. This Pelagius-influenced moral
discipline was to join with the ecclesiastical discipline of the African church
in various ways. At the Synod of Whitby, the English, and the Irish and the
Northumbrians, and those at Lindisfarne, opted for the Roman, instead of
the Irish, church.
Irish and Scottish Celts, Angles, Saxons, and Jutes did not emigrate to
the British Isles as clans or peoples. Rather, individual groups formed a
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following, headed by a leader. In crossing the seas, their clan and family ties
were broken. The I-form of speech developed, first among the Irish, then in
the Germanic languages. "The sea is the great source of freedom." (p. 182)
The historical background is much more complex than I have indicated.
Pelagius takes over the Stoic morality; at the same time he takes over the
religious morality of Clement and Origen of Alexandria. But he transforms
morality. The Stoics were elitists and so, too, were Clement and Origen, and
they would all use free will and personal liberty to flee the world. Pelagius
was no elitist. His moral extremism was for everybody. His asceticism is a
rule of permanent struggle in the world, a struggle to conquer the world.
There would be no desert foundations for him but, instead. missionary work.
The Franks did not have what was necessary, in order for a new Western
Civilization to take form. The Germans finally supplied the culture in which
the seeds of [Faustian] Western Civilization, and of a Western (as opposed
to an Eastern) Christianity, could become fertile. Here the all-important
figure, Boniface, comes into view as one of the great pivotal personalities
of Western Civilization, an organizational genius. Though he was born in
Devon, his training and upbringing were Northumbrian; thus he was in the
Iro-Norse or IroScottish cultural sphere. He took his missions to the Germans,
where he had freedom. A pity he naively agreed under pressure from the
Franks to evangelize non-Germans. The Frisians killed him. Boniface's
church reforms had succeeded, and they were essential to the Franks and to
the civilization.
There is another factor, regarding the all-important timing of the
evangelization of the Germans, namely the Eddas. In particular, the middle
Eddas and the parallel Siegfried saga, were heroic and optimistic, in contrast
to the paranoia, despair, and guilt of the early and late Eddas.
I haven't mentioned Athanasius, Benedict, Cassian, the Cabbala,
Paschomius, Erigena, all and others figuring in various degrees of relevance
and non-relevance in the emergence of Western Civilization. Franz Borkenau
wrote on many other subjects in this book. His discussion of language study
in the analysis of civilizations is brilliant. His essay on Roland, the defender
of Charlemagne against the Saracens, and the Song of Roland is full of
historical and psychological insight. All these writings invite reading and
rereading.

David Richardson
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WHAT CONSTITUTES A

WORLD HISTORY?
HISTORY OF OF CIVILIZATION: PREHISTORY TO THE PRESENT,
Prentice Hall, 1988. 892 pp, suggested readings and index.
How is world history to be written? This is not only a question of writing
of the past from a present viewpoint, which is unavoidable, since no one can
undergo a lobotomy to remove the ideas and attitudes one has obtained from
the times and places in which one has grown up. It is also a question of
which contemporary viewpoint or philosophy, evaluations or concerns, the
individual author has decided upon as the ones that will govern the research
and writing. Let us assume that each world historian endeavors to be
objective; that is, to get the facts correctly and not engage in a polemic
serving some idiosyncratic idee fixe or some organization's or movement's
favored agenda-in a word, to be properly professional. The endeavor to
be objective nevertheless occurs within a specific intellectual milieu or
ambiance and different historians or schools of historians will provide their
readers, writing at about the same moment with essentially the same fund
of facts, with quite different world histories.
Were I to attempt to produce a world history, I would not only try to
keep in mind the entire world, but would commence with the geographicalecological character of the surface of our planet, so that the readers would
have some understanding of what human beings had (and have) to experience
and work with, and where in the differentially patterned earth surface they
were (or are) living.
Our naturajl environment is immensely complex, but it is sufficiently
ordered that its major components are readily identifiable, and-the spatial
patterns of the distribution can be indicated with considerable economy of
effort (on a world map). While such·a presentation would fall far short of
satisfying a specialist in geography or ecology, it would be very helpful for
a student of history despite its broad-brush simplifications.
How is one to understand history if one has no knowledge of the stage
on which the human drama has been played, and how the arrangement
conditions on this complex stage have affected the way in which the drama
has unfolded? The actors not only interact with each other. Their behavior
is affected by where they are on the stage and the character of that portion
of the stage. Earth is the home of humankind. Like any home, it presents
different opportunities and hindrances for whatever actions its inhabitants
wish to undertake and does so differently at different times and in different
"rooms".
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The major components of our earthly environment are, simply, the
atmosphere, the hydrosphere (the world's oceans), the pedosphere (soils),
the lithosphere (rock), and the biosphere (living organisms), all interacting
with each other. Within the biosphere, the human species is our main concern,
of course, for each species is its own chief (and usually only!) concern. 2
To survive and to develop our potentials, the most important resource
to be obtained from our environment is energy, which we gain from all the
environment's components, but most obviously from the pedosphere and
lithosphere, aside from the oxygen we require from the atmosphere.
Agriculture without soil is still a rarity, and agriculture (broadly interpreted
to include horticulture and animal husbandry) provides our most basic source
of energy, food. The lithosphere is the source of the mineral fuels upon which
we are now so heavily dependent. It would extend this paper overly much
to pursue this-to me fundamental-matter further. It does place me in quite
a distinct category from all the world history textbook writers, and even the
specialists in history and the social sciences generally.
There is another problem that needs to be considered. Usually, when
reading historical works, I am bothered by a lack of theory and of an explicit
treatment of societal structure. These topics seem to me to be too skimpily
and only implicitly treated. However, readings in societal theory often leave
me in doubt about their empirical grounding and the validity of their
categorical concepts. It is as if one set of scholars could not see the forest
for the trees and the other could not see the trees for the forests. Historians
are not the only academicians with a disciplinary parochialism. This
shortcoming is found in abundance among the experts whatever their
academic specialty including my own discipline of geography. Such caveats
stated, let us proceed.
A History of Civilization by Winks, Brinton, Christopher and Wolff, is
definitely NOT a history of civilization. As Robin Winks states in the preface,
it "is about how we, as readers studying the past through the traditions and
biases of the West, have come to think about civilization" ... "we read history
to understand OUR OWN ancient beginnings '" or OUR modern heritage."
Although Winks informs us that this seventh edition (1988) has been updated
and "historical scholarship must now embrace statistics, psychohistory,
geography, and the arguments usually reserved to political science, sociology
and anthropology," such recent widening of the historians' purview does not
appear to be strongly represented in this now venerable text, which began
its life in 1955. I do not object to a history of Western civilization (however
that civilization is delimited), but it does not seem quite proper to give such
a work such an all inclusive title.
History, my predilections inform me, is really quite dramatic when
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taken in the longue dure' e, however mundane the details may be. It is a story
of the conflicts of personalities, movements, interest groups, institutions,
states, and ideas. I find much of that sort of excitement missing in this text
even tho' the authors do attend muchly to wars, dynastic struggles, and
political matters. Perhaps this is merely their writing style, or perhaps it can
be attributed to excessive concern with objectivity or nonpartisanship.
This is very much a history of wars, kings, art, literature and religion.
Perhaps I have been overly influenced by the school of anthropologists who
consider culture to be tripartite:to consist of material, behavioral and
ideational culture. The material is the realm of the artifact: tools, implements,
equipment, machines, built structures of all sorts, clothing, and the like. The
behavioral is the realm of institutions (or organizations or collectivities) as
well as personal behavior. The ideational is the product of the mind-ideas,
values, ideologies, philosophies, and so forth. It seems to me a practical
procedure to ask what a given portion of humankind has in mind about what
it wants to do (ideational),how it organizes itself to do what it has in mind
to do (behavioral), and the material means by which it can accomplish these
tasks (material culture). Perhaps some day a historian will approach the task
in this way. Meanwhile, let us return to the book at hand.
Accepting the fact that this is indeed a history of western civilization,
I paid especial attention to topics I find particularly interesting. As a cultural
geographer, my first topic of interest is one which answers the question
"Where?" Where did Western civilization start? For Winks and company,
the beginning is Greece. "The Greeks are the first ancient civilization with
which modern society feels an immediate affinity." (p.33). I must concur,
except that societies do not feel anything. The civilization of the Greeks is
the first of the ancient civilizations with which educated westerners can feel
an immediate affinity. Yes, there is something about the way educated
Hellenes thought that is more akin to our ways of thinking than that of the
ancient Egyptians and Mesopotamians. The authors provide information on
the Greek gods, their tragedies and comedies, arts, and historians and
philosophers (28X of a 32-page chapter). Wars and politics occupy 56X. It
is not easy task to depict a civilization in a mere 32 pages, but I was left
with the feeling that the economy, polity, the arts, religion, etc.,just happened,
and not that they were related to each other causally. Tangentially, one may
note that the only reference to homosexuality in the entire volume is a very
brief reference to Alexander the Great, as if this phenomenon's various
manifestations were not a thread running through the warp and woof of
western civilization. Some attention is paid to the changing position of
women through the centuries. Admittedly, questions of gender have moved
into a more central position in our awareness of human affairs since this
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book was written.
Of the geography of Greece and the Aegean, virtually nothing is said
despite the importance of the mountains and the little scattered fragments
of lowland, or of the climate. The olive is cited, but apparently only as an
occasion to remark on Greek religion.
Of the dependence of the Greeks on the intellectual achievements of
Egypt and Mesopotamia for the foundations upon which they built their
impressive intellectual achievements, nought but a brief sentence is provided.
I have a problem with assigning the origin of Western civilization to
Greece altho' I know this is a commonly accepted idea, and not only among
historians. It is appealing to all those who prize ideational culture above all
else and those who have the elitist view that "high" culture, wars, and politics
are what really matters, these being the "turf' of the ruling class. There is
no doubting the indebtedness of the West to the ancient Greeks, but their
culture was very much Middle Eastern. In terms of religion, diet, clothing,
daily commodities, and much else, the Greeks were close kin to the older
civilizations of Egypt, the Levant, Persia, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia than
to any post-Roman westerners. Nor was their treatment of sex and family
life much like ours at all.
A good argument can be made that The West's earliest beginnings came
after Charlemagne's (Karl der Grosse's) abortive civilizing efforts. There
was an interval of many centuries between the deterioration of the western
portion of the Roman Empire (with all its Greek influences) and the birth
of an embryonic West. Or, if one insists that this hiatus be minimized, then
one must recognize the continuum that occurs from Sumer and Egypt to
Rome, Sumer and Egypt then being the earliest West (and China as the East
as usual, and the Indus valley civilization as a relatively isolated "Near West"
or "Near East" or center.)
The transition from feudalism to capitalism is another topic I find
especially intriguing. I therefore examined chapters 5 to 17 (except for 6
and 9, which were not cogent). These treat a span in western Europe from
the period of the disintegrated Roman rule and the invasions up to, but
exclusive of, the French Revolution. All the material is pertinent to a history
of Europe, but some things seem lacking. One set of conditions seems to
turn into another, but I do not sense causal process. If feudalism gradually
changed because the popUlation grew, agriculture improved, cities and trade
developed, and cash replaced barter, I am left wondering WHY these
developments occurred. And, aside from the conflict between the secular
and the church authorities, why did the character of the State change as it
did, and why did major changes occur in religion? I am left, again, with the
impression that all this"just happened".
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The contents of the chapters were analyzed to test my impression that
this is largely a political history, with the arts and religion given more attention
than the economy. Of the total of 287 pages of text in these 11 chapters,
c.56% dealt with kings and dynastic matters, matters of State, and wars; c.
14% discussed religion, c. I 2X the arts (literature, art, architecture, etc.) and
c. 7% was given over to economic matters, c. 10% devoted to science, daily
life, chapter summaries, etc. As aforementioned, the approach of these
authors is very much a "top-down" rather than a comprehensive approach
to history and civilization, despite their inclusion of some notice of the
position of women and of daily life.
Furthermore, it is very much a history of England and France and their
immediate vicinity. Chapter 6 does deal with the crusades, Byzantium, the
Russians, and the Ottomans, and Scandinavia remains terra incognita
(insufficient military force or literature in the far north, I guess.) This portion
of the text is not merely Eurocentric, it is Anglo-franco-centric. The West
is not Europe, it is merely Europe west of the Rhine, sometimes extended
as far east as the Oder and the Adriatic, with some mention of Russia. There
is no explanation of this restricted geographic base or its subsequent
expansion. It is taken for granted.
All that said, one must remark that this is a handsome volume The
many illustrations are in color and quite well reproduced. The use of color
and choice of typography has provided us with exceptionally legible maps.
Unfortunately, the cartographic editing did not equal the cartographic design.
I found 72 flaws in 23 of the 61 maps. Most of these were simple drafting
or printing errors or misspellings that should not have gotten past a competent
editor. A few were more serious. On p. 781 the Basque Country was clearly
in Catalonia, and on p. 507, the Piedmont was in Provence. The world political
map seems to've been drawn by someone unacquainted with a world political
map, so numerous are its flaws.'
I could not review this text without examining others, and therefore
turned for assistance to my colleague, Dr. Arnold Schrier. As a result, I
examined fairly carefully two other texts, one authored by Anthony Esler,
and one by a team consisting of Peter Stearns, Michael Adas and Stuart
Schwartz. Space and time prevent more than a few remarks concerning these.
Insofar as the allocation of text space to the West can be ascertained,
the comparison of Winks et al. with these two is revealed in the following
tabulation.
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APPROXIMATION ALLOCATION OF CONTENT

Total
Pages

Winks

Esler

Steams et al.

892

724

1034

The West

62.2%

46.3%

38.5%

The West and
its would hegemony

29.0
91.2

6.9
53.2

16.9
55.4

Greece & Rome

9.7
100.0

4.8
58.0

4.3
59.7

The Rest

0.0
100.0

42.0
100.0

40.3
100.0

~t

al.

Esler's volumes provide a world history. The first five chapters provide,
in 82 pages, an introduction to pre-civilized peoples, to Sumcr, Egypt, India,
and China. Chapter Six presents Greece under the rubric "Western
Beginnings." Three chapters then follow on civilizations in Africa and Latin
America, on pre-civilized peoples and on early agriculture and religion. We
do not get to The West until page 136 and then only for one chapter.
Esler's text is in two slim volumes. The first carries us up to 1500: the
second takes us from 1500 to the present. The second volume, not
unexpectedly, is mostly about the West and what I dub "The West and its
global hegemony". The scope of this two-volume text is far wider, but the
number of pages somewhat less than is the case with winks book. The pictures
and maps are all black and white, so that it lacks the visual attractiveness of
the Winks book. However, from my vantage point, it is a text which is much
better suited to our contemporary needs.
Stearns et al. is, like Esler's, truly a world text. It is a much longer text.
Altho' the tabulated data might lead one with views such as mine to prefer
Esler's by a slight margin, I find the Stearns work to be the better of the two.
It does make mention of Greek indebtedness to earlier civilizations. While
Esler considers the Greeks to be the first westerners, Stearns and Company
recognizes the post-Roman West as a new civilization, and even goes so far
as to mention that India and China had, in some matters, greater achievements
than the GrecoRomans. That is, however, not by any means the basis of my
evaluation. Rather, I am favorably impressed with the authors' concern for
causation which, they note, is multiple). They do not favor any particular
theory of causation, but do make the student aware that history is something
more than "just one damn thing after another." This text is conceptually
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richer than either of the other books.
This text is blessed with 101 maps, many of them small, but almost all
of them easily read. Some even have an indication of the terrain, and many
have an indication of scale, features whieh are almost always missing on
maps used in history texts. I have questions of accuracy for only six or seven
of the maps. Altho' the map projections are not named (historians never
seem to think of this), their use is innovative (for history texts !) and
appropriate. Unfortunately, color has not been employed for the maps or the
illustrations.
The world, we've been told so often, has shrunk, and sure enough, there
it is in "World Civilizations: The Global Experience" as the title of Part Four
(covering the years 1450-1750). Like so many glib phrases, it misdirects our
understanding.
The world (Earth) is the same size it always was. What has drawn us
closer together is the recent development of instantaneous communication
via satellites, TV, and the electronic transmittal of funds and information.
In the 1500s, the successful transoceanic sailing by Westerners drastically
increased interactions among distant countries. However, we are not
physically any closer to everyone else. We are emotionally and behaviorally
more intensely interrelated, a condition which began its modern acceleration
in the 1500s. Human geography has been transformed; physical geography
remains rather constant, but we always ignore physical geography as much
as possible, not only in textbooks, but in daily personal life as well. If this
criticism seems quite minor I make it only because I've noticed several of
our common figures of speech and ordinarily used words and phrases serve
unintentionally to mask out of our consciousness the physical geographic
facts of life.
In all three of the books I've commented upon, I find missing a map
depicting the extent of the great Eurasian steppes, altho' the role the nomads
have played in the history of all the Eurasian civilizations is mentioned. The
Mongols, just to cite one case of nomadic intrusion, did not sweep all the
way from north of China to eastern Poland and the Balkans purely on the
basis of their superior military craft. With all of that, they had to have a
geographic condition that could give their military superiority continental
access. No steppe, no Mongol Empire! The is never shown WHERE this
crucial extensive bioregion is. Can one imagine relating the history of
Columbus without a map of the Atlantic Ocean?
These texts are not likely to satisfy civilizationists, nor will they satisfy
societal theorists, geographers or ecologists, even as introductory texts, but
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there does seem to be, clearly, progress in the presentation of world history
to undergraduate college students if these three texts can be taken as in any
way representative of world history textbooks generally. The purview of
these historians has widened. A considerable effort to leave ethnocentricity
behind has been made. This is to be hailed and encouraged.
NOTES
1) Unfortunately our terminology serves us poorly. The non-hum anproduced environment is traditionally and commonly referred to as the
"natural" environment, as if human beings were not also part of nature, and
as if it were not natural for humans to be creative in thought and behavior.
and then there is also the fact that this natural environment is very much
modified by human beings, a state of affairs that had its beginnings in preagricultural times!.
2) Some environmentalists oppose anthropocentric approaches. It
seems to me that each species has as its purpose in life the survival of itself.
We, therefore, act in accordance with this biological universal if we attend
to our survival. The problem with that is that traditionally we have not
realized how intimately our survival is related to the survival of other life
forms and the ecosystems of which we are all a part.
3) I taught college-level introductory cartography for several decades.
Political geography was also one of my teaching fields. I know from
experience that many students tend to regard maps as a part of the text that
they need not pay attention to, and many instructors do not appreciate the
pedagogic effort required to get students to appreciate maps as conveyors
of important information (and even ideas) that can be of analytical value as
well as being mnemonic devices. Nevertheless, in the service ofthat minority
of students and instructors who do actually use the maps, accuracy of the
highest possible level is requisite.
4) Dr. Schrier is professor of history, University of Cincinnati, and past
president of the World History Association. He, of course, bcars absolutely
no responsibility for any of the contents of this review.
5) Anthony Esler, The Human Venture: The Globe Encompassed,
Prentice Hall, 1986 and Peter Stearns, Michael Adas, and Stuart Schwartz,
World Civilizations, The Global Experience, Harper Collins, 1992.
Laurence Grambow Wolf
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REPRESENTATIONS OF
WESTERN WOMEN
Pauline Schmit Pantel, ed. A History of Women: From Ancient
Goddesses to Christian Saints Cambridge, MA: The Belkap Press, Harvard
University Press, 1992 572 pp. Index, plates
This is the first volume in a projected five volume series edited by
Georges Duby and Michelle Perrot on the history of women in the West.
Although this English text is a translation of a 1990 publication in Italian,
the influence of French scholars and of the French Annales school of history
is very clear. The North American edition also carries a brief two-page
introduction from Natalie Zenon Davis and Joan Wallach Scott-two familiar
scholars with approaches similar to those adopted in this volume.
Do not expect to find here a chronological history of women in Ancient
Greece and Rome. Rather than historical narrative, each of the selections is
a thematic treatment of some aspect of women's experiences in
Mediterranean Europe. It is more about "the representations of women" than
about women themselves as Pauline Schmitt Pantel makes clear as an editorial
introduction. Thus, for instance, Nicole Loraux explores the use of the words
"theos" and "theai" in several Hellenic texts such as Hesiod's Theogony.
She searches for clues about the Greek mentality towards gender in
conceptualizations of the divine. She spends considerable time reviewing
the well rehearsed debate as to whether or not a Mediterranean Earth Mother
preceded the eventual pantheon that models the male-oriented social
geneology of Ancient Greece.
All of this is butressed by erudite scholarship on ancient texts and
lexical usages that often prove bewildering to a reader not immersed in the
field of classical studies. But in this fir.st essay, as in the other 10 that follow,
minute examination of such themes constitutes the book. In a telling
observation, Loraux writes: "I am still not sure, however, that the notion of
a 'history of women' is pertinent here, and I do not believe that such a history
is possible in all periods." (pg. 44).
No doubt in an effort to soften this self-imposed judgment, the editor
of the book, Pauline Schmitt Pantel, has taken great pains to link each of the
themes to a history of women by inserting a valuable one page abstract after
each essay. Her comments are as judicious as they are succinct and offer an
introduction to the next article. Without careful attention to these short, but
critical inserts, this long book can easily sink into a prolix and disconnected
collection of somebody's latest research project. That it does not is the result
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of hard work in editing. In this volume, at least, the role of the editor is a
proactive and creative exercise in scholarship.
The book is divided into three parts, unequal in length, that analyze
Greek and Roman societies from their beginnings until the first several
centuries of the Christian era. Part One is entitled "Feminine Models of the
Ancient World." Besides the essay by Loraux, it includes analysis of Greek
philosophy, Roman marriage and inheritance laws, and a review ofthe figures
of women on some selected museum pieces.
This first part does not make a good introduction for the non-specialized
reader. Overburdened with lexical references, Jungian archetypal analysis
and deconstructionist polemics, one can easily lose the forest for the trees.
Overall, one walks away with little more than the useful summaries provided
by the editor. We are offered detailed examples for some rather simple
premises: religion reflects existing social values, Plato and Aristotle thought
like men, men marry women for money and art idealizes the feminine form.
This critique is not to deny that the case for each of these premises is
solidly constructed by eminently capable scholars. In Yan Thomas' essay
(one of three from male contributors), for instance, I learned a great deal
about the Roman institutions of matrona and materfamilias. Clearly, women
in that society used the means at their disposal to maximize their status and
influence in a world that, legally at least, gave preference to men. This is a
far more subtle approach to the vexing questions of a history of women than
a chauvinistic denunciation of all ancient societies as male-dominated
institutions that rendered women absolutely powerless. Moreover, the work
in Thomas' article provided a nearly indispensable background for later
treatments of these same issues.
Part two, "Traditional Rituals Women Share," placed the themes
selected by the authors in a more recognizably historical setting. The five
articles in this part of the book were the most satisfying to me. They provided
a familiar sense of historical narrative while introducing stimulating
conceptualizations such as "space" and "body politics." These notions, and
others like them, enrich a common understanding of historical events and
familiar institutions with a scrutiny that focuses upon male and female social
relationships. It becomes clear that the contribution to history of Womens'
Studies is a critical review of written sources from new perspectives. In ways
that complement the approach of the Annales school, Womens' Studies make
use of resources such as property lists, popular art, religious customs and
the like to contextualize the interpretations offered in chronicles produced
by the historians of the day.
Thus, for instance, I was pleased by the essay of Aline Rousselle, "Body
Politics in Ancient Rome," because it demonstrated that sexual reserve and
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continence for women was a Roman, not a Christian, religious paradigm
(see also Monique Alexandre, pg. 415). Rousselle observes that Roman
women were expected to bear three children, usually before the age of 25,
and thereafter could refrain from all sexual contact with their husbands for
the rest of their lives. Somberly dressed and adorned with a veil, the nonChristian Roman matron a lived in celibacy, with leisure time for arts, learning
and the management of household affairs. Such an image ofthe noble woman
gradually affected men, who sometimes adopted celibacy after providing
themselves with heirs. More importantly, the mores of the aristocratic woman
also extended to concubines, who sought marriage when their upper class
masters finally tired of them.
All of these changes took place against a steady drop in the
demographics of late Roman society. The much maligned Emperor
Diocletian outlawed polygamy, even for religious groups, like Phoenicians
and Jews, who protested that it was part of their own laws and continued to
avoid monogamy by various subterfuges (331 ff.). The same article shows
how reforms in the laws of inheritance by Augustus had some impact on
increasing the free population of the Roman world, in reducing the number
of abortions ami in granting some of the privileges of aristocratic women to
those of a lower class, especially concubines. But, as the author cogently
argues, the changes also lowered the status of all women by emphasizing
their reproductive role as an obligation rather than as a choice.
In her essay, Monique Alexandre criticizes the early feminist attitudes
of Simone de Beauvoir in the 1960s that condemned Christianity as a major
cause in the oppression of women (415ff.). Alexandre compares women in
Judaism, Roman religion and Christianity. She shows that Christianity broke
with the inferiorization of women that was characteristic of Jewish religion
(418-421). Despite the negative judgments of St. Paul (I Corinthians 14:3435 and I Timothy 2: II -14), women had significant ministries in the apostolic
church of the first century, corresponding to their roles in Roman religion.
According to Alexandre, when certain Christian heresies gave prominent
roles to women as priestesses and prophetesses, the institutional church
responded by curtailing women's leadership roles in the Christian
communities. Yet this marginalization was not total, because it created an
escape in anchoritic and monastic life where Christian women achieved
autonomy.
The third part of the book examines some theoretical issues that arise
from consideration of women in the Ancient European world in terms of
continuing study of the history of women. Schmitt Patel suggests three:
sexual asymmetry, social relations between the sexes and gender (466ft'.)
Sexual asymmetry is a study of unequal power relations and is familiar
territory in cultural studies. Social relations between the sexes is a
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sociological concept that is ultimately richer than studies of power because
it discloses the adaptations and relative autonomy women are often able to
achieve despite an oppressive official order.
Gender studies is the most challenging of the approaches to women's
history. It stresses the complementarity of men and women in a social and
cultural construct that keeps them different, but interdependent nonetheless.
Notions such "public and private space", the former belonging to men and
the latter to women, become more problematic with this approach than some
literature would suggest. Study of women in history is, in the final analysis,
only part of the human experience. And just as study of men is not the
complete picture, neither is a study of women a substitute for a comprehensive
view that puts the pieces together.
My overall assessment of this volume is that it sets a model for how
to sketch out new ground in Women's Studies. That is the value of the
volume, but also its weakness. To its credit, the conclusions of the book are
built upon carefully constructed historical pieces that serve as a gold mine
for those in search of representations of women in history. But with this
approach, even five volumes will never bring us to the women themselves,
only their images. I consider this a major drawback for the venture. Hopefully,
future volumes will offer more examples of the lives of real women than in
this book. Here the editor includes a three page analysis of St. Perpetua's
vision before martyrdom and an excerpt from an original document to supply
for this need. I believe that with more of such historical or biographical
excerpts carefully placed in context, readers will acquire not only knowledge
of representations but of the women themselves.
Secondly, the total absence of women from non-European sources is
not absolved by the repeated explanations of the editors that their series
limited to women of the West. This series is likely to set the parameters for
many other studies in the future. By sheer weight of its scholarship and
impressive production in publishing, the series establishes a model that future
studies will have to match. It is not clear to me that the powerful image of
the European women will ever be contextualized since at the onset the
approach of the editors virtually excludes such outside influences. It would
have been better, I think, to have promised to include other traditions within
the series, incorporating other scholars into the project. Instead, the editors
encourage Asian and African women to write their own histories (xviii-xix),
promising encouragement, but not resources.
In summary, I consider this a valuable and important foundation study
in the innovati ve review of womcn in history. The new ground that is broken
here is likely to provide a rich harvest for a long time to come.

Ana Maria Diaz-Stevens
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COMPARATIVE STUDIES
OF COLLAPSE
Nonnan Yoffee and George L. Cowgill, eds. The Collapse of Ancient
States and Civilizations. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988.
Just from the title, one would think this book to be as relevant to the
concerns of this Society as a book might possibly be. It is a collection of
papers from a 1982 seminar, six of them case studies of particular states or
civilizations, the other five addressing the subjects of collapse and of agents
that might cause it. In practice the book is not quite so useful as one might
hope, from onc another. The recorded interplay between presenters such as
occurs in our hook The Boundaries of Civilizations in Space and Time is
absent from this volume, except insofar as later revisions by individual
authors note the other papers. Nevertheless the book remains a good study
of the nearly current thought on the subject, particularly for the specific areas
under discussion.
The introductory chapter could have been designed to provoke
civilizationists' thoughts on the subject both of decline and of collapse:
Since it is apparent that the political systems of ancient
civili,"ations did collapse and that these collapses did not follow a
common trajectory or proceed to the same level of breakdown. we
need not only to explain these instances of social change, but also to
develop a methodology for their comparative examination. In this
introductory chapter, I present a digest of studies that have considered
the problem of collapse.

These begin with Spengler, whom he considers less a scientist than an
artist in metaphors - "the whole speculative superstructure rests on the
flimsiest of empirical foundations" and so discusses very briefly. Toynbee
is dismissed almost as curtly, though I would disagree with part of the
objection: "Although Toynbee seems'to have thought that the breakdown of
civilizations is not irreversible, [for him] ancient civilizations were caught
in a historical web of inevitable - emphasis] . This inevitability is quite true,
as stage in the metastasis of the collapse (presumably sometime before the
onset of what Toynbee calls "universal states", though he is admittedly
unclear about when probability becomes inevitability). But this does not
mean that all breakdowns ace permanent - Toynbee discusses several
successful "responses" in ancient times before "challenges" occurred that
were not successfully met - or that modern civilizations are immune to such
inevitability; the nomination of universal states in such empires as Muscovite
Russia and Tokugawa Japan places them on just the same footing as the
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ancient collapses. Other theorists addressed include Roy Rappaport, Elam
Service, Robert Dunnell, Kent Flannery, Colin Renfrew, Karl Butzer, and
Herbert Simon, most of them with particular applications of system theory.
These evoke a general objection.
One general problem with each of these system analyses is that
they tend to encourage US to assume that sociocultural entitl<Cs arc
normally highly intei!rated - highly systeillic - with well-developed
mechanisms for self regulation. Terms such as promotion,
linearization, and near-decomposahility are prohahly not "wnlng" and may well serve as starters for organizing hard thinking about ideas
and data. Nevertheless, the vague language and terillinology of systems
theory, and used by archaeologists and other social scientists. tends
[sic] to invite increasingly elaborate abstractions tat often illlpede our
ahility to break down complex data and may prevent the examination
of social institutions that are normally not well integrated.

His own suggestion is decidedly less abstract:
Collapse. in general, ensues when the center is no longer ahle
to secure resources from the periphery, usually having lost the
"legitimacy" through which it could "disembed" goods and services
of traditionally organized groups. The process of collapse entails the
dissolution of those centralized institutions that had facilitated the
transmission of resources and information, the settlement of intragroup
disputes, and the legitimate expression of differentiated organizational
components.

This formulation employs the basic idea that states and civilizations
are characterized by centralization, which I have elsewhere suggested to be
untenable on grounds of such milieus as the European Early Middle Ages
["The State. Organized Progressor Decay Product'?" Comparative
Civilizations Review 21 (Fall 1989): 20-46]. Such "Middle Ages" are
universally admitted to be periods of developing civilization and yet show
only the most centralization. But Yoffee's proposal would continue to apply
to the collapses of centralization, particularl y among those uni versal empires
(such as Rome and Han China) which are so often used as examples of early
states.
Next come the more specialized studies, which reasonably reflect
scholarly opinion as recently as the mid-1980s. Robert Adam~ and Norman
Yoffee present studies of Mesopotamian civilization. Adams emphasizes the
role of cities, first as city-states during the Sumerian-Akkadian period, then
as centers of Babylonian culture, such that collapse" means of the urban
centers. This is not quite as universal a phenomenon as he claims; Assyria,
quite as much part of Mesopotamia as its southern neighhor, was much more
Assyrian kings could shift their capitals from one site to another with no
regard for hallowed traditional claims. This attitude would have been
unthinkahle in the polity centered around Bahylon. In support of this urban
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focus, Adams notes a change toward an increasingly pessimistic appreciation
of life in the second millennium Be. The other analysis, by Yoffee, shares
with many others an unacknowledged debt to the Chinese mechanic of the
dyna~tic cycle; for example, the Old Babylonian kingdom of Hammurabi
and overstrained its resources and, instead of cutting back, continued to
retain the old order as long as possible. The Assyrian Empire, on the other
hand, fell beyond recovery because most of its fighting population was killed
off in wars and replaced by non-Assyrians who had no interest in resurrecting
the old system under their own control. A comparison with the same situation
in Roman Italy would be interesting. The study does leave one important
question hanging: "When the militaristic Assyrian and Babylonian 'national'
states, themselves creative responses to changing circumstances in Western
Asia, were vanquished in the seventh and sixth centuries B.e., no longer
was any characteristic Mesopotamian political reformulation possible. Why
not? The Sumerian civilization was based on the idea of individual gods
ruling individual city-states, and this was successfully reformulated after the
Amorite (barbarian) conquests of the early second millennium BC such that
these god-city partnerships became focussed on a ruling city (Babylon) or
a ruling people (the Assyrians). Why could no such reformulation have
occurred during the many periods of weakness soon to follow among the
conquerors of the first millennium BC? The implication is that these
conquests destroyed all the carriers of the old culture, and this seems
unparalleled. Egypt for example was conquered repeatedly beginning ca.500
BC, and its culture clearly lasted for another thousand years in some form;
medieval Russia was subjugated by the Mongols into just as tolerant a regime
as was created by the Persians, and restored itself quite effectively centuries
later; Jewish culture has survived for millennia under foreign rule. One must
suspect there is something more involved here.
The next two studies are of Mesoamerica, Patrick Culbert's on the
Maya, Rene Millon's on Teotihuacan. Culbert's study seems to this reviewer
the best in the hook; it is full of detail and covers both the changes of opinion
in the field over the last few decades and the various possible interpretations
of the presently accepted data. Millon's is rather more unilinear, presenting
ion of the possible nature of this ancient Mexican metropolis, but does not
pretend to be anything like final: In three consecutive lines one finds the
verbs "thought to have been," "appear to have been" and "may have come".
The agency of collapse proposed for Teotihuacan seems to this reviewer
perhaps the oddest ever postulated. While Millon would probably not agree
with the interpretation, he seems to propose that the city was the physical
realization of a social contract, and when the contractors became dissatisfied
because of internal problems with the arrangement, they broke the physical
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symbol (the city) and threw it away (abandoned it, for the most part). This
seems a bit disturbing; societies are not supposed to be deliherately broken
ant thrown away by their participants, at least not without a familiar
replacement ready to hand, and no replacement is postulated for Teotihuacan.
Still, there are instances on record of imperial ruling classes succumbing to
barbarian faddism, as in late Rome and Later Han. Perhaps if Rome had
been conquered by such oppressed lower-class people as formed the roving
peasant bandit gangs called the Bacaudae, some phenomenon comparable
to deliberate destruction and abandonment of an establish capi tal would have
occurred.
G.W. Bowersock next addresses "The Dissolution of the Roman
Empire," expounding a recently popular hypothesis that Rome never did
really fall, it merely mutated into something else something that involved
the break-up of the empire, a severe reduction ofurhan population, reversion
to manorialism, severe reduction or loss of a money economy, and other
things that must properly be considered only adaptations to new
conditions. This ion implies that post-Roman Europe, commonly called
"barbarian Europe," should be held equally civilized as Rome itself, or at
least that a "fall" is no more than an ad which should not be held to affect
people's level of civilization. Why this should be so is not addressed. Such
interpretation must further imply that the collapses of such un iversal empires
do not entail the ends of their civilizations. At least in the case of Rome, the
transition to one or more different civilizations (medieval: Western,
Byzantine ... ) would seem fairly well accepted. Thus the article seems to
present a case whose acceptance would create drastic implications, and these
implications are made as prior assumptions rather than heing discussed or
addressed. But within that caveat, this is a good anexpusition of the "not fall
but change" hypothesis as any.
Next is Cho-yun Hsu's "The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism
in the Fall of the Han Dynasty". Here the final suggestion is quite remarkable.
The general deterioration of Han effective rule, however, had
started at the time of purges against the literati (A.D.166- 176). In
A.D. 178 Tung Cho took advantage of the anarchy created by factional
conflicts between the pro-literati bureaucrats and the anti-·literati
courtiers and eunuchs which was an extension of the cleavage between
these groups. me Yellow Turban revolt was one of the symptoms of
the loss of effective governance by the Han order.l! was hardly a cause
of the fall.... In Han China by the beginning of the third century A.D.,
the Confucian elite had lost interest in participation in the national
bureaucracy, and thus China remained disunited.

The other cause of decline is also associated with the literati, to the
effect that the system of promotion among the scholar-bureaucrats made
for the appearance of regional factions. This analysis would seem to
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overstress the importance of the scholarly elite, particularly in such an early
period as the Han. The Confucian literati have been, particularly in their
own eyes, a central group in the development of traditional China, especially
since Ming times, but I have nowhere else seen the collapse of Han attributed
to a failure in literati support. It also seems questionable in light of the
circumstances in which the literati lived. Hsu notes that elite status and the
income of the literati. It is well known, as Hsu asserts, that particularly in
Later Han the government officials were using their positions and their
incomes to create landed estates, which became the focus of the post-Han
manorialism. Hsu's implication seems to be that when the purges the literati
simply abandoned their connections in the capital and became full-time local
lords, which position proved ended and new military governments were
created, the former literati refused to come back again. And this lack of
experienced personnel was enough to break Han apart and see that it was
not re-assembled. When Hsu proposes that the literati refused to return to
office, the implication is that they were called upon to do so. And indeed
one must suspect that the new military rulers needed capable administrative
personnel at least as much as had any previous government, and they
particularly needed capable personnel who as civilians could be trusted not
to revolt as soon as they were out of sight of the capital. If the literati were
in fact so useful, they would have been importuned and/or blackmailed into
government service at top speed support us with your services or your family
loses those estates. No such efforts at coercion are noted. This implies either
that the literati simply were not useful in that way any longer, that their
governmental training had lapsed and their ability to legitimize had lapsed
with it, or, possibly, that the literati had become immune to such attempts
at coercion, i.e. that they could fight back, and with enough force that the
central government would be more endangered than strengthened by the
effort. There are in fact reports that during Later Han these new local lords
were marshalling their dependents into private armies, a most un-Confucian
practice but one well known in similar situations elsewhere (the later Roman
Empire, for example). Thus it would seem that when the former literati class
moved their base of support from the central government -0 rural private
estates, they were subsumed into local lords who paid careful attention to
their own military backing, a situation in which Confucian standards of
behavior would have been much more a hindrance than an aid to success.
This would further imply that Confucian standards and legitimacy had been
collapsing as the Later Han dynasty aged. Thus it is at least a tenable
hypothesis that Later Han did not dissolve because of a failure of support
by Confucian legitimists. Rather, under this hypothesis, there were no, or
very few, legitimist Confucians left by the end of Later Han. Standards of
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elite status had changed. The problem would then become the reasons for
this change, and beyond the question of land accumulation, Hsu does not
address any questions of changes in the relationship between Confucianism
and the supposed Confucians in Later Han.
The book next has two article Bennet Bronson discusses "The Role of
Barbarians in the Fall of States, in so concise and lucid a fashion that a few
excerpts from the article will serve to illuminate its contents:
Observers agree that falling states have problems with restive
local magnates and corrupt bureaucrats. But is this not usually true of
states on the rise? Consider the evidence of Pepys' diary on the state
of of ficialdom in late seventeenth-century England - are many
kingdoms in the last stages of decay more corruptly and inefficiently
governed than England on the way to becoming a world power? ...
[H]ow about China in the Southern Sung period,just before the Mongol
conquest, or Byzantium in the dark days of the early fifteenth century?
Were their governments then more incompetent or venal than in earlier
and happier years? ... lam not arguing that bad government is irrelevant
but that it is (1) difficult to measure and (2), whenever we look at
strictly contemporary documents rather than the moralizing works of
later commentators, not at all clearly associated with declines and
falls ...
[On the borders of the Roman Empire] through social
mechanisms that are not quite clear (charismatic religious propaganda
and cultist elite units played a part), a number of the Frontier tribes
routinely fielded raiding parties that were equal in size to a Roman
legion. When, as occasionally happened, several tribes formed an
alliance, their combined forces were not inferior to the full armies of
most known premodern states. This is is an exceptional case, to he
sure. Yet it serves to give emphasis to the general point toward which
the present arguments have been building: that barbarian military
capabilities may in some circumstances be so formidable as to explain
the fall of states without reference to those states' internal conditions.
m e conventional wisdom is erroneous: the theoretical advantage of
central over noncentralized polities is neither invariable nor
insuperable. Given the right barbarians in sufficient numbers, it is
plausible that even the best- organized and least-senescent of states
could be overthrown ..
In direct evidence, however, suggests that barbarians with
decisive power over the survival of states are not all that rare. III e
ability of the Mongols and Arabs to overthrow states almost at will is
matched.d by a number of less well documented barbarian successes.
[He looks next at a case in the Philippines, involving not a fall
but a failure ever to form in the first place.] The point here is not that
the Luzon barbarians destroyed any states but that they appear to have
been powerful enough to prevent their rise, in one of the best locations
for a state in all of Asia. The case is similar to that of the Deli Plain:
despite their apparent locational and ecological advantages, both arcas
suffered the disadvantages of a narrow indefensible shape and a very
extensive and easily defended barbarian hinterland ....
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The hostile outsiders who are almost certainly present during
any political dissolution could in the case of an internally caused decline
be no more than spectators or minor participants. On the other hand,
they could be the main cause of symptoms of decline. Altogether there
arc four possible causal roles that outsiders can play [vultures: pure
scavengers - jackals: scavengers that kill the weak - wolves: hunters
that harry the weak into victims - and tigers. Like the Mongols ....
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Is the seizure of power by barbarians any more fatal to a state
than a rebellion or coup d'etat? I believe that it often is .... [A]s
shown by Theodoric's Ostrogoths and the various, other invaders of
Rome, a lack of administrative talent and/or will is to be expected in
even the most ardently admiring of barbarian conquerors. This is by
itself is enough to explain the close empirical association betwlOen
conquests by barbarians and the falls of states.

Next Herbert Kaufman presents a theoretical study of collapse as a
feedback reaction, in which a government exploiting to the full the revenues
of good times finds itself in hard times to adapt its expenditures accordingly.
The various measures taken to extract the same revenue from a smaller base
weaken the economic system progressively until it collapses. But the study
is much too speculative, with no evidence presented; for example, he
discusses possible restorations of the previous good times as follows:
In some instances, the extraordinary leaders [whose efforts
restructured the situation] proved to be the founders or rejuvenators
of dynasties that lasted for generations. Chances are that reversing: the
downward trend in the system started an upward spiral from which
their successors benefited. At any rate, the positive effects continued
past their lifetimes.

The proposal has a long history - one may suppose the Chi nese dynastic
cycle to be much the same idea - but is not presented with enough detail in
this instance to be more than suggestive.
Shmuel Eisenstaat's Beyond Collapse" is less a paper than a preface,
a prolonged emphasis that states and civilizations are complex assemblies
of subsystems and must be understood in terms of developments and
interactions of these subsystems. It conc1 udes with a statement akin to Gordon
Hewes's recent paper on "Anticivilization" that
there exists within any society the possibility that "antisystems"
may develop .... Although potentialities of conflict and change are
inherent in all human societies, the directions of change, including
collapse, differ greatly according to the specific constellation of
institutional forces outlined above. That is, different coalitions of elites,
the social divisions of labor, and the specific international and
ecological settings of societies allow us to see some regularitilOs in
social change. "Collapse," thus, is likely to be one possible kind of
change, particularly plausible in those societies in which the
differentiation among social groups is relatively small and the major
elites are embedded in ascriptive groups. In contrast, in ancient states
and civilizations the degree of differentiation is relatively large and
the major elites do not owe their status exclusively to their position
within any single ascriptive group ...
Of special interest in this regard is the distinction between the
older "ancient civilizations" (e.g. Mesopotamia, Maya, Teotihuacan,
as represented in this volume) and those called by Karl Jaspers "Axial
Aged civilizations ( ... the Roman and Han examples in this volume).
In the former, pre-Axial civilizations, there was a relatively weak
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distinction between the boundaries of the major institutional
collectivities (that is, the carriers ofreligious and political institutions
werc not separate and autonomous), and sectarian and heterodox
visions did not develop as active agents of change. Consequently,
there was more of a tendency in those ancient states to disintegrate (at
leasl partially, especially in the political system) and to lack the ability
to rdormulate those centralized political institutions. In the great
civilizations of the Axial Age, however, collapse carries within it the
seeds of likely reconstructions.

This contrast between the ci vilizations ca.2000 BC and those ca. BCIAD
may be a bit overdrawn; we do not know the origins of what Toynbee called
the "Osirian Church" in early Egypt, and the SumerianlAkkadian period was
followed in Assyria by a mild emphasis - hardly a universalist theological
reconstruction, but something - on the world-position of the moon-god Sin.
But the civilizational reconstruction the end of the Axial Age were at least
much more sllccessful than earlier models.
The fin,t! essay, "Onward and Upward with Collapse" by George
Cowgill, has three subjects. The first is a heartfeItcry for precision in labeling,
a detailed complaint that social scientists and particularly those of us who
compare civilizations have the very bad habit of borrowing both
philosophical and technical terms from more solidly organized fields as if
those terms were incantations, capable of providing certainty and legitimacy
merely by being there. The second point is a closing look at the fragmentation
of empires, with particular attention to financial stresses such as were
discussed in outline by Kaufman. The third topic involve; closing thoughts
on the specific cases addressed in the earlier papers (the Maya, Rome, etc.).
Finally comes a coda which is worth quoting in full:
I shall mention only a few of the topics for further research
suggested by the chapters in this volume. Why did some empires last
50 lI1uch longer than others? How closely is their duration conne.;ted
to degrees and kinds of integration, economic and social as well as
polilical? How do empires solve (or not solve) the problem of adequate
income when £fast wealth through easy conquest of rich neighbors is
no longer possible? How do erT\jJires respond to crises? Why are some
timcs of trouble fatal, whereas others are not? What orderly relations,
if any, hold between fiscal troubles and developmental cycles of
empires? Are there trends over time in the incidence of scoundrels or
incompetents in governments? Is the incidence of either fiscal troubles
or misbehavior really just as high early as late? If so, are there structural
reasons why the effects of such sources of trouble are sometimes less
serious, or is it simply that part of the time an empire is SO successful
thai it can tolerate a startling amount of systemic malfunctioning?
Struggles between heads and important subordinates over
accountability and autonomy seem universal, but can we identify
important variables? Were certain strategies in these struggles given
much greater emphasis in some instances than in others? If so, are the
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differences explainable by differences in environments, technologies,
and relations of production, or were differences in ideas about rules,
techniques, and purposes of political activity also important?
Finally, what of the role of ideology in imperial expansion?
Conrad and Demarest (1984) argue that ideologies gave the Incas and
Aztecs decisive edges over their competitors. Ideology was also
important in the explosive Islamic conquests of the seventh century.
Other peoples, however, such as the Romans, were very succc"ful
empire builders on a much lower ideological plane, motivated less by
a sense of mission than by quite pragmatic appetites for power and
wealth. Was strong dependence on ideology one reason why some
empires were short lived, since there may he little else to hold things
together if ideological fervor wanes')
Underlying all these questions is the insistence that, if ideas.
are not merely epiphenomenal, we need greatly improved concepts,
especially hypotheses that have withstood testing against subsL,ntial
bodies of evidence, about causal connections between ideas and
material phenomena.

It is obvious that this book goes very much to the heart of ,;omparativist
studies, and for that reason alone should be on a library shel I' in every school
at which a comparativist resides. Those of us who write papers drawing
heavily on comparati vist principles should also consider acquiring a personal
copy,

John K Hord
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FROM THE EDITORS
The Comparative Civilizations Review will seek to publish analytic studies and
interpretive essays primarily concerned with (I) the comparison of whole
civilizations, (2) the development of theories and methods especially useful in
comparative civilizational studies, or (3) significant issues in the humanities or
social science studied from a comparative civilizational perspective.
By 'a comparative civilizational perspective' we mean (I) the use of evidence from
more than one civilization (the various national traditions of the modern West being
regarded, in this respect, as constituents of a single civilization) and (2) a method
likely to throw new light eitheron the processes and structures of civilizations or on
the problems of interpreting civilizations in diverse natural and analytic languages.
A less essential consideration, but highly desirable in civilizational studies, is (3)
some degree of incorporation of the perspectives, questions, and methods of both
the humanities and the social sciences.
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